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Abstract 
This thesis investigates through situational and empirical analysis the beneficial and 
detrimental characteristics of the informal economy in Lebanon and its impact on the public 
and state interest through its socio-economic associations. The informal economy is a 
polymorphous entity, and in order to determine its versatile contribution, has been separated 
into four different variables or key drivers. The four key drivers constitute the determinant 
variables of the informal economy.  
The main method used to explore the four determinant variables is the Force Field 
analysis. The first key driver is informal remittances as they represent a significant fraction of 
the informal economic activity in Lebanon and make a major contribution to Gross Domestic 
Product. The second driver is corruption, as this involves massive economic transactions on a 
daily basis, with an enormous impact at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. 
The third key driver is the informal employment and commerce sector, as the unpaid VAT 
and corporate and income tax evasion results in a huge annual loss of government revenue in 
Lebanon. The fourth and last key driver is the illegal networks, as Lebanon represents an 
international hub for smuggling, drug and people trafficking and money-laundering, with 
strong links with, and implication for, its sectarian constituents. The current situation in 
Lebanon fuels the creation of a chaotic socio-economic environment where it is impossible to 
estimate accurately the significance of the informal economy, or indeed the size of the overall 
economy. 
As far as possible in this research all the key drivers have been independently and 
collectively evaluated through the data collected from the primary sources (users/public 
opinion, government officials and academics) and secondary material in order to assess each 
key driver‘s input to the informal economy. Subsequently the thesis provides an estimation of 
the beneficial and detrimental contribution of the informal economy in Lebanon, as well as 
the overall perceptions of each of the respondent groups. Lastly, the primary and secondary 
materials are collectively assessed from a single perspective to build, using an inductive 
approach, a theoretical model of the factors which fuel and perpetuate the informal economy 
in the country. The present thesis may constitute the foundation for future analysis of the 
informal economy in Lebanon by providing unconventional recommendations. It is an 
attempt to present the possibility of an alternative approach to the informal economy, by 
stressing its merits and advantages, while also recognising the dangers and challenges it poses 
for both the state and the society.  
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
Introduction 
This thesis investigates through situational and empirical analysis, the beneficial or 
detrimental characteristics of the informal economy in Lebanon and its impact on the public 
and state interest through its socio-economic associations. The informal economy is a 
polymorphous entity and in order to determine its versatile contribution, I have divided it into 
four (or more) key drivers, as proposed by the Force Field analysis (which is explained in full 
in chapter seven. The four key drivers constitute the determinant variables of the informal 
economy. The first key driver is the informal remittances as they may represent a significant 
fraction of the informal economic activity on Lebanon and a significant percentage of the 
Gross Domestic Product. The second driver is corruption as it represents massive informal 
economic activity on a daily basis, with significant impact on the micro-economic and macro-
economic level. The third key driver is the informal employment and the commerce sector, as 
the unclaimed VAT, the tax evasion constitutes the basis of the annual revenue losses in 
Lebanon. The fourth and last key driver is the illegal networks, as Lebanon represents an 
international hub of smuggling, trafficking and money-laundering with strong association and 
implication of its sectarian constituents. 
 All the key drivers will be individually and collectively assessed through the data 
collected from the primary and secondary material in order to present the overall evaluation 
of the beneficial or detrimental contribution of the informal economy in Lebanon. Also with 
the association of primary and secondary material a theoretical assessment will be displayed 
regarding the factors which fuel and perpetuate the informal economy in the country. 
 
Background and statement of the problem 
The question of informal economy throughout the world resembles the Hydra from the Greek 
mythology, where when one of the heads is cut off another one emerges. In other words, 
whenever you attempt to deal with one of the effects of informal economy another aspect of it 
somewhere else emerges, probably stronger than before. 
 The web of informal economy is a theatre of deception, illusion and survival. 
Deception, as it involves a great deal of ‗behind the scenes‘ speculation. All things 
considered, in most cases it entails illegal actions or practices not acceptable in most of the 
licit and formal economic functions. Illusion as due to its apparent informality, it operates 
10 
 
behind a vague curtain, not allowing monitoring of the transactions and dealings with 
accuracy. As a result, the countries that heavily rely on the informal economy have proved 
rather difficult in presenting a holistic and precise estimation on with regard to their 
economic performances and indicators; usually, the estimations are far from the truth, giving 
us completely inaccurate impressions. Last but not least is survival. Apart from the 
aforementioned, it is part and parcel with the struggle of the working class to sustain a decent 
livelihood. In many countries, the informal economy is entrenched in the mindset of the 
population as the only way or at least the main way of conducting business. 
 In a less philosophical way a similar triptych regarding informality has been identified 
by Portes, who also mentions survival. Even though Portes is mainly referring to informal 
labor, those distinctions are valuable for an overall understanding. Survival for Portes is the 
direct production or sale of goods and services, but it is something more than that. It is the 
process of the underprivileged people to maintain their living standards to the lowest 
tolerable level of endurance. Also according to Portes the second parameter is exploitation, 
which is the increasing managerial flexibility and the decreasing labor costs through informal 
hiring and subcontracting. The last parameter is growth through capital accumulation by 
small firms using connections and social acquaintances.
1
 This triptych is the quintessence of 
informal economy throughout the world. In the two shores of the Mediterranean region 
however, you can easily descry that those practices are well maintained. Even in the north 
shores of the Mediterranean, where someone would have expected that as part of the 
European Union, and being well-established in a globalised open-market economy, the 
inclination of those countries towards the informal economy would be less extensive. The 
countries of the European Union enlargements of 1981 (Greece) and 1986 (Spain, Portugal 
and Italy) notably have the highest rates of informal economy activity in the European Union 
prior to the enlargements 2007.
2
 These four Mediterranean states only lost their lead on the 
informal economy levels when there was the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the 
European Union. Needless to say, those four countries, still maintain an inconveniently high 
position in the charts. 
The situation in the southern shores of the Mediterranean is very similar in terms of 
the intensity of the informal economy penetration. The Mashreq and the Maghreb countries 
                                                          
1
 Martin Baldwin-Edwards – Joaquin Arango (eds) “Immigrants and the informal economy in Southern 
Europe” Frank Cass,  London/Portland: 1999, p.5 
2
 www.nationmaster.com 
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are sharing and –not surprisingly- surpassing their northern neighbors in the degree of 
―informality‖ as the informal economy is playing a drastic role in their GDPs.3  Besides, from 
an anthropological perspective the peoples of the Mediterranean basin may have a cognitive 
characteristic – whether they are Christian or Muslim- that enables them to conduct business 
in a more unconventional manner than other cultures (particularly the traditional ‗west‘).4 
Probably this view is associated in the popular images with the idea of a stereotypical 
Mediterranean society;
5
 however it is undeniable that the informal economy is a very 
important element in both shores of the Mediterranean. 
 As Toufic Gaspard supports, ―for over 40 years Lebanon has been the only laissez-
faire economy in the developing world. As such, it provides a singular case study of the 
effectiveness of the market strategy for development that is advocated by mainstream 
economics.‖6 In addition, of all the markets in the Mediterranean, Lebanon is one of the 
highest ranking countries in terms of informal economy dependency.
7
 The aforementioned 
coupled with its historical economic presence in the Mediterranean rendered Lebanon a prime 
sample for exploring the paradoxes involved with the successes and failures of the informal 
economy over time (i.e. from medieval  bartering systems through to current international 
radical and illegal networks).  In that perspective Lebanon is unique. It is one of the most 
important crossroads that brought Islamic economy and western economy into a mutual 
synergy, despite the decades of unrest.
8
 
Someone may suggest that Lebanon is the ultimate nexus of the two shores of the 
Mediterranean. It is a unique mosaic of religious, economic and social divergence. Lebanon 
has a long history of commercial activity and it has enjoyed higher standards of living in 
comparison to other Middle Eastern countries, serving as a centre of commerce and finance.
9
 
                                                          
3
 Friedrich Schneider ―Size and Measurement of the informal economy in 110 countries around the world‖ 
World Bank, July 2002, p.8-9 
4
 For more details look in W.V. Harris ―Rethinking the Mediterranean‖ Oxford University Press: 2004 
pp.xii,55,272 
5
 Ibid, p.55 See also Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell ―The corrupting sea: a study of Mediterranean 
history‖ Blackwell, Oxford: 2000 p.300 
6
 Toufic K. Gaspard “A Political Economy of Lebanon, 1948-2002: The limits of Laissez-faire”  Brill, Boston: 
2004, p. xix 
7
 Friedrich Schneider ―Size and Measurement of the informal economy in 110 countries around the world‖ 
World Bank, July 2002, p.8-9 also look at www.bi-me.com the article ―Remittances are major asset for some 
Arab countries‖ 
8
 Contrary to Max Weber‘s beliefs that Islam and capitalism are mutually exclusive entities Lebanon, -highly 
likely due to its multicultural synthesis- allows to Islam to coincide with a modern capitalist system. See more 
details in Bryan S. Turner ―Max Weber: From History to Modernity‖  Routledge, London: 1992, p.282 
9
 Andersen, Roy – Seibert, Robert - Wagner, Jon ―Politics and Change in the Middle East‖ Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, 1993, p.360 
12 
 
The literature stresses that Lebanon has a laissez-faire economic orientation, meaning more 
market rather than state led, however the reality is a bit more complex. As Milton-Edwards 
mentions, the lack of natural resources and the large amount of immigrant population 
contributed to the development of economic practices based on the services sector. 
Unfortunately the economy collapsed due to the perennial problem of corruption and due to 
the devastating civil war,
10
 undermining the ideal cross-section of the oriental and the 
occidental symbiosis. 
The informal economy in Lebanon represents a way of life. It is a live entity which 
supports and caters to the majority of the social strata, from the peasants to the bourgeoisie 
elites and the nouveau riche class. The same people that despise it are the same people that 
utilize it. There is a social inertia towards this trend as it serves the micro-interests of 
everyday life and the accumulation of wealth of several political and/or criminal elites.  In the 
long run, however it damages the state, depriving from it funds and sustainable development, 
disrupting the economy and perpetuating a situation that possibly benefits a few. It is 
probably the lack of financial maturity and the lack of sense of punishment due to the weak 
state structures. It is an irregularity that turned into a norm, the informality that became 
formality, the malpractice that obtained legitimization. 
 However, the taking of extreme measures –such as the sanctions after September 11- 
to balance out some of the parameters of the informal economy has proven disastrous even 
for the West.
11
 The informal economy is too important for Lebanon to simply abolish, but on 
the other hand it is a descending path. At the end of the day informality is part of the 
cognitive financial behaviour in Middle East, but this is simply not enough to legitimise it. 
The triptych of Portes, as mentioned earlier can be absolutely applied to the case of Lebanon, 
nevertheless, this country has all the potential- based on its history- to act like a modern hub 
between East and West and re-introduce itself into a phase of modernity and successful 
economic performance. Many may invoke the political imbalance of the country and war for 
the poor economic performance, and up to a certain degree this is true. However, positive 
economic output does not require necessarily robust regimes but collective yearning for 
improvement. The sad truth is that Lebanon may have signs of reflex from its oblivion but it 
                                                          
10
 Milton-Edwards, Beverley ―Contemporary Politics in the Middle East‖ Polity, Cambridge , 2001, p74 
11
 As a precautionary measure, Islamic banks have withdrawn their money from American and European banks. 
These withdrawals have reached approximately $1 billion. Raphaeli, Nimrod  ―The Marginalization of OPEC's 
Pricing Power‖ November 18, 2001 Middle East Economic News Report - No. 12, Available also at 
http://memri.org/ 
13 
 
is extremely hard to discard these peculiarities. They are in all probability part of Lebanon‘s 
identity. 
 As it can be seen from the above analysis, the role of the informal economy is not 
adequately understood in the context of Lebanon. Its scope, operation and beneficial or 
detrimental values are yet to be determined. The perceptions of the society, the government 
and of the academia are in a constant flux regarding the nature and input of the informal 
economy in Lebanon. All these aspects generate a problem, because the government and the 
society are unable to regulate or stop abusing the informal economy. This situation fuels the 
creation of a chaotic socio-economic environment where it is impossible to resolve the 
significance of the informal economy in Lebanon. 
 
Aims and Objectives of the Study 
The primary objective of this thesis is to establish the balance of the informal economy into 
the Lebanese state and society through a situational and empirical research. Which displays 
the beneficial and detrimental aspects of the informal economy for the Lebanese state and 
population and at the same time is attempting to establish the conceptual parameters of what 
is informal and not. In other words, the thesis is attempting to establish what is informal and 
the way it is fuelled and if the informal economy in Lebanon functions as an accelerator or a 
decelerator for growth, development, social stability and economic sustainability with the use 
of the situational and empirical data gathered over a period of two years, through a diverse 
sample in terms of location, education, employment and income. 
The secondary objectives will ultimately shed light on the willingness and symmetry 
of the Lebanese society and the state apparatus to abandon or maintain the informal economy. 
However, can Lebanon really abandon informal economy? Or is it an integral part of the 
country‘s identity and modus vivendi? Or perhaps it is just a catalyst for the adversities of the 
country? How important are the beneficial characteristics of the informal economy and how 
much are they disadvantageous? 
The secondary objectives of the research will attempt to explore the overall 
perceptions of the three groups of the respondents and examine the theoretical and historical 
background of the informal economy in Lebanon. Also, the secondary objectives will shed 
light on the settings of the operation of the informal economy and provide a sound 
understanding of its components. Additionally, the secondary objectives include the 
assessment of the contribution of the informal economy in Lebanon with some emphasis 
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placed on the macroeconomic level, and project the determination of the interconnections of 
the components of the informal economy with the state and the society. Lastly the 
determination of the theoretical framework on which the informal economy expands and 
fuels its operation will be analysed via the loose implementation of the grounded theory and 
the association of analytical methods of the thesis. 
The literature review coupled with the interviews section clarified and projected the 
conceptual interpretations or misinterpretations of the key drivers. The thesis' purpose is to 
determine if the informal economy in Lebanon functions as an accelerator or a decelerator for 
growth, development, social stability and economic sustainability. The use of the situational 
and empirical data, directed the present thesis into the formulation of certain results. 
Potentially the result did not provide a one-sided outcome or an answer with a single 
perspective. Besides, the implicated parties cannot be represented via a monocular outcome. 
The informal economy is not a black or white notion, nor a simply good or bad element. The 
primary objective of this thesis has been fulfilled as it revolves around a comprehensive 
conception of the informal economy, responding to each parameter of the Lebanese state and 
society. The secondary objectives have also been achieved to a satisfactory extent. Indeed, all 
the respondent groups provided a diverse and sometimes conflicting view regarding the key 
drivers and the entire informal economy, as shown in the cross tabulation of the responses in 
Chapter 9.  
The overall results, as explained in chapter 9 and briefly described in chapter 10, of 
the thesis could be summarized in the following paragraph:  
The informal economy in Lebanon is a catalytic and complimentary mechanism for 
most of the adversities that stem from the complex socio-political situation. The theoretically 
injurious nature of the informal economy represents an indispensable tool for the effective 
juxtaposition of the social and economic insolvency of Lebanon. The informal economy 
contributes to the endurance of the Lebanese society in the face of adversity, however it 
undercuts every beneficial input, as the synchronised burden that imposes on the society and 
economy is unbearable. 
The beneficial characteristics are vastly important and imperative as they support the 
survival of significantly large parts of the society. However the detrimental characteristics 
may undermine the entire state structure and render the whole nation unsheltered and 
desolate. Lastly the formulation of a theoretical framework formulated by the primary and 
secondary data regarding the factors which enable the informal economy in Lebanon resulted 
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in the drafting of 3 key factors: 1) The systemic factors which pertain to the organised 
establishments of the state, foundations and institutions. Those systemic factors affect the 
civic system itself, the market, the economy and the society as whole. 2) The cognitive 
factors which refer to the mental processes of perception, judgement and reasoning of the 
society, as contrasted with their emotional and their volitional behaviours. Those factors deal 
with the innate social tendency to defy the authority, the laws and the regulations of the state 
and 3) The criminal factors pertain to the sphere of the disapproved or not permitted -for 
moral or ethical reasons- actions, which as a rule involve crime and illicit transactions. The 
lack of effective appliance of the legislation coupled with disorganised governmental and 
judicial agencies, results in the expansion of the criminal factors within the informal 
economy. 
 
 
Brief description of the orientation of the study (chapter outline) 
In order to effectively analyse the circumstances of the informal economy in Lebanon, the 
thesis was divided into ten chapters. Each chapter is summarised below with a brief 
description of the content of each. Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5 represent the core of the literature 
review of the thesis and in association with Chapter 6 constitute the theoretical basis and the 
necessary historical background regarding the informal economy and its four key drivers and 
their input in the wider politico-socio-economic framework. The synergy of those chapters is 
shown in Chapter 9 where the evaluation of the primary and secondary material is presented. 
Chapter 8 and 9 represent the core of the primary research. However the necessary exegesis 
of those associations and the overall research methods are explained in Chapter 7. The brief 
description of the chapters is as follows: 
 Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter constitutes the necessary prologue of the thesis. It provides a brief description of 
the analytical method and then briefly explains the background of the problem, the problem 
statement, the aims and the objectives of the thesis. In the last section of the chapter I briefly 
outline each chapter‘s content and purpose. 
 Chapter 2 Key Driver One: Informal Employment and Commerce Sector 
This chapter examines the various theoretical representatives of the informal employment and 
commerce sector, as well as the rationale and motives that encourage people to seek refuge 
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behind the parapet of informal employment and informal trade in two independent sections; 
the theoretical and the pragmatic. The chapter focuses on the debate between normality 
versus criminality and attempts to project if the informal sector operates as a criminal factor 
or if it has obtained a certain degree of legitimacy, as has become the norm in several 
countries. Additionally this chapter assists the determination of the informal employment and 
commerce sector as a beneficial or detrimental element in a given country. This chapter 
provides the necessary theoretical background regarding the informal employment and 
commerce sector for a wide and in depth understanding. The first part identifies the 
theoretical framework which the entirety of the informal sector is based upon. It projects the 
theoretic components which classify the predispositions and perceptions in the informal 
labour and trade sector, though a conjectural spectrum. The theoretical section provides the 
analysis of the three dominant schools of thought. These schools are the dualist, the 
structuralist and the legalist. Generally the chapter focuses on the impact of the informal 
sector on the informal workers and sometimes on the formal as well. Additionally, the second 
part of the chapter projects the impact on the economy and its associations with several 
crucial social aspects such as education, the role of immigrants within the society, the 
formation of wages and the identification of the social groupings and their occupation 
grading, as affected or shaped by the informal movement in various countries, with the 
weight placed on Lebanon. 
 Chapter 3 Key Driver Two: Remittances 
The primary aim of this chapter is to shed light on the vast importance of the remittances 
towards developing and underdeveloped countries and how instrumental and facilitating the 
informal methods of remitting may be. The vast majority of the bibliography studies 
remittances in a theoretical and a deterministic perspective or from a developmental angle, 
attempting to demonstrate the broadness of remittances contribution to the public‘s and 
state‘s welfare. As a result, I have divided the literature into three sub-categories; books that 
apply a more theoretical approach, material with a more developmental perspective and 
material that focuses mostly on the informal side of remittances. Also the chapter notes the 
potential links of the informal remittances with other key drivers. Specifically noting the 
association with the various illegal networks which used –and still use- the attributes of the 
informal transfers systems in order to shift and launder their illegally obtained capital. 
 Chapter 4 Key Driver Three: Corruption 
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This chapter outlines the two types of corruption (petty and grand) and portrays the motives 
of corruption and the geographical occurrence. It also establishes the various forms of 
corruption and in the second half of the chapter provides the less theoretical aspects of the 
secondary material. Additionally, the chapter stresses the twofold nature of the contribution 
of corruption to the wider macro-economic concept and analyses the impact of corruption as 
a faction of the informal economy, impacting on the socio-economical life but not as a 
political tool. In general the chapter divides the bibliography into an all-encompassing 
theoretical section and a less theoretical situational section which examines the pragmatic 
components of corruption in conjunction with the informal economy. 
 Chapter 5 Key Driver Four: Illegal Networks 
This chapter deals with those networks which inevitably operate within the framework of the 
informal economy due to their illegal or controversial status.  The aim of this chapter is to 
identify the existence and the level of contribution of those illegal networks in the economy 
as well as the level of integration within the state and the degree of association with the state 
apparatus. This enables a conclusion on whether this economic activity generated through 
those networks has beneficial or detrimental value. This chapter observes all the major 
economic activities involving illegal economic dealings. In some cases, the services or goods 
will be illegal, such as the sale of narcotics; whilst in  others, the merchandise will be 
otherwise legal goods but sold illicitly to avoid tax payments or licensing requirements, such 
as unregistered firearms. Also the chapter attempts to establish an acceptable or politically 
correct definition regarding the illegal networks, as Hezbollah for most of the secondary 
resources and significant percentage of the Western academia is perceived as a terrorist 
organisation, while the Lebanese view is that it is a legitimate political entity, without really 
judging the extensions of its operations. 
 Once again the chapter divides the bibliography between theoretical and 
pragmatic concepts. The pragmatic concepts deal with tangible aspects of the illegal networks 
such as prostitution, trafficking and money laundering, while the theoretical part of this 
chapter, uses econometric papers and other theoretical secondary material, which shows the 
lack of regulatory framework and the intense interconnections of those networks with the 
state. The chapter establishes that the criminal practices the illegal networks use, such as 
prostitution, smuggling, illegal arms sales and drug trafficking are multi-billion dollar 
businesses with extended associations into other ideologically radical networks. 
 Chapter 6 Analysis of the secondary  material on Lebanon 
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This chapter represents an integral part of the analysis, as it provides the 
chronological settings of informal economy in Lebanon. The first section of this chapter 
analyses the historical background of Lebanon in order to establish the necessary sequential 
framework which contributes to the better understanding of the political, societal and 
economic complexities of Lebanon that paved the way for the adoption of a laissez-faire 
economy, after the ―proper‖ independence of the country. The second section analyses the 
elements of Lebanon‘s past and present, which assisted the formation and expansion of the 
country‘s sizeable informal economy and also briefly displays several causes that facilitated 
this expansion. The last section of the chapter focuses on the contemporary aspects of the 
informal economy in Lebanon giving support to the argument that the country maybe is not 
the champion of the informal practices in the world, but displays some very unique features. 
This chapter shows the long-lasting fermentations of traditional and modern ways which 
produced the current volatile and capricious politico-economic environment which is 
susceptible to corruption, defiance of the rule of law and the informal ways. 
 Chapter 7 Research Methodology 
This chapter primarily explains the analytical method which I used for the deduction of the 
results. The focus of this chapter is to explain the research methodology of this thesis, which 
assisted in the elaboration of the secondary and primary data. The basic analytical tool which 
links all the chapters together is the Force Field Analysis. In order to establish all the 
objectives of the research, I have disbanded the informal economy into four different 
variables. Each variable or key driver stimulates the core of the Force Field Analysis in 
proportion to its input By assessing the components (key drivers) of the informal economy 
independently someone may also assess the informal economy as a whole and determine the 
positive and negative aspects that it may have to offer in a given situation. 
 This chapter also explains the size of the sample and the irregularities I faced in the 
process of the research. Also included are the schematic tables with the details regarding the 
sample and describes the primary material research procedure, including the data collection 
methods. 
 Chapter 8 Interviews 
This chapter deals with the primary research material gathered over a period of two years. 
The interviews project the views of the diverse sample of respondents regarding each key 
driver individually concerning the input, the participation and the significance of those 
components in the informal economy matrix of Lebanon. The sample groups are constituted 
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by directly involved individuals of the informal economy and indirectly involved such as 
academics or members of the public without personal involvement. The entire sample is 
predominantly constituted by the users or the public opinion and in a complimentary level by 
government officials and academics. This chapter provides the bulk of the opinions, outlook 
and situations which constitute the informal economy in Lebanon according to the diverse 
sample I have examined, coupled with my personal encounters with the informal practices in 
the country. 
 Chapter 9 Results 
The findings of this research were presented in this chapter and they are divided into three 
areas, namely the contribution of each individual key driver of the informal economy at the 
socio-economic level, the contribution of the informal economy in total, as assessed by the 
overall input of the four key drivers and the theoretical conceptualisation of the three factors 
which fuel the informal economy in Lebanon. Specifically, the first section separately 
analyses the responses of the interviewed regarding the positive or negative participation of 
each key driver in the social and economic development, the second section funnels all the 
responses of each key driver, in a single spectrum in order to provide an overall image of the 
informal economy‘s beneficial or detrimental values. Finally the third section assesses the 
three foremost ingredients of the informal economy‘s emergence and development and places 
them into a theoretical context. 
 Chapter 10 Conclusion 
The final chapter presents a synopsis of the findings of the thesis and the major conclusions 
of the research as shown in chapters 8 and 9. Also it presents some brief recommendations 
regarding the future of the informal economy in Lebanon and its importance. Additionally the 
chapter explores areas for further research on the topic and a critical assessment of my own 
work, that is to say, the extent to which the objectives have been achieved. Lastly, the chapter 
projects the significance and contribution of the study regarding the issue of the informal 
economy in Lebanon and considers the potential scientific contribution of this present thesis 
to the wider academic community. 
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CHAPTER 2 Informal Sector; Employment and Commerce 
 
Introduction 
Usually when someone refers to informal economy they are referring to the millions of 
underground, informal transactions that take place on every street and all of the unofficial 
labour that is offered or demanded. The heart and soul, the lifeblood, the backbone of 
informal economy within any given society lays in the presence of the thousands of street 
vendors, home workers and illegal immigrants in the streets and homes of every city and 
village. The questions that arise from this are manifold. The informal sector contracts with 
many themes and various academic distinctions and schools of thought. The three prevailing 
schools of thought regarding the informal sector will be analysed in this section. 
One of the key questions in the practices of the informal sector is the matter of 
legality. Is it legal or illegal? Is it a normative process or a criminal offence? Is it connected 
to corruption or does it have legitimate grounds? And what are the causes which lead people 
towards informal economy? In this section, I will also examine the various theoretical 
representatives of the informal sector as well as the rationale, and the motives that encourage 
people to seek refuge behind the parapet of informal employment and informal trade (with 
emphasis placed on the shores of the Mediterranean basin). Additionally, I will examine the 
debate between normality versus criminality. The question is, if the informal sector operates 
as a criminal factor or if it has obtained a certain degree of legitimacy as it has developed into 
the norm in several countries. Lastly, this review will function as a guide to assist the analysis 
in order to determine whether the informal employment and commerce sector is beneficial or 
detrimental in a given country. This section will provide the necessary theoretical background 
regarding the informal sector for a wide and in depth understanding. What follows is a 
summary that projects   the ways that the informal sector is linked or not to the formal sector 
and the purposes it serves. 
 The presence of the informal sector as a key driver is tremendously important in this 
paper. In opposition to remittances and corruption, it is probably associated with the majority 
of the population, in most of the under-developed and developing countries and it holds a 
significant portion of presence in many developed countries. The generation of capital even 
though it is hard to calculate it accurately, is vast and the proportional involvement of people 
in it is staggering. For example, according to a joint International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and World Trade Organization (WTO) study, 93% of India's workforce is employed in the 
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informal sector—the largest percentage of working population for any country in private 
unregistered enterprises.
12
 The levels of informal employment vary substantially across the 
countries, ranging from as low as 30% in some Latin American countries to more than 80% 
in certain sub-Saharan and South Asian countries.
13
 According to another ILO study informal 
employment is estimated to make up 48% of non-agricultural employment in North Africa, 
51% in Latin America, 65% in Asia, and 72% in sub-Saharan Africa. If agricultural 
employment is included, the percentage rises, in some countries like India and many sub-
Saharan African countries beyond 90%. Estimates for developed countries are around 15%.
14
 
Also it is something that in most countries of the world cannot be avoided or eliminated.  The 
impact of this sector is so important that many studies present the informal employment and 
commerce sector as a synonym of the informal economy as a whole. 
Axiomatically I can suggest that everyone at least once will be exposed to it. There is 
no city or village in the world without unlicensed street vendors, or unsecured workers or 
sellers of goods with no invoice or receipt or any other formal recognition. Corruption can be 
rejected or avoided - even though in many cases, it proves to be inescapable- and remittances 
are not channelled for everyone. However, informal employment or trade has a certain status 
within any society. Definitely the interconnection of the informal sector with the other key 
drivers is important and noticeable. Firstly the inadequacy, or the lack of remittances 
reception as shown in Chapter 2 in combination with other changeable circumstances such as 
the inability to work in the formal sector, may encourage or compel someone to work in the 
informal sector. Secondly to maintain the status and presence in the informal sector more 
than likely will resort to certain practices thoroughly explained in Chapter 3 like bribing 
officials i.e. to be granted a licence, or look the other way for unregistered workers or tax 
evasion. Certainly corruption in the informal sector is an integral component for its 
sustainability and functionality. Thirdly, the various illegal networks as I will also depict in 
the following chapter, need the nebulous informal sector as the main channel of the 
distribution of the contraband, pirated goods and all the products they deal with. In the long 
term maybe the effects of the other key drivers can and do affect the general population and 
the economy etc, but the informal employment and commerce sector is in every corner. It 
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also swallows individuals that belong to the formal sector exercising practises like 
moonlighting; meaning having a second untaxed job besides the official one.
15
 
 It is also characteristically difficult to determine which informal practice of 
employment or trading is illicit. In a naive and simplistic explanation we might accept that 
whether all informal practices might be generally against the law, the ones that assist survival 
can be socially accepted but those who deal with criminal activities can be totally 
objectionable. Although that slips into the fields of criminology, I will deal with it further 
down. Lastly, I would like to point out that employment and commerce in this paper are 
perceived as a unit, as people who engage in informal employment and commerce have the 
same motives. As I will depict further down, these fall into the same violations and go 
through the same difficulties and hardship. In most cases, at the end of the day it is probably 
the same individual who harbours behind the virtual haven of the informal sector. If someone 
is for example a street vendor, he or she will be described as someone who is (self) employed 
in the informal sector buying or selling his or her goods probably from the informal sector 
too. 
 It is also suggested that the informal sector tends to expand during periods of turmoil 
and general instability. This is quite self explanatory, as during those periods the state 
apparatus is disrupted and normality dysfunctions. It is an excellent opportunity for arrivistes, 
black marketeers to expand their operations and sometimes it can be inescapable as the 
disruption that crops up may be only by-passed if people succumb to informal acts. For this 
reason Lebanon is an appropriate example, as its transmutation from peace to war and from 
periods of relative stability to instability effusively displays the succession of more or less 
informality in its society. 
 
Theoretical Framework (Schools of Thought) 
According to Martha Alter Chen, Joann Vanek and Marilyn Carr, over the years the various 
debates regarding what gives rise to the informal sector, its defining characteristics and its 
links to the formal sector or the regulatory system have been packed into three main schools 
of thought.
16
 These schools are the dualist, the structuralist and the legalist. According to the 
authors the structuralist and the legalist can be explained in contemporary context as different 
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 See details in Mattera, Philip ―Off the books: The rise of underground economy‖ St Martin‘s, Ney York: 1985 
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components of the informal economy, on the other hand they characterise the dualist 
perspective as rather outdated. Indeed, certain aspects of the dualist view may be simplistic; 
however they do express adequately the foundations of the informal sector in several 
developing countries like Lebanon or Egypt. Probably the obsolete social and political 
processes of those countries render it still valid. Those schools examine the informal sector in 
very different perspectives. The dualist looks upon the relationship of formal and informal 
sector as two different entities. Structuralism, analyses how subordinate the informal sector 
can be to the formal and the legalist deals with regulatory dimension of the informal sector. 
In the next three sections I will describe the three dominant schools of thought, as each one is 
shaped by (at least) two of their main academic voices. 
 
Dualist view  
The dualist theory was largely publicised by S.V. Sethuraman and a specialised agency of the 
United Nations that deals with labour issues called the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) in the early 1970s.
17
 The dualist school of thought expresses the notion that the 
informal sector is completely separate from the formal, comprised mainly by marginal 
activities, and it operates as a safety net in times of crisis.
18
 Also this theory suggests that the 
perseverance of the foretold marginal activities is due to the fact that there is: 
a) lack of adequate employment opportunities for the workforce in supply, 
b) economic underdevelopment, 
c) overpopulation, 19 
Lebanon acutely displays all of the three categories. Regarding the lack of adequate 
employment opportunities according to Sabri, Lebanon is a unique case, as it is the only Arab 
state which is importing and exporting labour at the same time, but the value of exporting is 
more than the value of importing.
20
 However, despite the labour exchanges Lebanon is still 
charted 80
th
 in the unemployment charts. The surprising element however, is the massive 
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drop of Lebanon‘s unemployment in 2009 from 20% to 9.2%.21 The economic 
underdevelopment, I suppose can be taken as a given, but due to Lebanon‘s reconstruction 
period the real growth has increased from -4.3% in 2006 to 6.8% in 2008.
22
 Of course, those 
figures reflect only the formal economic activities and therefore they cannot provide an 
accurate outlook of the economic performance including informal activities in the thriving 
sector of tourism for example. Besides, despite the increased growth rate, the levels of 
inflation have sky-rocketed within a year up to 10%, offsetting by default several of the 
advantages that it may have occurred from growth.
23
 Also, Lebanon was never considered as 
an overpopulated country, but despite  conventional wisdom, it suffers from severe 
overpopulation in the coastal areas, mainly in the Greater Beirut Area and due to the various 
conflicts, displacements caused imbalance in population distribution, causing overpopulation 
in urban areas.
24
 However, due to the lack of a formal census since 1932, the figures are only 
estimated via a mixture of studies, surveys and projections. All these parameters have 
fostered a flourishing informal sector in Lebanon. 
Another conveyor of this school is Keith Hart who also looks in the fields of economic 
anthropology. Hart explicitly derived his analysis from Weber‘s theory of rationalisation, 
which refers to the growing scope for bureaucratic organisation and calculation of rewards in 
the history of Western economic institutions.
25
 Hart used a typology that apart from the basic 
distinction of formal/informal sector features a variation between illegitimate and legitimate 
activities within the informal sector.
26
 Also in his article he emphasises that the typology 
refers to activities and roles and not to individuals and he provides us with a list of the formal 
and informal income opportunities depicting the foretold distinctions in a triptych: 
a) Formal income opportunities, which include: public and private sector wages and 
transfer payments such pensions and benefits 
b) Informal income opportunities (legitimate), which include: primary and secondary 
activities (farming, tailors), enterprises with large capital input (housing, transport), 
small scale distribution (petty traders, street vendors), other services (musicians, shoe 
shiners, photographers) and private money transfers (gifts, borrowing, begging) 
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c) Informal income opportunities (illegitimate), which includes: services (prostitution, 
smuggling, protection rackets, drug-pushing, loan sharking) and transfers (petty theft, 
larceny, gambling and confidence tricksters).
 27
 
A similar categorisation is presented by Sethuraman; however for him all the ventures of 
informal economy are encompassed in small scale economic activities. Meaning that he 
excludes all the possible businesses that produce considerable incomes.
28
 Of course, the 
majority of the non-criminal informal ventures tend to be small scale, but we cannot overlook 
the successful ones. 
Hart also mentions the dilemma of legal – illegal status of the informal sector. He makes 
another distinction between illegitimacy and illegality. However, the examples he provides 
cannot produce a certain holistic outcome, as the social processes of Ghana cannot be 
transferred elsewhere or at least in most of the Western European and North American 
countries. To be more specific, a ―cop-killer‖ is perceived differently in countries with 
authoritarian suppressive regimes than in democratic liberal states; on the one hand he is a 
hero and on the other a ruthless criminal. Another example is prostitution; in some countries 
it is illegal and in some others absolutely legal and accepted as a norm. In different societies 
the same informal activity can be legal or illegal, negative or positive. Thus the line between 
Hart‘s views of the illicit or not activities of informal sector is extremely thin. Nevertheless, I 
do have to mention that Hart is not as absolute on the dualist theory as many of his critics 
assume, nevertheless Andrew Long judges Hart‘s work as limiting.29 On the other hand, Hart 
does actually recognise the so-called moonlighting and he acknowledges the fact that (at least 
in his case study in Ghana) rarely is a family dependent on a single source of income. In 
general, Hart adopts a more underwhelming stance towards the informal sector‘s contribution 
to economy.
30
 And that alone renders Hart outdated. 
Another important representative of the dualist school of thought is Viktor Tokman. In his 
work, apart from being an advocate of dualism, he supports the distinction of the Periphery 
and the Center as economic indicators regarding the informal sector‘s performance and 
behaviour towards informal economy. This distinction, however, has to be attributed to Raul 
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Prebisch who divided the world into the economic "centre", consisting of industrialised 
nations such as the U.S., and the "periphery", consisting of primary producers.
31
 Tokman, 
used that distinction but he chose two case studies situated on the two extremes of highs and 
lows, to project Prebisch‘s dynamic insufficiency of peripheral capitalism.32 On the one hand, 
we have the labour intensive Latin America and on the other the capital intensive United 
States of America. He displays that in the under-developed Latin America we have an 
increase of unregistered businesses and workers as those countries have a certain inability to 
incorporate technical progress and that in the USA exactly the opposite  happens. Of course, 
due to the era (early 20
th
 century) Tokman examines that the two regions are even further 
apart in terms of the rates of development, growth and potential. Tokman also focuses on 
productivity, and he provides a complex outcome, as during the era in question Latin 
America and the USA had very contradictory statistics regarding low and high productivity 
on the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. First of all, if nowadays the statistics of those 
countries are debatable, I cannot imagine how accurately they could estimate productivity 
100 years ago and secondly there is no worthwhile comparison on formal or informal 
industrial productivity between the two case studies in our time, as figures are so extra-
ordinarily far apart.
33
 Lastly, worth-mentioning is Tokman‘s monocular and obsolete 
perception of the informal sector as he adopts Prebisch‘s term ―inferior technical stratum‖ for 
the informal sector as a whole.
34
 Of course, productivity is not an area of concern for this 
study, however, Lebanon‘s labour costs, licensing, tax rates and underutilized capacity are 
significantly negatively affecting productivity levels, which proportionally to other MENA 
countries have an average level.
35 
In conclusion the dualist model suggests that the informal activities –whether that is 
employment or trading- are completely isolated from the formal sector and they mainly 
articulate small scale economic performance. 
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Structuralist view 
On the other hand, the structuralist model, in opposition to the dualist model, acknowledges 
the interconnection between the state and formal firms with various informal activities as 
well as the presence of large scale production and income. The main representatives of this 
model are Caroline Moser and Alejandro Portes. According to Martha Alter Chen, Joann 
Vanek and Marilyn Carr the structuralist school ―subscribes to the notion that the informal 
sector should be seen as subordinated economic units (micro-firms) and workers that serve to 
reduce input and labour costs and, thereby, increase the competitiveness of large capitalist 
firms”36 While they expand on Portes study, who argues that in the particular model 
―different modes and forms of production are seen not only to co-exist but also to be 
inextricably connected and interdependent‖37, they also suggest that development structured 
within capitalist modes of production assists the emergence and perseverance of the informal 
activities.
38 
This view provides a more tangible theoretical explanation of the informal sector, without 
excluding or undermining the definite contribution or actual application of the dualist school, 
despite the latter -as I mentioned above- being rather obsolete. 
 According to Portes and Castells, the informal sector is the sum of unregulated 
economic activities by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which 
similar activities are actually regulated.
39
 Portes makes probably one of the most important 
distinctions regarding informality. He divides it into three categories, which are: 
a) Survival, which occurs through direct production or sale of goods and services 
b) Dependent exploitation, meaning the increasing managerial flexibility and the 
decreasing labour costs through informal hiring and subcontracting and 
c) Growth, which is the capital accumulation by small firms, using connections.
40 
Those three categories summarise the motives, the energy of the informal sector and they 
surpass the limits of the three schools, as they are applicable in the whole wide range of the 
informal employment sector, independently of the school of thought someone may belong to 
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or examine. Also they suggest, the industrialists and more generally the firm owners, are in a 
power struggle with the state, seeking further ―informalisation‖ in order to decrease the trade 
unions influence, avoid further taxation and gain access to reduced labour costs, payment of 
benefits, VAT payments and in order to dodge taxation.
41
 Similarly to Tokman (dualist), they 
also suggest that  in the Periphery, the population is more likely to turn to unofficial 
employment, as in most cases, it is the only viable option. In the following section dealing 
with the pragmatic factors, I will describe why people may choose to work in the informal 
sector. 
 Another major parameter that Portes and Castells mention, which absolutely fits with 
the structuralist view as well, is the trend of subcontracting, where larger firms assign smaller 
ones to complete production and tasks that they were contracted to do. It is enormously wide-
spread, and Lourdes Beneria presented several examples describing the increasing 
competition of the subcontractors and the lengths they are willing to go, in order to obtain a 
subcontract.
42
 However, as I found out in my interviews the sub-contracting fashion is not 
only constrained to large, medium or small  businesses only. I have discovered that it is 
exceptionally common even for individuals and self-employed entrepreneurs to assign to a 
third –drastically less paid- party to  the task. It may occur not only in semi-skilled operations 
like construction, but in specialised labour like computer programming. Lastly, Bryan 
Roberts focuses on lower class households that simultaneously exist in both sectors. Roberts 
explains that in many households at least one member of the family works in the formal 
sector in order to gain access to the social security system, while the others work 
informally.
43
 In my research I came across  such examples. I found families in Beirut, with 
one member working in the public sector, where all the other members of the family used the 
same dispensatory for transcriptions and medical care. 
 The editors however, in their conclusions present a rather grim outlook for the 
informal sector. They suggest that the informal employment sector boosts the industrialist 
exploitation of the working classes and as they seek for a cheaper and more flexible 
workforce, simultaneously this shrinks the wages and annuls the vested rights of workers 
gained following bloody clashes throughout the years.
44
 Despite the negative outcome of 
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their study they point out that it is almost impossible to record the complete dynamics of the 
informal sector‘s input. 
  The second major representative of the structuralist model is Caroline Moser, who 
quite fiercely dismisses dualism‘s theoretical framework as of limited utility and for putting 
forward utopian recommendations.
45
 In her anathema towards dualism, Moser also mentions 
that the ILO focused  its analysis on the wrong aspects of the informal sector and she 
criticises it for putting emphasis on major policy objectives aimed specifically at the 
unemployment problem rather than at the economic growth per se.
46
 Also she emphasises  the 
debate regarding the informal sector‘s potential to generate employment and whether it is an 
independent component or a subordinate one. However, in opposition to Portes and Castells 
who include in their study smaller and larger enterprises, she mainly focuses on smaller scale 
enterprises and the social characteristics of the petty traders.
47
 In general the article examines 
how the proletariat, meaning the working class, due to the difficulty in antagonising the 
penetration of large formal firms, tends to lose even more ground and becoming exceedingly 
poorer and more marginalised. Nevertheless, she also recognises that the particular issue is 
also associated with the subject of income and resources redistribution and the infiltration of 
such a problem to capitalistic economies which are using advanced social models and 
policies, like Sweden and Germany.
48
 Regarding the failing economic infrastructure and 
performance Moser found in her case studies in Zambia and in the Philippines  that ―a major 
source of vulnerability has been the labour market; a decline in the share of formal sector 
employment, and increased insecurity and instability in the informal sector have all 
contributed to declining household income.
49
 However, according to Moser the only way to 
partially counter-balance the effects of the foretold vulnerability in the labour market is by 
the overseas remittances from migrant family members and by employment in the growing 
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informal sector.
50
 In other words, the one parameter that contributes to the negative economic 
climate is actually the same parameter which  tolerates the adverse economic situation that in 
reality it creates. This paradox provides for most of the Lebanese people the quintessence of 
the everyday economic life. It is a vicious circle. 
 Therefore, in conclusion the structuralist model investigates the association and the 
links of businesses and enterprises of all sizes and individual workers in the informal sector 
with formal firms, examining the degree of subordination of the former to the latter. 
 
Legalist view 
This model has appeared in the mid-1980s and early-1990s in the work of the Peruvian 
economist Hernando de Soto, who in his two books argues that the informal sector is 
constituted by various entrepreneurs who willingly operate in the margins in order to avoid 
the costs, time and effort of formal registration.
51
 According to de Soto, micro-entrepreneurs 
will continue to operate informally as long as government procedures are costly and 
complicated and in most -if not all- of the Third world and ex-Soviet countries, highly 
corrupt. In his research he found that in Peru in order to obtain planning permission you need 
207 bureaucratic stages, or in order to obtain a legal title deed you need 728 bureaucratic 
stages and years of waiting.
52
 For de Soto, operating legally is as difficult as to be illegal. In 
reality, legality is actually the margin as illegality and informality have been the rule.
53
 
However, de Soto also pointed out that this situation in some cases could be conventional 
wisdom for the micro-entrepreneurs as being ―extralegal‖  may prove more costly and 
troublesome than being legal.
54
 But still, even if that is the case without significant changes in 
the way the state apparatus works, being extralegal will be inevitable. Indeed, according to 
Weshah Razzak the only hope for micro-entrepreneurs in Lebanon is to increase their 
productivity and in order to achieve that, they resort to all the aforementioned practices. 
Consequently, Small or Medium Sized businesses  (SMEs) frequently shutdown because they 
fall into various violations and the need for legal compliance of the firms makes the 
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productivity and output  plummet.
55
 Nevertheless, de Soto probably displayed the most 
shallow yet more accurate guideline to distinguish legality and illegality. Being legal within 
the context of informal economy is privilege only for those with political and economic 
power and the illegality is only a burden for the poor.
56
 
 In the same school of thought, even if some prefer to place it as whole new category, 
William Lewis mentions the parasitic nature of the informal sector. He argues that it is ―a 
means to gain unfair advantage in the competition with formal counterparts.‖57 He 
characterises informal practices as parasitic since they do not pay any taxes and the burden 
falls heavily on the legitimate businesses.
58
 While de Soto links informal unemployment with 
the lack of legal titles of the workers‘ de facto properties, Lewis argues ―the lack of capital is 
seen as the key constraint in the expansion of formal employment.‖59 Indeed, this argument 
could not be more relevant, especially today, with the financial crisis infesting households all 
over the world and the lack of capital being the main predicament in most of the countries. 
Lewis holds the lack of capital mainly responsible for the high degree of tax evasion, as he 
observed it in his case studies in the USA and in Brazil, which happens for a variety of 
reasons, which he does not expand on. 
 Similarly to Lewis, William Maloney supports the idea that the informal micro-
entrepreneurs, mostly the self-employed, work informally in order to avoid taxes, electricity 
payments, rental fees, and other costs of operating formally and they have no intention 
whatsoever to alter their current situation.
60
 Meaning that for those people, the pitfalls of 
being employed in the informal sector are not as important as someone would expect. Also in 
parallel with Bryan Roberts the formal sector is only preferable due to its access to social 
security, but as Maloney mentions, the costs of being in a formal job is counter-balanced by 
the unavoidable taxes, therefore the informal sector wins over the formal on all  fronts 
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according to his surveys.
61
 Also, on top of the aforementioned the informal sector functions 
as a safety net for older workers, recently retired or dismissed. However, I find it odd that 
Maloney suggests that formal occupation, especially for older workers, may be too arduous 
and consequently they abandon it for an informal and less arduous one, when in reality at 
least half of the informal jobs tend to be labour intensive, thus such an argument may be 
flawed. Also Maloney, apart from underlining the surprising desirability for the informal 
sector, points out the comparative advantage in terms of the payments calculating the gains at 
25% more.
62
 Of course, he explains that those figures are meaningless as the nature and 
quality of the work might be unimaginable and the percentage of failure of small businesses 
in his case studies is extra-ordinarily high, rendering the informal sector and self-employment 
attractive but risky.
63
  On the other hand, regarding informal employment as a salaried status 
his observations are still very positive but in a more moderate manner. However, he still finds 
informal salaried workers benefited by the usually high turnover rates of their employers and 
the tendency of being occupations being short-term particularly due to their young age.
64
 
Maloney continues that they might be less paid in some cases by their formal counter-parts, 
but due to the flexibility and autonomy they still prefer it.
65
 
Generally, I find Maloney‘s views extremely optimistic on informal employment, as 
there is no panacea for poverty and he brings up at the end the only , the tangible benefits of 
the informal sector as being dignity and autonomy, but this is also debatable. Besides, apart 
from the self-employment cases, informal employment is usually preferred by the employers 
due to the lower wages, thus I think the idyllic conditions that Maloney describes only apply 
to very specific cases. In Lebanon, there are cases, which are in accordance with Maloney‘s 
arguments, meaning happy self-employed micro-entrepreneurs who enjoy higher than 
average income and a certain degree of independence, but in most cases the call for cheap 
labour assists the existence of a backbreaking low-paid informal sector. Also, the existence of 
cheaper labour fosters an over-reliance on it, meaning that people will only assign the 
laborious tasks to informal workers as they are significantly cheaper. For example, in 
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Lebanon according to the BBC due to the mass influx of Syrian workers in some parts of the 
country, like the Bekaa Valley, people have grown to rely on the cheap imported labour.
66
 
Therefore, as de Soto mentions, working at the informal level was the only way for 
the ―extra-legals‖ to arrange their lives and transactions. Being an illegal on that level has no 
anti-social tendencies, those illicit actions are only for the achievement of ordinary, daily 
goals.
67
 So, once again we notice that the theme of inescapability is recurring and the need for 
survival is apparently unrelenting, constituting the informal employment sector as an 
inseparable element in most of the world‘s economies. 
 In conclusion regarding the legalist view, the model focuses on those informal units 
(individuals or micro-enterprises), that choose to operate in the informal sector and their 
relationship with the state apparatus and its normative/regulatory framework. In the next 
section, I will provide the literature that examines the informal sector unconventionally. 
 
 
Pragmatic Framework 
No matter which model someone chooses to examine the links of informal employment 
sector and the formal, there are always two common denominators among the parameters, 
and they are survival and exploitation. Those two parameters, I might add, are not mutually 
exclusive. As Chen et al, points out ―given the heterogeneity of the informal economy, there 
is some truth to each of these perspectives‖.68 None of the three schools of thought should be 
dismissed, but the truth is that independently of how academically obsolete or contemporary 
those schools are, it is very difficult to determine where ―real‖ situations fit. Occasionally it 
might be a straightforward answer, but in most cases only a combination of the theories can 
provide the theoretical foundations to analyse a certain state of affairs. For this reason, I 
swept the bibliography to discover situations apart from those the theorists presented in their 
case studies, in order to provide a spherical view of the bibliography and build a basis that 
accurately shows the strengths and weaknesses of the informal employment sector.  
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In the ―real world‖ context, we can assume that Portes still provides a realistic 
analysis of the nature of the informal sector. The World Bank distinguishes the informal 
sector into two categories similar to Portes‘ motives: 
a) Coping strategies meaning activities that assist a sustainable survival, like 
casual jobs, temporary jobs, unpaid jobs, subsistence agriculture and moonlighting 
and 
b) Unofficial earning strategies meaning illegality in business like tax evasion, 
avoidance of labour regulations and other government or institutional 
regulations, no registration of the company and other criminal activities, 
with which I will deal in the next section.
69
 
One of the most vulnerable social groups, with the higher percentage of involvement in the 
informal sector are immigrants. As Iosifides and King mention, immigrants are subdued to 
super-exploitation. This term according to Baldwin depicts their willingness to tolerate 
significantly lower wages, tougher working conditions and sub-human living arrangements. 
This situation is derived from two conditions. Firstly, from the desperate situation in the 
migrant‘s home country; meaning that despite the hardship in the host country it is still 
preferable and secondly, from the immigrants‘ possible illegal status in the hosting country, 
which forces them to no other option than working in the informal sector.
70
 The 
aforementioned situation differs dramatically from Maloney‘s idealised informal sector. In 
other words, exclusion and inequality are terms inclusive to the notion and nature of the 
informal sector. The degree of this assumption varies according to the society it applies, as 
described in this section‘s introduction. Similarly to that, Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis and Ravi 
Kanbur emphasize the decisive role of informal labour markets in allowing countries to 
successfully adjust to the forces of globalisation, also their case studies were focused on the 
various problems associated with the expansion of informal employment, such as poor 
working conditions, the lack of worker protection and irregular wages in terms of quantity 
and frequency.
71
 Chen et al, also explains that informal employment entails hidden costs, 
such as under-employment, meaning an involuntary irregularity in working hours and 
payments, the seasonality of work. Meaning that ―to earn a living it is often necessary for 
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workers in informal employment to have two or more jobs simultaneously or from season to 
season‖, additionally the occupational hazards render the workers vulnerable to health issues 
as they are all uninsured.
72
 
According to the OECD 2008 Employment Outlook, the higher informal wages are 
often associated with the lower wages in the formal sector for a similar job. However there 
are countries like Korea that do not function in that way and the informal sector wages are 
usually equal or higher than the formal sector‘s for a specific task; of course this may be the 
exception that confirms the rule.
73
 The real life associations of the informal sector with the 
formal are multiple. The two sectors are highly interconnected, as policy changes, taxation 
alterations impact directly on the ways the informal sector moves and behaves, rendering it in 
a status of constant flux. A simplistic example would be that a sudden increase in the taxation 
might cause increased labour costs, and therefore that causes incentives for hiring or working 
unofficially.
74
 In most cases, it seems that the informal sector behaviourally adopts the 
inclinations of the formal sector. However, de Soto suggests that sometimes the formal sector 
tends to adjust to the informal, as happened in the 19
th
 century USA, where the US 
government had no other option than to implement the informal practices of the ―pioneers‖ 
into the state apparatus.
75
 This is a primitive but characteristic example of informality‘s shift 
from a marginal activity to a normative legal process. 
 While Iosifides and King describe the informal sector and the problem of Albanian 
migration to Athens, someone may easily draw parallels with the situation in Beirut for 
example.  Beirut may not have the multinational panel of informal and formal workers as 
Athens, but definitely it is heterogeneous in terms of religious fragmentation. Despite the fact 
that Lebanon is generally ethnically unified, the religious differences are sharp. So when 
King et al, project Athens as a place with a long-established, heterogeneous informal sector 
which interconnects with the formal, based on a seemingly high rate of self-employment and 
that the atomisation of production and services based on one-person or small family 
enterprises (such as shops, stalls, restaurants, workshops, building trade activities, removal 
firms which are embedded in the socio-economic fabric of the city and have long experience 
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of dodging the depredations of the regulated economy), someone may easily picture in his 
mind the streets of Beirut.
76
 The surprising parameter is that Greece is supposed to be a 
capitalist long standing member of the European Union and Lebanon is a perceived war 
infested middle-eastern country; the comparison is remarkable, but in any case valid. 
Immigrants fit easily into such a framework according to Iosifides and King as helpers, 
assistants and unskilled manual employers. Also, even though  in Lebanon the levels of 
education are not the same as in Europe, the relatively higher levels of education cause high 
expectations in employment away from manual and low status employment.
77
 Education and 
expertise have inexorable links with formal and informal employment as stated above. 
According to Gaspard, skills were always the comparative advantage and strength of the 
Lebanese economy as it resided in the skilled manpower. Contrary to that statement though, 
Gaspard cites two different surveys which portray that this assumption is not the case any 
longer as the two surveys regarding national manpower prove the aforementioned 
stereotypical perception to be incorrect. Also the surveys claim that the quality of education 
has dropped. Specifically, the surveys show that in 1970 the participation in primary 
education –meaning up to the 12th year of age- was 80%, when in 1997 the participation was 
45.2%. However, in 1970 universities hosted a rather small 4.3% when in 1997 they attracted 
a 16.2%.
78
 Generally, Gaspard supports the notion that Lebanon was slightly overestimated in 
the consciousness of people, however in comparison to other regional countries was indeed in 
a better position, in terms at least of economic performance.
79
 Those figures show that the 
informal sector was fed by the additional uneducated output of the primary education and 
maintained by the increased percentage of higher education recipients who tend to avoid 
laborious jobs. However the surveys do not depict which is the estimated percentage of 
higher education students who actually ended up in informal occupation. 
On the other hand, for McLaughlin the informal sector is a pool of rather unskilled 
workers usually unable to use sophisticated machinery.
80
  However, McLaughlin is in 
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concurrence with Maloney regarding the high flexibility of the sector coupled with the 
usually precarious style of work. McLaughlin also points out the creativity of the informal 
sector as it has the ability to improvise on products and services from scrap materials. Of 
course that is in detriment of the quality of products and consequently it only provides a means 
of subsistence through the production of goods and services on a small scale.
81
 The truth is that 
the vast majority of informal trade and employment is represented by small scale ventures, as 
it was quite obvious from the above mentioned studies. However the bibliography, as I have 
stated earlier, tends to overlook the larger endeavours in the informal sector which keenly 
avoid the spotlight, as they usually have criminal elements at their core. For this reason, I 
attempted to include in my analysis, further on, informal activities of larger scale enterprises, 
including some undeniably illegal ones. The correlation of this section with the following is 
rather important as the informal sector is a pool for members, distributors and facilitators for 
the various illegal networks that usually operate in the margins. 
Conclusively, we can assume that given the heterogeneity of the informal sector, a 
tremendous assortment of situations and individuals become integrated. As Chen et al, 
mentions ―conditions of work and earnings differ markedly among those who scavenge on 
the streets for scrap and those who provide services and products via sub-contracting.‖82 Also 
the pre-supposed assumptions, whether the informal sector has a beneficial or detrimental 
impact on economy, are definitely a 'catch-22'. It can create jobs and offer opportunities to 
individuals who were unable to work or find a satisfactory occupation in the formal sector, 
but at the same time it can lead to a loss of jobs and opportunities and create an imbalance 
among the workforce, especially amongst the ageing and the retirees.
83
 Lebanon according to 
the D&B Country Report “unlike most of its Arab neighbours, has an ageing population. 
Apart from the direct impact on the labour market structure, this may exacerbate the issue of 
pension provision in the long term.‖ 84 
 
                                                          
81
 Ibid 
82
 See more in Alter Chen, Martha, Vanek, Joann, Carr, Marilyn ―Mainstreaming informal employment and 
gender in poverty reduction: a handbook for policy makers and other stake holders‖ The Commonwealth 
Secretariat, London : 2004, p.80-81 
83
 Ibid 
84
 ―D&B Country Report: Lebanon 2009-2010‖ D&B, Marlow: 2009, pp.26-27 
38 
 
Conclusion 
Thus, in conclusion the bibliography was separated into two different sections, the 
theoretical and the pragmatic.  The first part identifies the theoretical framework which the 
entirety of the informal sector is based on. It projects the theoretic components which classify 
the predispositions and perceptions in the informal labour and trade sector, though a 
conjectural spectrum. The theoretical dealt with the three prevailing models of the informal 
sector and they were identified as follows. The dualists argued that the informal has no or 
limited linkages to  the formal economy and it operates as a distinctly separate sector of the 
economy, and that informal workers comprise the less-advantaged sector of the labour 
market. The structuralists perceived the informal and formal sectors as intrinsically linked. To 
increase output, capitalist firms in the formal economy are keen to reduce their labour costs, 
by endorsing informal production and employment relationships with subordinated SMEs and 
individuals. The legalists focused on the relationship between informal entrepreneurs or 
enterprises and the formal regulatory environment, which excludes formal private firms, 
meaning that it mostly characterises the association with the state. The three schools and the 
other secondary sources, from the pragmatic section that I have used, have projected the 
status of the informal sector; they have also expressed the essence of this particular sector, 
along with its impact on the informal workers and sometimes on the formal as well. 
Additionally the section has shown the impact on the economy and its associations with 
several crucial social aspects such as education, the role of immigrants within the society, the 
formation of wages, and the identification of the social groupings and their occupation 
grading as affected or shaped by the informal movement in various countries, with  weight 
placed on Lebanon. The next section will deal with the role of informal and solely illegal 
activities in the economy and their impact as a determinant on the informal economy and 
society. 
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CHAPTER 3 Informal Remittances 
Introduction 
This literature review is an integral part of the analysis and also serves a dual purpose. It not 
only reviews the sources available for the topic in question but scrutinises the key drivers that 
direct the methodological tool used in this research.  The chosen key drivers have to be 
analysed in order to determine in which category of the forcefield analysis structure they will 
fall. Remittances for example - as it will be shown further down - will be purely a positive; a 
green key driver, as it facilitates both the state and the public interest. However, during the 
collection of my data, it was obvious that on certain occurrences remittances can vary as a 
debatable influence in the economic structure of a society. Those debatable connotations of 
remittances will be dealt with in the following chapter (money laundering and other illegal 
activities). The primary aim of this chapter is to shed light on the vast importance of 
remittances towards developing and underdeveloped countries and how much informal 
methods of remitting act as instrument and facilitator of this process. 
The bibliography on remittances is vast.  Remittances are also undoubtedly linked 
with migration. Most of the books and articles examine remittances in connection with this. 
The vast majority of the bibliography studies remittances in a theoretical and a deterministic 
perspective. Or taken at the developmental angle, it attempts to demonstrate the broadness of 
remittances contribution to the public‘s and state‘s welfare. Very few books closely look at 
remittances as part of the informal economy. The books gathered in this research constitute 
an eclectic mix of references on remittances. As a result, I have divided the literature into 
three sub-categories; books that apply a more theoretical approach, material with a more 
developmental perspective and material that focuses mostly on the informal side of 
remittances. Of course, each book or article that fell into a certain category could also fit into 
one of the others; however for the sake of balance I placed the material according to where 
the weight of analysis was heaviest. 
Theoretical Approaches 
Most of the theoretical approaches use a mathematical model or a typology. Usually it is an 
attempt to determine them, as Ramesh Subramanian exemplifies by presenting a model of 
determinants of urban to rural remittances transfers in developing countries.85 Similarly West 
and Brown more creatively categorize remittances expenditure and they make a useful 
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distinction of their determinants between endogenous factors and exogenous.86 More 
specifically they render as endogenous factors the individual (i.e. someone‘s behaviour) and 
the structural (i.e. the composition of the community) and as exogenous something that can 
effectively change the endogenous (i.e. economic policies in host or home countries, wages 
and interest rates)87 The first paper simply attempts to mathematically determine them, but 
the second which focuses on behavioural aspects categorises them and then determines them. 
On the other hand Richard Adams stresses the lack of analysis on the impact of these 
financial transfers on poverty and investment. He claims that most of the bibliography is 
based on the assumption that most of the remittances are spent on consumption. This could be 
characterised as conventional wisdom, however it is not necessarily incorrect.  Adams 
identifies three factors for this failing; firstly the lack of remittance data, which is partly true 
as remittances are extremely hard to trace especially when they stem from informal channels, 
secondly the lack of poverty data. However in most countries, empirical examination can 
easily project the depth of poverty and World Bank mechanisms can produce fairly accurate 
estimations, and lastly it is relatively unknown how exactly remittances are used or spent. 
This is closely linked with the first factor since it is hard to trace them and it also hard to 
observe how they are actually funnelled from the recipient. Adams, using an econometric 
model produced three key findings, which emerged from the analysis of the impact of 
internal and international remittances on poverty and investment in Guatemala. However it 
must be noted that Adams does not explain how he surpassed the aforementioned pitfalls and 
produced his outcome. The first finding of Adams suggests that remittances may indeed 
reduce poverty in depth, level and severity. The second suggests that the majority of 
remittances are not actually spent on consumption goods. However, he based his study on 
comparing recipients and non-recipients of remittances and then he compared the percentage 
of the expenditure of the two, only to realise that non-recipients spent 58.9% on consumption 
goods and recipients spent between 54.2% and 55.9% of their money on such goods.88 
Therefore both spent more than half of their money anyway and the difference is marginal. It 
is also logical if we suppose that recipients due to their slightly enhanced income can simply 
afford to save or invest. The 4% difference is indeed negligible between recipients and non-
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recipients if we take into consideration that the augmented income of the recipients allows 
them to direct some of their capital to alternative commodities. Thus the distribution and the 
comparison of the income on equal terms seem rather unbalanced. However Adams had no 
clear indication of the quantity of the income between the recipients and the non-recipients. 
Therefore he did not make his comparison based on specific quantity of money or an average 
of per capita income. Meaning that, the 100% of the income of a recipient can be much more 
actual (spending) money of the respective 100% of a non-recipient. The third finding 
suggests that if recipients view remittances as a temporary stream of income they tend to 
spend more on investment.89 Temporary though, is a vague term, as it could easily mean 
several years, enough time for example to finance the construction of a house. Indeed 
theoretically, injections of income may stimulate spending as both the multiplier effect and 
the accelerator effect influence the responses of capital. On the one hand the multiplier effect 
is easier to be established as it is directly involved with deposits and reserves. However, due 
to the lack of data regarding remittances is almost impossible to calculate their impact in 
association with the multiplier effect. I suppose a rough estimation on the formal transfers 
could be possible based on the deposits but it would neglect the biggest stream of remittances 
which is funnelled via informal channels. On the other hand the accelerator effect is more 
substantial or self-explanatory as it suggests that the increase of income accelerates capital 
accumulation. Spending on consumption or investment it does engage anyway development 
and additional investment. Nevertheless, the lack of data constitutes rather difficult such 
macroeconomic estimations. Besides, the spending behaviour, as it will  be discussed further 
down tends to be very partial and relative to certain individual circumstances and situations. 
 In opposition to Adams, de Haas, suggests that, ―empirical evidence indicates that 
remittances are a comparatively stable, less volatile and counter-cyclical source of income 
and that the relation between migration duration and remittances is not linear‖90. However, in 
my opinion this is mostly linked to the aforementioned exogenous and endogenous factors. 
For example in Albania after the mass emigrational exodus of the mid-nineties most 
Albanians invested their remittances into the notorious pyramid schemes,91 on the other hand 
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in other countries like Somalia remittances are -generally speaking- an absolute necessity of 
livelihood for some families and there is no excess for investment. Actually such a 
perspective for some may sound extremely farfetched.92 Also, in contradiction with Adams‘ 
argument are Yang and Martinez as they suggest that remittances‘ effects can be really broad 
and even affect in a positive way families without migrant members. This is what they call 
favourable spill-overs, which is quite valid to occur as economic activity amplifies. However, 
the main core of their article pays more attention to exchange rates and especially in the 
shocks caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis.93 The crisis caused a serious spiral effect 
throughout the world even resulting in the significant drop of the oil price.  The exchange 
rates also suffered significantly as the devaluation of several currencies seriously affected the 
survival and living standards of millions of recipients and senders. For example, the change 
in the Thai baht was -40.2% and in the Indonesian rupiah -83.2 from July 1997 to July 
1998.
94
 Undoubtedly the pressures and the dependence on the unstable formal economic 
system pushed many senders towards alternative -perhaps less safe- but more stable in terms 
of exchange rates transfer systems. 
In this point it may be relevant to mention that the non-conformity of de Haas and 
Adams regarding the impermanence of remitting is strongly linked with the remittance decay 
hypothesis and how it is perceived. This hypothesis suggests that migrants with the intention 
of return, remit more than those who intend to stay permanently in the host country. The logic 
behind that is the fact that those who intend to return invest back to the home country for 
something better than those who have no intention to return and therefore no need to create 
savings or build a house, but just to help their families. It could also be because temporary 
remitters are attempting to use the opportunity to earn more money abroad and thus increase 
their transfers back home. Whereas permanent remitters feel that time is not as restrictive and 
they can even out the amount of spending they commit to remittances. Maimbo suggests that 
the decay could stem from the loosening of the ties as the migrant incorporates more into the 
host country. Maimbo also notes that the remittance decay indeed occurs and remittances 
indeed decline but the flow of money never actually stops completely, and even if that occurs 
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the remittance volume might show a sharp rise in the income levels.95 De Haas mentions that 
―remittances tend to increase in the first two decades after migration, and the subsequent 
‗remittance decay‘ is more delayed and the slope of this decline is much flatter than 
previously assumed‖.96 However, Ratha suggests in a recent World Bank report that 
remittances tend to be resilient when a financial crisis occurs and they are more stable than 
private flows in economic downturns.97 Also, because remittances are sent not only by new 
migrants but from settled ones, maybe relatively financially secured as well, this makes them 
persistent over time.98 This means that only a large break of emigrational influx might hinder 
remittances flows over a certain depth of time, for example the tightening migration policies 
of the US and the EU can affect those trends.99 However, slowdowns are inevitable not only 
because of the decay hypothesis but due to the unprecedented loss of jobs in the EU and 
especially in the US, such as in the construction sector where most of the migrants are 
traditionally absorbed. In a following chapter, for example I have gathered interviews of 
several families who lost their jobs due to the crisis and demonstrate how this affected their 
remittance habits. 
Developmental approaches 
The majority of books dealing with developmental issues linked with remittances also 
attempt to provide trends or determinants and they also examine the interaction of migrants 
with development and illicit tendencies. However illicit operations will be discussed further 
down. 
Aviva Chomsky, in a more journalistic way, bases her case on Latin Americans in the 
US. She stresses the fact that remittances are more effective than foreign aid, however her 
analysis is based upon a utopian approach generalizing and unifying problems that cannot be 
universally applied, perhaps not even within her own case study. For example the suggestion 
to send remittances to local associations that are involved in different types of development 
projects contradicts her cornerstone argument that resources that go directly to the person in 
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need are more effective than foreign aid. However it expands the idea for a more utilitarian 
use of remittances than just general consumption. For example in Guanajuato in Mexico there 
is a programme of joint ventures with home town associations producing clothes for export. 
However, US companies use this town as a site for building factories because most families 
rely on remittances and they are able to pay even less wages than in other parts of Mexico.100 
This shows clearly how fragile the balance is between a more centralised and organised 
structure (government or local association) and the actual recipient (end-user) of the 
remittances. 
 In a similar manner, Yang and Martinez point out the significance of remittances in 
comparison to official development aid or even foreign direct investments. For example in 
2002, remittances receipts of developing countries amounted to 79 billion dollars while 
official development aid in total was 51 billion dollars and FDIs approximately 189 billion 
dollars.101 Indeed, looking from a recipient‘s point-of-view foreign aid will not obviously 
contribute to build a house or buy a car. Foreign aid is aimed at macroeconomic and 
sustainable development-on a theoretical basis, at least- not on the immediate improvement 
of everyday life. Besides, in most countries a large part of the aid never reaches the point to 
finance the actual project it was supposed to assist. According to Sabri, remittances are also 
the major source of revenue for most Arab non-oil states. The figure he presents is far 
spectacular. Lebanon for example was the highest recipient of remittances in 2006 which 
accounted 5.6 billion US dollars.102 Sabri also focuses his attention on the problems, the 
policies and the measures of home countries on fund transfers, stressing the same fact as 
Adams, that the lack of published official  data and the degree of flows through informal 
channels constitutes the main problem of examining remittances.103 
On the other hand, as a counter-argument for the aforementioned, Maimbo and Ratha 
have a more optimistic view on remittances as they argue that remittances may complement 
efforts by governments. They also point out that they cannot be a substitute for sustained 
development.104 Ratha also draws attention to the counter-cyclical attributes of remittances 
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when an economy is on recession as a country could be enabled by the large capital inflows 
to pay for imports, repay foreign debt and at the same time improve the living standards of 
the recipients on a long term basis, as they can gain access to better education etc.105  In other 
words remittances can be beneficial for both the state and the public, even during a period of 
turmoil. Maimbo and Ratha, in general provide a very thorough examination on remittances 
as they cover every possible aspect. Very often they have a fixed convergence and alignment 
with Hernando de Soto‘s views, but their book definitely constitutes a certain kind of manual 
regarding remittances. They have covered every possible aspect of remittances but sometimes 
the book seems that it neglects to merge them with other variables apart from migration and 
state policies.  They divide the book into five themes, dealing respectively with trends and 
determinants, development, formal infrastructure, transparency in the informal channels and 
the interplay of remittances, migration and development. The book explores policy options 
for enhancing the poverty easing impact of remittance money in recipient countries, and 
acknowledges fears about the increasing migration and inequality. It also looks at new 
technologies that allow remittance service providers to reduce direct transaction costs and 
open new ways of making life easier for remitters and improving levels of transparency and 
accountability for regulators and policy makers. However, this is not necessarily the case as 
the lack of transparency is probably the fuel for remitting, nevertheless the deduction of the 
costs is something extremely important for those whose choose more transparent and possibly 
safer ways to send money to their families (as a great deal of money is being lost on the way 
by commissions and fees). They also point out that lack of data may be a problem as even 
developed countries like Denmark refuse to report any figures regarding remittances; 
however on a smaller more local scale the strength of the spill over effect of this extra income 
in certain communities is so evident and noticeable that it becomes very easy to record, at 
least on an empirical basis. Ratha and Maimbo also mention that in areas where remittances 
have been reportedly decreased, as in Sub-Sahara Africa, living standards have 
deteriorated.106 This argument is also supported by Micheal Reid, who notices that the decline 
in house-building and tougher immigration policies for a first time showed a general drop in 
remittances especially in Latin America. Nonetheless, remittances would still act as a cushion 
for several countries but they will no longer fuel economic growth.107 Besides, Hernando de 
Soto asserts that economic growth will not be achieved as long as houses and property are 
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only a shelter and not a means to produce capital, a tool that will enable people to enter in 
Braudel‘s glass bell.108 
Informal Remittances 
This category might be superfluous as remittances have an informal nature given the lack of 
transparency in the way they are earned, remitted and spent even when they funneled through 
official channels. Remittances certainly have a dual impact. On the one hand they affect the 
individual and local level and on the other hand, the state‘s development. On the individual 
and local level, communities are now able to afford basic goods such as food, and there is an 
overall improvement of their living standards and possibly enhanced investment. These 
transfers support lives in ways that are not easily captured by statistical evidence.109 Also due 
to the increase of the purchasing power, there are better chances for the lower classes to 
receive education, as the children do not to work to contribute financially to the family and 
the child death rate is reduced.110 On the other hand, according to Richard Adams, this 
situation has worsened the income distribution. However in contradistinction from Adams, 
Feiler argues that remittances improve the income distribution particularly for the unskilled 
migrant workers.111 The downside of this is the fact that the surplus capital is not usually 
directed to savings and investment but to flagrant and luxurious consumption.112 Another area 
that the surpluses were heavily directed is real estate. Gil Feiler points out that the high levels 
of real estate investments in the Middle East is a fact that led to the dramatic increase of land 
prices.113 On the state level the situation is clearer. The proportions of Middle Eastern 
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remittances in 1982 reached 10% of all international official money transfers.114 As Jeremy 
Scott-Joynt mentions, ―for the foreseeable future it seems clear that remittances will play an 
increasing role in the finances of poorer states‖115 The biggest asset the remittances offer to 
the state‘s economy is that they constitute one of the main sources of foreign currency. Apart 
from easing the foreign currency shortages, remittances also assist on the recovery of the 
balance of payments as I mentioned in the previous section. The overall external trade 
balance continues to rely on workers‘ remittances.116  The importance of remittances for the 
state is also portrayed by the fact that governments aware of the necessity, promoted 
migration.117  To be more specific, in Lebanon -which are the clearest example- remittances 
in 1951 formed 6% as part of the GDP, in the years 1971-1973 this increased to 16% and 
after 2000 is well over 20%. Of course it is difficult to calculate due to the large amount of 
errors and omissions.118 The figures suggest the over-reliance of Lebanon on remittances, this 
could foster idleness among those who benefit and also push up the value of the currency.119  
Moreover, as Charles B. Keely, who scrutinizes the negative aspects of remittances, states 
that they ―provide a transition to an otherwise unsustainable development but increase 
dependency and contribute to political and economic instability and development distortion 
and lead to economic decline that overshadows a temporary advantage for a fortunate few.‖120 
Following the same train of thought Hernando de Soto suggests the developing states cannot 
possibly continue living under the confusion and chaos of the informal economy. However, 
de Soto says that the current situation of most of the developing countries in the Third World 
and the former-soviet countries is just a phase of transition similar to the one Western Europe 
had during the industrial revolution or the USA at the beginning of the 19
th
 century. In other 
words, according to de Soto, those countries at the moment are going through a transitional 
phase, a very difficult phase of re-establishing their economies, their mind-sets and the 
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societal structure like Europe did 200 years ago.121 De Soto has minimal references on the 
actual remittances; however he thoroughly explains why the developing countries are failing 
to embrace capitalism. He founded his answer mainly on the fact that most of the developing 
countries have no formal or unified apparatus of recognizing and registering the private and 
state property. As a result, with no official proof and legal recognition, people cannot convert 
their houses to capital (meaning mortgages, loans etc) and all the transactions are carried out 
at the small local informal level. In that way those countries have vast amounts of dead 
capital, unable to finance and ensure their welfare and development.122 I will deal with this 
book more in depth in the following chapter which deals with corruption. As I mentioned 
previously, remittances have an informal nature. Most of the figures mentioned in the chapter 
were a result of the official transfers, meaning there is a vast percentage of capital flows in 
the world that cannot be accurately calculated. Gil Feiler mentions, that the unofficial total 
remittance transfer might be double than the official.123 Which are these networks that are 
capable of moving large amounts of money from one place to the other in a global 
framework? In the next section, I will describe Hawala, this ancient banking system, which 
allows almost instantly transferring money all over the globe. However, returning back to the 
pros and cons of remittances Savvina Choudhury comes in opposition to Keely and his 
generic views of the negative aspects of remittances, for instance she writes that in Egypt 
from 1974 to 1985 the economy grew at a rate of 8% per annum. This unprecedented growth 
had been fuelled by the return of Sinai oil fields, the higher oil prices, the re-opening of the 
Suez Canal as well as from the massive influx of foreign exchange from the remittances.124 
While, in the period from 1986 to 2003 due to the fall of foreign exchange receipts from the 
petroleum sector, the Suez Canal and from the decline of remittances the inflation increased 
from 13% in 1986 to 31% in 1987.125 
Being from a Mediterranean country myself I found staggering similarities in the way 
that people in many Middle Eastern and other developing countries conduct business. The 
common grounds were more than obvious.  It seemed like that the tendency to defy the law 
was innate (maybe with less extremity in Greece). Initially I was under the impression that 
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something cultural was involved. However, it is evident that this kind of behavior is more 
than usual to most of the developing countries, as also shown further down by Hernando de 
Soto. However, a certain cultural nearness does exist, probably due to the geographical 
proximity.  Also due to the cultural interaction in the Mediterranean when I came across the 
economic Islamic principles this alleged proximity became probably vaguer. Those principles 
are the following: 
 The principle of Tawheed and Brotherhood. This principle ―teaches the man how to 
relate and deal with other men in the light of his relationship with God‖ 126 In other 
words; it links up our duties to men with our duties to God. It places emphasis on 
social justice, which actually emanates from the Quran. As Choudhury simplifies the 
term; it is the principle of equality and co-operation.
127
 Also Tawheed eliminates riba, 
the Arabic term for interest, and israf which is excessive and wasteful consumption. 
Generally Islamic banking disapproves the presence of interest in economic 
transactions. 
 The principle of Work and Productivity. This principle reminds me of the 1977 
reformation of the Soviet constitution, which was actually stating the same thing. 
Independently of the Islamic and Communist similarities, which do not end here, 
Work and Productivity means that an individual‘s wages must be proportionate to the 
amount of labour performed by him. 
 The principle of Distributional Equality. This principle gives the right to society to 
redistribute private property. The objective of that is to increase the productive 
transformation of national income and wealth to the employment and welfare citizens. 
For example, ―the early Muslim refugees evicted from Mecca…and found refuge to 
Medina were treated on equal terms and not confined to camps…‖128 
Those principles refer to something more insubstantial than in real life economic activity or at 
least to something that cannot completely describe Islamic economic activity from the bank 
to the pavement. Nevertheless, cultural similarities had no important significance. First of all, 
all these certain aspects of informal economic activity can be found apart from in the 
Mediterranean, in the former Soviet countries, in Latin America and in most of the Third 
world countries. Hernado de Soto mentions that ―the difference of wealth between the West 
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and the rest of the world is so immense, that it cannot be explained by using only civilization 
as a criterion. Japan and Switzerland or the USA are entirely different countries culturally 
from Estonia, Mexico and Lebanon, however the former have succeeded miracles when the 
latter live in poverty and corruption.
129
 Informal money transfers are not a feature found only 
in the Middle East or in Latin America. Hawala also referred to as ―hundi‖,  was initially 
developed in Calcutta (India) around 1770, established before the introduction of western 
banking practices, and is currently a major remittance system used around the world.
130
 It is 
but one of several such systems; another well known example is the ―chop‖, ―chit‖ or ―flying 
money‖ system indigenous to China, and also, used around the world. Even American 
soldiers during the Vietnam War were exposed to hawala through the operations of Indian 
merchants in Saigon.
131
 Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists 
outside of, the ―traditional‖ banking or financial channels. Meaning it bypasses these systems 
which are often referred to as ―underground banking‖; this term is not always correct, as they 
often operate in the open with complete legitimacy, and these services are often heavily and 
effectively advertised.
132
 The components of Hawala and other informal transfer systems 
distinguish from other formal remittance systems because of mutual personal trust and the 
extensive use of connections such as family relationships or regional affiliations. Unlike 
traditional banking Hawala makes a minimal - and in many cases no use of any sort - of 
negotiable instrument. Transfers of money take place based on communications between 
members of a network of Hawaladars, or Hawala dealers.
133
 What is more Hawala recognizes 
no borders, as it says ―you can arrange a delivery of cash anywhere in the world -Hong Kong, 
Johannesburg, New York, Paris - it will be done in a maximum, of eight hours.‖134 For 
further understanding of what Hawala and most of the informal transfer systems are and how 
they work I quote the following example from the same article: 
To move money to New York, for instance, Ali will accept payment in Indian rupees 
from a client in Delhi. Then he'll call associates in Dubai, who in turn contact their man in 
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New York. The client in Delhi is given a code, usually the numbers from a currency note, 
which is passed on to the recipient. When the phone rings in New York, both messenger and 
recipient will read back alternate digits from the password. Identity thus established, the 
recipient would be paid in dollars.
135
 
Another more illuminating but more complicated example is when A gives $5000 to B to be 
transferred to D. B communicates with needs C (mediator) to pay the $5000 that he has given 
for D. B then can do this by invoicing a shipment $20,000 worth of telecom devices but 
invoice C only for $15,000. Then C pays B the $15.000 and the extra value (the $5000) 
finally end to D.
136
  Cronin mentions, that money is transferred into other commodities (such 
as diamonds in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and tanzanite from 
Tanzania) easily from all over the world.‖137 Apart from that the transactions as we saw are 
fast and they do not necessarily need the existence of information technology. 
A recent Economist article mentions that the vast majority of Hawala transactions 
legitimately help the Muslim poor, but some certainly did finance al-Qaeda.
138
 Indeed, it is a 
system that no names are kept and your background or the intentions of your transaction do 
not concern the medium or the Hawaladar. However, apart from that, what makes Hawala so 
preferable not only amongst the poor? 
Hawala in comparison to the modern reliable, technologically advanced systems of banking 
seems at least unreliable, risky, and obsolete and lacks recognised regulations and 
transparency. Meaning if something does not go according to plan the likelihood of being 
able to accuse those responsible and expose the fraud is limited. As I foretold on the one 
hand, Hawala seems untrustworthy but in fact it is quite the opposite. According to an 
Interpol research, there are six reasons that compose Hawala‘s and all the similar informal 
funds transfer systems prolongation; the reasons are as follows: 
 The primary reason is cost effectiveness. Meaning that, as Hawala does not use the 
bank exchange rate, the rate occurs after negotiations with the Hawaladar, as a result 
saving significant amounts of money. 
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 Secondly is efficiency and speed. A Hawala transaction needs from a couple of hours 
up to two days to be conducted. From my own personal experience a simple bank 
transfer needs at least three days. 
 The third reason is reliability. Complex international transactions, which might 
involve the client's local bank, its correspondent bank, the main office of a foreign 
bank and a branch office of the recipient's foreign bank, have the potential to be 
problematic. 
 The fourth reason is the lack of bureaucracy. People with expired visas, illegal 
migrants or people who lack adequate identification, generally people who cannot 
open a bank account use Hawala. This is one of the reasons that terrorists use Hawala. 
 The fifth reason is the lack of a paper trail. Meaning these transactions are anonymous 
and intractable. 
 The sixth reason is tax evasion. In South Asia, the ―black‖ or parallel economy is 
30%-50% of the ―white‖ or documented economy. Money remitted through official 
channels might invite scrutiny from tax authorities - Hawala provides a scrutiny-free 
remittance channel.
139
 
On top of those attributes Hernandez-Coss adds 
 Versatility and resilience. Remittances can survive civil wars, economic crises and 
sanctions and other events that can affect formal economy. 
 Secrecy and anonymity. No I/D is usually required nor any record keeping exists 
 Cultural familiarity. Out of comfort and familiarity they prefer informal systems and 
also every corner shop is a potential agent of making informal transfers meaning that 
language barrier maybe surpassed.
140
 For example, in Athens (and in most of the large 
Western cities) where most of central districts have buffers of a certain nationality or 
ethnic group, and shops spring out all over those areas and operate as mini markets of 
goods from the country of origin, they usually act as informal banks as well. 
Therefore, Hawala or whichever informal system of remittances is the quintessence of 
informal remittances. The stereotype of the average migrant from an underdeveloped region 
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usually depicts young men who are more than likely illiterate and possibly not able to obtain 
a bank account. Those are the main users of this system. Those are the people who really 
need it. It is definitely the technique to transfer remittances quickly and reliably without red 
tape obstacles. However the positive aspects of Hawala act like a Delphic sword, a double-
edged weapon for its own future. The intractability of Hawala and all the other informal fund 
transfer systems allow illegal transfers to be conducted such as money laundering. After 9/11 
the efforts to limit Hawala have been inadequate and in some cases detrimental. The most 
common recommendation regarding the restriction of Hawala was the creation of a regulatory 
framework. 300 bankers and law enforcement specialists attending a conference in Abu 
Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, said regulation was the key. In antithesis of 
the American stance against Hawala suggesting abolition, opposed by Nikos Passas 
(Professor at the Temple University) who argued that ―this system has worked for ages; 
instead of killing it, we need to learn from this successful business model‖141 Indeed Hawala, 
is much faster and possibly has the same reliability as modern banking apparatus'. Besides, 
the ―West‖ utilizes transfer techniques which were paved by Hawala , like the Western 
Union. Back to the regulation problematic, the central bank of the United Arab Emirates has 
started to tighten regulations on the informal money transfer system in an attempt to curb 
money laundering. The bank said it would start registering and certifying Hawala brokers, 142 
however it is possible that tighter regulation of the Hawala transfers might be harmful for the 
remittance dependent economies. Generally speaking, the suggested registration will allow 
the monitoring of flows towards illegal operations. Only recently Reuters mentioned that it 
has been discovered that Taliban have as a main source of income -  not money from opium 
trade as previously thought -  but money informally transferred from ―certain Gulf states‖. In 
any case though, the analysis here is not about the regulation of the informal transfers 
systems but for their existence, utility and role. The downside of the informal fund transfer 
system is the problem resolution. In the happen-stance, of non-reception of the funds for 
example, no one is accountable for the loss. However, according to Koning - Bielefeld ―even 
when formal channels are used, the level of genuine assistance provided to resolve problems 
has often been criticised.‖143 Other problems might be ―unexpected fees‖ or unexpected and 
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unjustifiable delays,144 but whatever the problems are that might appear, informal banking 
systems still remain an acceptable, trustworthy and efficient worldwide medium of fund 
transfers. 
 
Conclusion 
The bibliography in general recognises the positive input of formal or informal remittances in 
the economy. Definitely there are some negative elements in the whole process, such as the 
potential over-reliance of parts of the society and possibly states as well and their lack of 
perspective to sustainably support the economy. However their overall input is inexorably 
associated with the safeguarding of the livelihood of thousands of people in the developing 
world. Probably the most problematic aspect of the informal remittances and their informal 
transfer systems is the association with the various illegal networks which used –and still use- 
the attributes of those systems in order to transfer and launder their unlawful gains. This 
situation has led to a strong debate regarding the future of those informal transfer systems, 
rendering the situation extremely delicate as millions of recipients will be negatively affected 
as happened in Somalia after the September 11
th
 incidents of the regulation framework 
becoming tighter and stricter. Nevertheless the links of Hawala and remittances with money-
laundering will be adequately analysed in a following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 Corruption 
Introduction 
There is an axiom often applied to those with political ambitions: Power corrupts; absolute 
power corrupts absolutely. And Pittakos once said that a man‘s true character is only 
displayed when you bestow power upon him.
145
 Corruption is the second key driver to 
examine in relation to informal economy. Etymologically speaking, corruption stems from 
the Latin verb ―rumpo‖ which means to burst, to tear, to force open and to interrupt; to 
interrupt a circuit of normality I would add, to suspend the order of a status. This may be 
occasional and opportunistic in certain societies but in some cases it can become the status 
quo itself. The normality is substituted with abnormality. When instead of following the 
designated path you choose circumvention. 
Although the informal economy is often associated with the informal employment 
sector; informal remittances and the black market. It also includes other processes of 
economic activity as well as social characteristics. There is need to identify and analyse all 
the aspects of informal economy that are often neglected in similar studies. Any unregulated 
exchange of capital or services is a fraction of the informal economy. Corruption facilitates 
both and examination is absolutely needed to fulfil the comprehensive and global analysis of 
this paper on informal economy. Without corruption in the equation an immeasurable amount 
of informal economic activity will be ignored. Corruption as a key driver constitutes a 
developmental anathema not only in Lebanon as a developing country, but in the entire 
international stage. Lebanon is not a unique case regarding corruption; however in the words 
of Maha Al-Azar corruption in Lebanon is a fact of life.
146
 Undeniably, both shores of the 
Mediterranean basin suffer from a high degree of corruption. The literature I have used and 
the academia in general are -more or less- concurrent with the notion that corruption acts as a 
negative factor in sustainable development and restrains real economic growth. However, my 
empirical data on Lebanon projected a more moderate attitude. Perhaps it was from those 
who have benefited from corruption in terms of extra income or those who successfully used 
it to achieve something probably unachievable through the legal channels of bureaucracy. 
However, a satisfied minority cannot outperform the staggering macro-disadvantages of 
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political and economic corruption in a given state. Therefore corruption will be marked as a 
―red‖ key driver. 
According to Moe Farida and Fredou Ahmadi-Esfahani, “it appears that corrupt 
practices in Lebanon are at the core of the political system to the extent that even the most 
optimally designed institutions might fail in combating corruption as society‘s norms appear 
to rationalise taking bribes, and the country‘s elites regard politics as an arena for self-
enrichment.‖147 
 The bibliography on corruption is based on a triple axis. Colin Leys identifies the 
literature in historical studies, inquisitional and sociological; he also mentions that in English 
bibliography there is no general study on the matter.
148
 Once again, I have used a diverse 
combination of books, articles and online resources to provide a literature review on 
corruption, and avoiding to be distracted by an irrelevant categorization, as informal economy 
coupled with corruption is only a small fraction of total corruption. In this review instead of 
categorizing the literature and analysing it according to the discipline it serves, I have split 
corruption into components and I have applied the relevant bibliography, more like a 
structured article. For although I am keen to categorise it was impossible to do that as the 
present bibliography was rarely part of a single category. Firstly I am presenting the 
theoretical and explanatory components of corruption and secondly I am presenting the 
pragmatic factors of corruption in Lebanon and other developing countries that project 
whether it is favourable or damaging to growth whilst displaying the linkages with informal 
economy. 
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the significance of corruption as part and 
parcel of the informal economy in the international stage, as well as, in Lebanon and to 
demonstrate, if corruption hinders developmental and economic advancement whilst 
simultaneously being a useful tool for everyday people to utilise (as this may be the only way 
to surpass irrational liabilities usually within a state‘s apparatus). 
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Theoretical Framework; Descriptive examination 
Definitions 
I found it extremely challenging to find a satisfying definition for corruption to match the 
perspective and view which I applied to my analysis. Transparency International (TI) defines 
corruption as thus: 
“The misuse of entrusted power for private gain. Transparency International further 
differentiates between "according to rule" corruption and "against the rule" corruption. 
Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something 
that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other 
hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing. 
149 
However, TI focuses the definition of corruption on bribery, neglecting to define all 
the other elements that it may constitute. On the other hand, Nick Duncan perceives 
corruption as an element of dual nature. One part is tax evasion and the second part is the 
production that is not part of the GNP.
150
 I suppose in the word production Duncan also 
includes the innumerable informal daily transactions, otherwise this definition would 
overlook a gigantic fraction of corruption's components within a society. In addition, Michael 
Johnston describes corruption as the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit.
151
 
Generally the literature provides multiple explanations of what political or economic 
corruption is. It seems certain that none of the explanations provide adequate clarity on what 
actually constitutes corruption and without doubt none of the definitions offer a broad 
description to encapsulate of all the aspects of corruption. For this reason, William Miller 
states that it is preferable to avoid defining corruption given its non-fixed nature.
152
 John 
Gardiner follows Miller‘s train of thought and he goes a step further by pointing out that 
corruption is perceived differently by public opinion and differently by the authorities. 
However, even though he also states that it is preferable to avoid definitions, he provides us 
with an extensive catalogue of definitions. Nevertheless, Gardiner is extensively based on 
Michael Johnston‘s works. The distinctions between public, private and government are 
                                                          
149
 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq#faqcorr1 
150
 Duncan, Nick ―The non-perception based measurement of corruption‖ pp.131-160 in Sampford, Charles – 
Shacklock, Arthur – Connors, Carmel and Galtung, Fredrik (eds) ―Measuring Corruption‖ Aldershot, Ashgate: 
2006 p.153 
151
 Johnston, Michael ―Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, power and democracy” Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 2005, p.12 
152
 Miller, William ―Perceptions, experience, lies; what measures corruption and what do corruption measures 
measure.‖  pp. 163-188, In Sampford, Charles – Shacklock, Arthur – Connors, Carmel and Galtung, Fredrik 
(eds) ―Measuring Corruption‖ Aldershot, Ashgate: 2006, p.164 
58 
 
Johnston‘s hypotheses; even the distinctions between which activity is corrupt and which is 
not.
153
 Still, I found it unusual that Gardiner doubts the level of corruption in situations that 
corruption essentially assists public interest in such as during World War Two Germany 
when Jews were forbidden by law to emigrate and a passport inspector for 1000 DM would 
approve the departure.
154
 As I mentioned above corruption is not only about bribery, fraud 
and nepotism, it is also there to facilitate services as TI‘s definition cites. Since the inspector 
did not approve the departure free of charge it was not out of selflessness, the humanitarian 
factor was eliminated. Certainly using an example from that era enhances the argument as it 
triggers compassion. However, would the reader feel the same if the example was an African 
trying to emigrate in Europe, possibly for similar reasons? Unbiased corruption does exist 
though. Occasionally there are instances whereby for no apparent reason and for no obvious 
personal gain that someone looks the other way. An example from my personal experience; a 
tax auditor in Athens, rather than give me a large fine for not being punctual with my VAT 
responsibilities and presenting –to him- insufficient paperwork, he gave me an extraordinary 
-off the record- extension so I could deal with it, without being pressured. He did this twice. 
Even this bureaucratic deviation can be seen as a form of corruption. 
Petty and grand corruption 
In this point it is relevant to classify corruption for a better understanding.  Corruption is 
generally divided into two categories; the petty corruption and the grand corruption. 
According to Elisabeth Harrison, petty corruption is the everyday corruption that takes place 
where public officials meet the public. It is also referred to as routine corruption when people 
give small bribes to obtain a speedy completion of a bureaucratic procedure or to avoid a fine 
by a traffic policeman.
155
 As Uslaner mentions, people come to terms with petty corruption, 
(the small payments they make to doctors, clerks etc).
156
 Uslaner suggests that petty 
corruption is less tolerable than inescapable and it actually helps a large number of people to 
cope with broken public and private sectors. Also he does not regard petty corruption as 
unlawful and because it involves small amounts of money it does not engender jealousy and 
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people do not associate it with inequality.
157
 This actually exactly stands in opposition of my 
empirical findings. As we will observe further down, more often than not large sums of 
money are involved and feelings of inequity are quite widespread amongst the population. 
Lastly due to its accommodating nature in everyday life Uslaner suggests that it is actually 
wrong to think that petty corruption is wrong.
158
 I quite understand that, as his research is 
based on the ―real‖ world. However even though he portrays a clear picture on how useful it 
can be and how inevitable petty corruption is, his rhetoric in places is quite deifying for petty 
corruption, as he assumes that the money to be given is negligible and everyone can afford do 
it to help themselves. It reminds me of the signs on the Greek motorways which inform 
drivers that the tarmac is dangerous and worn. The state goes through the trouble to invest 
money on signs rather than actually repair the road because that way it is cheaper and easier. 
It is similar with Uslaner, petty corruption is helpful for everyday transactions and there is 
nothing anyone can do about it, even if it is dire for society and the economy. So if you 
cannot beat it, join in it. Similarly, Van Vuuren, according to a survey, highlights ―the fact 
that a large number of citizens do not know how to report corruption and many are afraid of 
the consequences of whistle blowing. The belief that reporting corruption will not change 
anything is also of concern.‖159 Also according to Van Vuuren, petty corruption gifts and 
favors are not perceived by many as a form of corruption. In any case petty corruption is 
generally overlooked as an area of concern in the public debate.
160
 
On the other hand is grand corruption, which usually involves large amounts of 
money and more senior officials dealing with infrastructure contracts, arms deals, passing 
laws that serve specific interests or simply using governmental money for personal gain.
161
 
Uslaner obviously suggests that grand corruption is the exact opposite of petty, sociologically 
at least as I see it. People are not so blasé about grand corruption and even the smallest 
amounts of money are perceived as morally evil.
162
 Of course, this situation occurs as people 
usually condemn to others their own disadvantages. Meaning, petty corruption is acceptable 
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as it helps the family but grand is not because it helps a certain official to build a larger 
palace. Definitely there is more of a moral dilemma there than an incidental or a social one, 
which affects the economy. For Uslaner corruption is generally dealt with like something that 
needs to be conserved rather than to be fought and fixed, as I mentioned above. In contrast, 
Susan Rose-Ackerman mentions that grand and petty corruption in essence shares certain 
features, and both can be deeply destructive of state functioning, bringing the state to the 
edge of failure and undermining the economy.
163
 Even a state‘s legitimacy can be 
undermined especially in cases when it becomes quite obvious that a narrow set of powerful 
private and public figures control the state. This is the case of bilateral monopoly.
164
 
Regarding the state‘s legitimacy, Lebanon is a clear case in point. For example, 
Transparency-Lebanon reports in a press release published the day following the elections 
that several candidates gave money to voters in exchange for their vote: a vote is worth 800 
dollars in Zahle (Bekaa province), between 60 and 100 dollars in Saida (south) and can reach 
3000 dollars in Zghorta (north).
165
 This is a very distinctive case of corruption, in terms of 
labeling it at least, as the citizens voluntarily undermine the fragile democratic institutions. 
However, they expect favors after the elections which operate as a compensating factor. As a 
final point, Ackerman handles corruption realistically throughout the book, seeking for long-
term solutions and focusing on the economic challenges using various case studies. In general 
most of the literature agrees that corruption, grand or petty, has profound in-egalitarian 
effects,
166
 and the most damaged parties are usually the poor, whether they have been 
(usually) voluntary victims of petty corruption or involuntary victims of grand corruption. 
Reasons for corruption and geographical incidence 
Which countries are more prone to corruption though? Conventional wisdom would suggest 
that countries with centralized governments and chaotic bureaucracies might be more 
inclined. However the literature is indisputably divided on that. Some academics feel that it is 
not even necessary to have a chaotic state apparatus and a centralized or authoritarian 
government at the same time to be more corrupt than others. Case studies prove that even 
economic liberalization and democratization processes might be reinforcing for corruption. 
Mark Robinson quotes Harris-White and White who suggest ―economic liberalization could 
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displace, refine and lead to more corruption according to China‘s and Korea‘s examples‖ 167 
and Robinson also adds that in Tanzania the same processes actually have enhanced corrupt 
tendencies.
168
 According to the World Development Indicators Database the top forty or fifty 
scoring countries with the highest corruption levels are what we consider as Third World 
countries , and almost all of them suffer from serious democratic deficit (in this case they 
were predominantly ex-soviet nations).
169
 Also according to the World Bank‘s Corruption 
Perception Index the top lowest scoring countries are usually democratic with economic 
stability but the bureaucracy level might be debatable.
170
 Supportive to that evidence are 
Alberto Ades and Rafael Tella who propose that corruption is higher in countries with 
economies dominated by a small number of firms or where anti-trust regulations are effective 
in preventing anti-competitive practices. Also economies with sheltered domestic firms from 
foreign competition tend to be more corrupt.
171
 Obviously the result of their paper is that 
opening up a country‘s domestic economy to foreign trade makes domestic firms more 
competitive and less corrupt. However, from my own understanding, the opening up of 
certain sectors like shipping or dairy farming in Greece caused the formation of cartels 
against the foreign firms with behind the scenes assistance from the government. In theory, 
Greek seas for example were open for any firm to provide transport services –mainly UK 
based ones- but in practice all efforts were incomplete as the local ex-rivals allied to render 
the status in a condition acutely unattractive for the foreign firms to enter. The same thing 
happened with dairy farming firms and telecommunications. No wonder Greece slipped four 
places in 2009 alone, to 71
st
 in the Global Competitiveness Index Report released by the 
World Economic Forum.
172
 Similarly in Lebanon, the lack of government transparency and 
reliable contract enforcement ensured that private sector investors only entered a market if 
they had cut deals with governing elites. It is not surprising that the UN reports that over 43% 
of foreign companies in Lebanon "always or very frequently" pay bribes and another 40% 
"sometimes" do.‖173  Anwar Shah in concurrence with Ades and Tella suggests that countries 
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with weak governance advocate the emergence of systems of rent extraction.
174
 Weak 
governance does not exclude of course democratic, developed and capitalistic states from the 
equation like Italy and Greece. For Jain, corruption is an issue of political health and it is 
synonymous with bribery. However Jain focuses mostly on grand corruption and not so much 
at the parochial level. Corruption for Jain is layered in three levels; policy, go-between and 
society and it is widely attributed to a morally failing society in the way Uslaner advocated it. 
The book however, despite the sum of contributions, fails to analyze low level corruption.
175
 
Goldem and Picci have a more holistic view on the matter. Corruption is everywhere. It 
occurs in any given state or society even in those with high honesty indices. Every official 
elected or appointed will deal eventually with corruption in a benevolent or malevolent 
manner.
176
 
 Thus the literature provides three main views on why and where corruption occurs 
habitually. Firstly, it is easier to arise in Third World and developing countries with low 
infrastructure and possibly authoritarian regimes, secondly it arouses in most countries 
(democratic and authoritarian) yet it is more predisposed in states with weak governance and 
looser institutions and thirdly it is universal. 
Forms of corruption 
Much of the attention regarding corruption is concentrated on bribes.  However, bribery is 
only one of the forms corruption takes. Nick Duncan applies a quantitative measurement of 
corruption and he identifies five forms. 
 Monetary rent; under that category would fall bribery, extortion fraud, favouritism in 
contracts etc. Also bribes can obtain prices at the market clearing price. 
 Social obligations; mostly common in petty corruption examples but frequent in grand 
corruption as well. Nepotism would fit perfectly under this banner. 
 Value/supply chain distortion; for example enforcing certain purchases from certain 
suppliers. Extremely widespread and very often it takes the form of social contract 
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especially around the Mediterranean when personal rivalries, social correctness, might 
impose anti-competitive tendencies and irrational behaviours. 
 Product or service gain; for the example the transaction is for 1 tonne of cement, to 
deliver 100KG in my truck. Interviews I had with truckers, verified this certain form 
of corruption, but I will develop that further in a following chapter. 
 Acquisition of non-monetary personal trappings of power; social dominance in 
various guises for example: fear, security, sexual behaviour, prestige.
177 
On the other hand, Matsoso identifies four forms of corruption and he places as a common 
denominator between grand and petty corruption, embezzlement. He explains that 
embezzlement is undisclosed amounts of government funds and procurement of illegitimate 
profits from public service for personal gain. He also mentions it -in a less descriptive 
approach than Duncan- as separate forms extortion, bribery and nepotism.
178
 For Matsoso 
corruption is a pandemic which impacts on society, it diminishes democracy and razes the 
states‘ budgets. On the same level Girling mentions as well as Matsosso that corruption is 
damaging to democracy and its institutions and he divides it into three dimensions:  
functional to development (economic) corruption, dysfunctional (political) corruption, and 
corruption that is offset by normative strengths, as in civil society. Generally he talks about 
corruption in a more theoretical, political level, mentioning Aristotle several times.
179
 Despite 
his philosophical pursuit, he makes a very interesting distinction. He describes corruption as 
interactive between democracy and capitalism and he distinguishes corruption in both a broad 
and narrow sense. ―In the broad sense it signifies the perversion of principles upon which a 
political system is founded and in narrow the secret form of social exchange by which 
administrative power holders make a living‖.180 I saved for last the opinion that generates the 
most controversy. From the point of view of analysts, economists, political theorists, what is 
more important is economic efficiency and political stability in a state. Provided that 
corruption has a positive effect on those two variables, no one is rushing to condemn 
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corruption. 
181
 Lockley Miller, Grødeland, and  Koshechkina refer to Samuel Huntington and 
Nathaniel Leff who suggest that corruption maintains  the stability of an autocratic regime but 
at the same time it could be functional in the same way that reform is. They also say that 
corruption and reform can be the equivalent of a revolution. For example corruption assisted 
as, they mention, to lubricate the creaky old machine of communism. On other side, de Soto 
quotes Joseph Reid who mentions that regimes have collapsed because the extent of 
corruption divided people between those who can deceive the system and to those who 
cannot.
182
 For Lockley Miller et al, corruption helped people to make relations between state 
and the population less inhuman; however they do recognise that it is a second best solution, 
with the first being the reorganisation and improvement of governance.
183
 Lastly they refer to 
corruption as potentially democratic as it offers opportunities to people otherwise excluded. 
However, even if this is true, in my opinion it pushes meritocracy into obscurity as other 
people more capable might be now excluded. In general, I think Miller, Grodeland and 
Koshechkina refer to the principle of effectiveness; we don‘t care how you do it, as long as 
you can do it, in plain words. The reality is that if such long term changes are impossible to 
take place, corruption is the only way out. However, Tanzi and Davoodi state that literature 
has replaced the romantic view of corruption and economy with a more realistic one. 
According to this new view, the payment of bribes is not a panacea for overcoming red tape 
and cumbersome government regulations.
184
 
 Hernando de Soto mentions that corruption is replacing the legal procedures, since it 
might be fairer this way.
185
 Normality is substituted, sometimes in detriment of the rule of 
law and legitimacy, by institutions out of the ordinary. In some other cases as de Soto argues, 
people resorted to corruption and became outlaws -in a way-, because the state would not 
allow them to operate inside the legal framework.
186
 Of course, de Soto as well as Jain 
recognises that they are not criminals, they only try to achieve ordinary goals, such as to 
obtain a driver‘s licence. That ―prohibited normative‖ which people resort to is probably the 
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only viable option in many cases. He continues that when the law is in opposition and there is 
antagonism with the laws that people in real life abide by and follow, corruption, poverty and 
violence are inevitable.
187
 
 
Pragmatic components; Corruption and Informal Economy 
Corruption as an act is an abstract meaning. Corruption takes flesh and blood with money. 
Jain argues that corruption makes itself visible as an economic transaction, but it would not 
exist if political institutions were able to apply their influences and controls.
188
 Stating the 
same thing with Jain but looking at it from the reverse point of view Rashid Sabri, identifies 
the link of political corruption with economic corruption in the Arab World; the high degree 
of government corruption leads to inefficiency in driving economic plans for development.
189
 
De Soto as well as Heinzen, believes that corruption and informal economy are two elements 
interconnected and interdependent.
190
 Ades and Tella also provided a simple model for 
corruption which renders it a profit sharing entity.
 191
 For example, a bureaucrat can obtain 
rights and therefore he receives bribes to overlook violations, grant licences etc. If the 
bureaucrat exercises his control properly then the profits are zero for the recipient and the 
donor. 
 Ultimately, capital flow under the banner of corruption is tax free, it is not part of any 
GNP, and therefore it signifies that corruption is one of the building blocks of informal 
economy. De Soto mentions that in Peru the operating cost of an unregistered business 
includes the 10% to 15% of the annual turnover directed to bribes and procurements.
192
 It is 
not much less in several countries for a legally operating business. These are vast sums of 
capital that stay in the shadow. In Lebanon, for example, a replacement driving licence 
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requires a US $7 bribe, car registration US $27 and passport renewal almost US $70. The 
baksheesh for a building permit for a residential house can cost more than US $2,000.
193
 
The everyday dealings are innumerable and the most sizeable capital flows which 
occur in the grand corruption ranks are sometimes laundered, but in most cases the funds 
follow underground passages being part and parcel with informal economy. If we exclude the 
personal gain and perhaps the assistance and humanisation of the inflexible state apparatuses, 
corruption constitutes an unsustainable suggestion to growth. Maybe parts of the literature 
suggest otherwise but in the end, it recognises that it is short-lived or just a second best 
solution in a desperate environment. Informal economy thrives with corruption and many 
make a living out of it. I have certain examples from my interviews regarding a postman who 
financed the construction of his house only via the extra informal income he made by small 
bribes and tips. Some countries thought this could be easily resolved. As Vitti Tanzi mentions 
―There has been some speculation in the theoretical economic literature that high 
wages may reduce the number of corrupt acts, while they may lead to demands for higher 
bribes on the part of those who continue to be corrupt. The reason is that high wages raise 
the opportunity cost of losing one's job, while they do not eliminate the greed on the part of 
some officials. Thus, while the number of corrupt acts is reduced, the total amount of 
corruption money paid may not necessarily fall.”194 
 As Ades and Tella point out, it is difficult to overstate the economic and social 
significance of corruption as the lack of reliable data kept corruption out of the research 
agenda. This allowed speculation of whether corruption is beneficial or harmful to growth.
195
 
The debate still remains the same. Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Khalid Sekkat concur with 
this view. They discovered as well as others that corruption has a negative impact on growth, 
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independently from its impact on investment.
196
 Maybe this is the source of the debate. They 
support that some managed to grow out of bribes, but as with other authors, who I mentioned 
further up, they found corruption more detrimental to growth and economy when the 
governance is poor.
197
 However in opposition to Sekkat and Tanzi‘s findings, Moe and 
Esfahani using Lebanon as a case study and supported by substantial bibliographic 
references, report that the connection between corruption and investment is negative.
198
 
Generally, Meon and Sekkat base their article on two hypotheses; a) the grease on the 
wheels hypothesis and b) the sand in the wheels of growth hypothesis. In both instances, 
despite the pros and the cons of each hypothesis, the common denominator is that corruption 
impedes economy and growth whilst it skyrockets informal economy and tax evasion. On the 
topic of Lebanon, Moe and Esfahani concluded that corruption reduces Lebanon‘s standard 
of living as measured by the real GDP per capita.
199
 Those two hypotheses allow us to 
establish that those who are benefited from corruption could the ruling elites, the bureaucrats 
but the general population as well. Probably the general population greases the wheels as in 
this way is able to bypass the rigid red tape and complete successfully the smallest 
transactions which otherwise would be extremely time consuming or even impossible. In this 
way the petty clerk for example may extract some personal benefits from the established 
corruption. It does cause a vicious circle of petty clientelism and micro-bribery from civil 
servant to the public and vice-versa. Someone may even suggest that this actually sands the 
wheels as it maintains and feeds a rather unethical way of conducting business or simple 
bureaucratic transactions. Of course, to a large extent this must be attributed to social 
propinquity or even kinship where in countries like Lebanon for example due to the strong 
ties and size of the extended family is more than frequent to find a relative in a bureaucratic 
position. Kinship of course is evident in the ruling elites as nepotism is one the most 
frustrating elements among the social web. Public positions tend to be hereditary and the lack 
of meritocracy nourishes upheaval, political movements and even migration. However, it is 
the ruling elites within the government and the business circles that harvest the most.  
Political corruption deprives the legitimacy in governments, investments and the whole wide 
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state apparatus. It does sand the wheels in such extent where social frustration is eminent and 
potentially dangerous for the stability of the state. Usually the utilization of the rents results 
in even more corrupt tendencies as we can see in Lebanon for example where a handful of 
ruling elites controls pretty much everything. As shown earlier and as it will be discussed 
further down it is highly unlikely that the rents extracted by corruption will be redirected to 
beneficial activities for the social web or the state. Generally speaking the embezzled funds 
or the rents are channelled to private accounts for the enrichment of certain elites and the 
deeper establishment of this capability. 
As a general rule literature is abound in citations, stories and examples of petty and 
grand corruption transactions. I will not refer to any of those stories here as I will mention a 
plentiful example in a following chapter. However, there are limited references, counter to 
the remittances bibliography, regarding the funnelling and usage of those funds. Apart from 
several speculations on investment as Meon and Sekkat mention, in total, the bibliography 
misses a holistic study on the usage of corruption money.  Robert Wade points out the 
obvious. Corruption is ―channelling resources out of the hands of the clients of the 
bureaucracy and the state treasury, into their own [meaning those who receive bribes etc] and 
that, those informal transfers are not just one small part of administrative mechanics. They 
are at the very centre of the system of bureaucratic surplus extraction.‖ 200 At the end of the 
day as Michael Johnston mentions, corruption by nature is a secretive process in most cases, 
with all who know of illicit dealings having an interest in concealing them.
201
 
Corruption is macro-economically regressive. According to Vitti and Davoodi it also 
affects the structure of taxes; this also may in part explain the predominant share of indirect 
taxes in total tax revenues.
202
 Another example is an unusual practice, applied in Greece 
regarding corruption. It is what I call pre-emptive taxation. The state recognises that all 
businesses will evade taxes and it enforces an increased taxation –out of the regulated 
frameworks sometimes- especially to small and medium businesses as a payment in advance 
or deposit for the future income that a businessman will ―definitely‖ conceal. Of course, that 
extends from my personal experience-those who can afford it- to increase bribes to the tax 
office for exclusions and deliberate typing errors. Nevertheless manifold MENA countries - 
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including Lebanon- have progressed in anti-corruption measures, as Sfakianakis and 
Leenders suggest, however, none of the promising effort seems to be adequate to control the 
problem.
203
 The Global Corruption Barometer ―lays out the situation pretty starkly for 
residents of Arab world countries and especially Lebanon.‖ The article mentions that despite 
several efforts to curb corruption, it still remains one the most important challenges in 
Lebanon.
204
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, corruption has proven to be a golden opportunity for those who can 
benefit from it, whether they are recipients of a service or of a favour, or they are recipients 
of a bribe or procurement. But for others it is an untamed and uncontrollable beast because, 
for multiple reasons, they could not turn the cogwheels of this system and they were excluded 
and marginalized. In a more long range view, corruption can be, according to specific 
circumstances, beneficial for certain economic factors like investment –according to several 
authors- but in the vast majority of the occasions it is regressive and harmful to economic 
growth and welded to informal economy. In Lebanon, as Moe and Esfahani suggested, 
corruption reduces Lebanon‘s standards of living, and investment as well as human capital 
productivity. It also creates increased inefficiencies in the government expenditure, and as a 
consequence, reduces its effectiveness. However, there are insufficient grounds to suggest 
that corruption alters the quality of foreign aid.
205
 Also in a more social perspective the 
spectre of corruption in Lebanon seems to be so invincible that the people of Lebanon as Al-
Azar mentions have become resigned to the problem.
206
 Last of all, Transparency 
International asserted that in Lebanon and in most of the Arab states "the issue of combating 
public sector corruption has gained momentum and legitimacy, and is now being addressed 
openly as a principal obstacle to development." 
207 
In this review, I have analysed the impact of corruption as a single element of the 
informal economy, impacting on socio-economic life and not as a political tool. This review 
lays the ground for further exploration of Lebanon‘s hectic informal economy and corrupt 
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practices. However, several questions have occurred. How does corruption specifically work 
for Lebanon? What role does corruption play during the manifold wars in Lebanon? Is 
corruption necessary for the general population, despite the proven macro-economic 
disruption that it impose 
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CHAPTER 5 Illegal networks 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I discussed the difference of illegality and criminality. Hernando de 
Soto made the distinction between those who are privileged within the context of informal 
economy and those who can actually operate unhindered and unrestricted due to their 
political or economic ties and those who have no privileges whatsoever and therefore are 
more vulnerable to legal prosecution. Also I have dealt with the need for informality. The 
vast majority of the population in developing countries lives and breathes in an informal 
world for its survival, when an ―influential‖ minority brightly bestirs in the shadowy path of 
exploitation and criminal activity. Even corruption (petty) given the inadequacies of any 
given state can be a means of survival, but at the same time it can be an instrument for 
extortion and blackmailing on a large scale. Also in Chapter 3 I have analysed the informal 
remittances‘ flows as a beneficial fraction for society and economy. However, numerous 
illegal networks use all those informal mechanisms for their own benefit, in order to achieve 
their goals. Those goals can be funding of specific paramilitary or even terrorist organisation 
and money laundering processes which are absolutely needed in order to legitimise the 
illegitimate capital and in general to facilitate the whole economic activity generated by 
criminal activities like embezzlement, black markets, drug trafficking, illegal arms sales, 
smuggling and others. 
 The present chapter will deal with those networks which inevitably operate within 
the framework of the informal economy and due to their size and impact are capable of being 
of significant influence and dynamics, even in a cross-border level. The aim of this chapter is 
to identify the existence and the level of contribution of those illegal networks to the 
economy as well as the level of integration within the state and the degree of association with 
the state apparatus, before finally coming to a conclusion on whether this economic activity 
generated through those networks has beneficial or detrimental value. This section is tackling 
the fourth key driver of the analysis which plays an important role on the final determination 
of the informal economy‘s status as a parameter of benefit or as a parameter of loss. Those 
illegal networks come to fill the blanks on a probably favourable impression regarding the 
informal economy‘s input. 
 In this chapter all the major economic activities will be observed involving illegal 
economic dealings. In some cases, the services or goods will be illegal, such as the sale of 
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narcotics; in some others, the merchandise will be otherwise legal goods but sold illicitly to 
avoid tax payments or licensing requirements, such as unregistered firearms. Generally 
speaking regarding the operation of those illegal networks, apart from the moral issues that 
they impinge on such as the exploitation of human life, they are an unfavourable ingredient 
for growth. 
 Also due to the inclination of those funds to be deposited in different countries than 
the ones that the activity has been committed in and due to the tendency of this capital to be 
hoarded in various tax havens and not in the vaults of commercial conventional banks, the 
overall benefits of the existence of such large amounts of money are actually eliminated, at 
least for the ―host‖ country of the activity or operation. Indeed, as Alexandro Pansa writes 
when the funds enter the commercial circuit they are usually spent in different areas or 
countries from those the money was produced in.
208 
 One of my major concerns is the fact that apart from very blatant illegal 
organisations and activities, a large fraction of the economic activities has to be attributed to 
terrorist organisations. Generally, after the events of September 11
th
 2001 the thorough 
inspection of the finances of specific organisations came to the fore. For example Al-Qaeda is 
irrefutably characterised as a terrorist organisation and all the assets linked to Al-Qaeda were 
systematically scrutinised. However, speaking for other specific organisations the 
characterisation ―terrorist‖ might be proven academically difficult. This situation probably 
stems from the ―uber-cliche‖ motto ―one man‘s terrorist is another man‘s freedom fighter‖, or 
from the Metternichian attitude of the Western world towards the various reactionary and 
radical organisations.
209
 However, no matter the shifting political attitudes towards the 
various groups or the conventional perceptions of a given group or organisation, giving the 
brand of ―terrorist‖ to an individual or an organisation -for me at least- is extremely 
complicated.
210 
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 Nevertheless, if an organisation operates in underground and illegal channels, 
terrorist or not, it still produces an illegal economic activity. For example Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, is perceived by many in the Western world as a purely terrorist organisation due to 
its extensive guerrilla fighting -via its military wing called Islamic Resistance- in South 
Lebanon mainly and due to the debatable links with other radical organisations and also due 
to the several hijackings, bombings and kidnappings that took place in the previous years.
211
 
However Hezbollah at the same time is co-governing party in the alliance of several political 
factions in Lebanon currently holding 13 seats in the parliament out of 57 held by the 8
th
 
March coalition that it participates in the current government, in the total of 128 
parliamentary seats.
212
 Hezbollah, apart from the aforementioned is often characterised as a 
state-within-the-state organisation due to its provision of social services, including the 
operation of schools, hospitals, and agricultural services for thousands of Lebanese Shiites 
and due to the fact -as Robert Rabil writes- that over the years Hezbollah has developed 
within the public sector strong informal ties.
 213  
 A major problem that I came across, derived mainly by the feelings the September 
11
th
 attacks have created and the on-going War on Terror, is that a respectable amount of the 
bibliography it seems is rather biased and potentially hyperbolic in the views toward 
Hezbollah and other comparable organisations like the PKK (Kurdistan‘s Workers Party). 
Meaning that, those organisations can be easily condemned (or praised) in a rather 
disproportionate manner. Without the slightest intention to diminish or exaggerate any event 
or incident that one of those organisations may have participated in, I have encountered with 
the over-jealous attempt of some of my primary and secondary evidence to typify a priori 
several situations and individuals. This situation renders the present analysis extremely 
delicate in the approach. However it must be noted that despite the constant characterization 
of Hezbollah as integral part of the informal economy -and excluding the political 
representation in the parliament-, I must acknowledge the existence and operation of various 
organizations linked with Hezbollah that operate within the framework of formal economy. 
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For example the Bayt Al Mal which utilises the Yousser Company for Finance and 
Investment to secure loans, the Jihad Al Bina which the real estate foundation of Hezbollah 
responsible for the reconstruction efforts in Lebanon and of course the radio station of 
Hezbollah Al Nour and the TV station Al Manar.
214
 Also Hezbollah apparently through the 
parliamentary decision making process, supports all most if not all the governmental efforts 
for economic regulation and improvement. However, as all the political parties in the world 
there are some contradictory aspects, without necessarily undermining the democratic 
processes. Also it must be noted that after the Lebanon Israel conflict in 2006, Hezbollah 
dispensed tens of millions of dollars to the displaced Lebanese people of the South as well as 
of Beirut‘s southern suburbs. This small boost to some extent according to several economists 
and bankers will affect positively but not extensively the inflation and slightly relieve the 
economy.
215
  
 Another problem that I came across is the complete lack of a specific study 
regarding the matter. Most of the secondary material deals with the impact of terrorism (as an 
act) on the economy or with the finances of terrorism in terms of origin and process, for the 
reason that it is probably more contemporary to deal with those aspects. Also apart from that, 
there are no specific studies regarding the finances of other illegal networks, let alone 
specifically in Lebanon. Apparently due to the secretive ways and their criminal status, it is 
quite understandable to be difficult to acquire that information; but in any case the purpose of 
this section is not to look into the economics of very specific illegal organisations but to the 
overall input in the ranks of the informal economy. Of course there are some articles dealing 
with the issue but their approaches are more predictive based on rather vague estimations. 
Also there is no adequate theoretical or analytical framework to base this chapter upon; 
however there are some more generic studies dealing with the issue of illegal networks, 
which might help to evaluate the level of incorporation of those networks into the state, the 
society and the economy. 
 
Theoretical Concepts 
All the illegal networks make use of the informal remittances channels, like hawala to 
transfer the unlaundered capital and they are part and parcel with corruption, as it assists to 
                                                          
214
 www.almanr.com.lb 
215
 Habib, Osama ―Hizbullah deluges economy in dollars‖ Thursday, August 24, 2006 available at 
www.dailtystar.com.lb 
75 
 
achieve their goals - since the authorities will look the other way - and informal trade by the 
use of black market and other informal trade deals. In order to achieve that level of 
amalgamation it means that those networks are not a separate entity, completely detached 
from the state apparatus, as in some cases it may act as a facilitator or even collaborator of 
those networks.   
 As Josiah McConnell Heyman writes, the state does not conspire with the illegal 
networks but in many cases it certainly lays the ground for more favourable conditions. This 
―structuralist‖ perception explains the symbiosis of crime with the state and that the lack of 
governmental transparency acts like a buffer for the expansion of those networks and their 
practices.
216
 Heyman‘s examines the phenomenon of why some states launch law 
enforcement crusades when others tolerate illegality and closely collaborate with criminals.
217
 
Generally Heyman often looks at the issue from a rather philosophical point of view, but in 
several occasions he offers some very sharp examples displaying that in many cases the state 
itself could act as an illegal network.
218
 He also stresses that in the day to day illegal 
engagement with illegal practices the state workers are particularly important as they are 
needed in order to bend the law to fit various decisions and conditions.
219
 Alan Smart is in 
agreement with Heyman as he also suggests that the illegal networks need to include state 
officials in their ranks.
220
 Smart is dealing mostly with the varieties of bribery and he 
demonstrates several categories of briberies such as if an illegal dealing is on a continuing 
basis or if it happens every now and then.
221
 The point is that the illegal networks cannot 
survive or exist without the assistance of the government or the state in general. Tim 
Newburn, from the criminologist‘s point of view describes Seattle‘s crime network which 
includes financiers (solicitors, accountants), politicians (mayors, councilmen), businessmen 
(restaurant owners, club owners, and pawnshop owners), law-enforcement officers and the 
various racketeers (usurers, pimps, drug distributors).
222
 It is quite noticeable that in order for 
an illegal network to operate successfully it needs a wider ring of collaborators. The 
interconnection and interdependence of most of the illegal networks throughout the world is 
common. 
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 As I mentioned earlier, some states have different responses towards those networks. 
According to Jessica Piombo, the location of the finances of those networks is situated within 
the informal economy; states that are more conflict-prone or heavily relied on their informal 
economies like Sudan or Somalia take little or no measures against the various illegal 
networks because they are unable to do so or because they are partly reliant on them.
223 
 Piombo exhausts her analysis mainly on the fact that anti-money laundering regimes 
(AML) and counter-terrorist finance (CTF) weapons are not that welcomed in East Africa 
because firstly they might be harmful to the local population who relies on the informal 
economy‘s mechanisms and secondly because the governments assume that they will be 
ineffective. To be more specific, Somalia for example, has had no formal banking system for 
several years;
224
 meaning the shutting down of Somalia‘s Al Barakaat225 hawala office – due 
to alleged connections to Al-Qaeda- in the United States as a result of the Executive Order 
13224 was devastating.
226
  Hawala and all the other informal transfer systems are very 
essential, for the low-paid workers, who in their majority are mostly illiterate and cannot 
formally open an account in a bank or they cannot afford different transfers systems.
227
 The 
remittances for the Somali economy have vital importance, thus depriving those from a state 
that had already suffered from the various conflicts and serious economic under-development 
was extremely damaging. On top of that, as Ibrahim Warde writes, the Al-Barakaat was set 
up to address the needs of Somali immigrants who sent, on a weekly or monthly basis, a 
significant part of their earnings to their families.‖ Warde continues ―that the whole operation 
was based on wrong assumptions and at the end the US government accusations turned out to 
be false.‖228 Remarkably other states or regions had been dealt with in a dissimilar attitude. 
                                                          
223
 Piombo, Jessica ―Terrorist Financing and Government Responses in East Africa‖ in the Giraldo, Jeanne – 
Trinkunas, Harold (eds) ―Terrorism financing and state responses: a comparative perspective‖ Stanford 
University Press, Stanford : 2007, p.194 
224
 ―Fears over US Hawala crackdown‖ Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1993346.stm 
225
 Somalia was largely supported by that charity group, Al-Barakaat, which accounted for ―about half of the 
country‘s $500 million remittances. From Kilkenny, Allison ―Al-Barakaat: the little charity that could have 
saved Somalia”  Saturday, May 16th, 2009 Available in http://www.jwharrison.com/blog/2009/05/16/al-
barakaat-the-little-charity-that-could-have-saved-somalia/ 
226
  Basile, Mark ―Going to the source: Why Al-Qaeda’s Financial Network Is Likely To Withstand The Current  
War On Terrorism Financing.‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Volume 27, 2004 p.176 
227
 ―UAE tightens ‗terror money‘ rules‖ Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2396645.stm 
228
 According to Warde the Al-Barakaat assumed a significant role in the Somali government. Warde adds that 
at the time of the September 11 attacks Al-Barakaat was Somalia‘s largest business group with ―subsidiaries 
involved in banking, telecommunications, and construction. The closing of Al-Barakaat had devastating effects 
on Somalia. International telephone service to 25,000 people was cut off. For additional reading look in Warde, 
Ibrahim ―The Price Of Fear: al-Qaeda and the truth behind the financial war on terror‖ I.B. Tauris, London: 
2007 p.93 
77 
 
For example Dubai
229
 which acts as a hub of many of the Hawala activities, dealt with 
completely different behaviour. As an economist states Dubai is described privately by 
American officials as a centre for trade-based money laundering.
230
 Nevertheless, returning 
back to Piombo‘s analysis, an important element of her study is the suggestion that those two 
efforts of tracking down the trail of terrorist money has created a tidal wave of informality 
and that it forced those networks to shift almost completely out of the formal sector and go 
deeper into the informal economy.
231
 Nevertheless, as Costigan and Gold suggest, there are 
still strong ties with the formal sector as a large percentage of the capital is still circulated 
through official channels and various legitimate businesses.
232
   
 The overall premise of the bibliography dealing with the finances of informal 
networks is that the studies are by large focused on terrorism and the material that looks with 
a more theoretical perspective is actually a call for further regulation. Thomas J. Biersteker 
and Sue E. Eckert for example are on a constant call for regulation, even though they debate 
its effectiveness.
233
 Also they support Piombo‘s view that especially after September 11th; all 
the illegal networks have almost abandoned operating within the framework of formal 
economy. But one of the most interesting theoretic divisions Jeroen Gunning drew in the 
same book is the differentiation of the various illegal networks-terrorist or not- to socially 
embedded ones and non-socially embedded, meaning the ones having a lesser amount of 
welfare orientation.
234
 For example, Hamas or Hezbollah in Lebanon as I mentioned above 
since they provide social services and their power stems from the popular support are more 
socially, economically and politically embedded. On the other hand, Al Qaeda is a 
transnational network that has no social emphasis and minimal local accountability, while it 
is rather focused on armed activity.
235
 This particular distinction stands for all the types of 
illegal networks such as the various Mafias for example. From this distinction we also may 
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draw results regarding the economic input of those networks. For example when an illegal 
network directly affects social groupings in terms of their location, beliefs, interests etc, it is 
highly likely to be socially embedded or -at least- accepted since some people are actually 
benefited. However, when we deal with introvert illegal networks, meaning those that keep 
the profits for themselves and for their few leaders, the local impact is rather limited and 
feelings of resentment are more widespread amongst the society. In any case, part of the 
sustainability of those networks must be attributed to petty crime and drug trafficking as well 
as the legal means of funding like donations. This is another example of the immense 
interconnection of various illegal networks with others and in some cases with terrorist 
ones.
236
 
 Apart from the vast majority of the literature that deals with finances of terrorism or 
with the ―potentially‖ terrorist organisations, I found several specific studies that deal with 
the other factions of illegal networks like drug trafficking and corruption. One of the models I 
came across was Fabio Méndez‘s study dealing with the effects of corruption on illegal 
economic activities. Mendez suggests that a potential increase of bribing very specific official 
may contribute to an overall reduction of illegal economic activities. Specifically Mendez‘s 
model shows that an increase in the level of corruption may lead to greater regulation 
compliance and less unofficial economic activity. Mendez‘s ideas come in opposition of the 
greater bulk of the bibliography that suggests a greater degree of regulation. Of course 
Mendez recognizes that the regulatory compliance might be complex for his theory and that 
his mathematical model has several variables that they could render it outdated as they might 
cause opposing reactions. Mendez mentions ―the level of corruption was measured by the 
fraction of corrupt public officials and the level of illegal economic activity was measured by 
both, the level of regulation compliance and the size of the unofficial or shadow economy. 
This paper, however, ignores the links that may exist between the monitoring efforts of a 
corrupt official and the level of corruption in general.‖237 Apart from the flaws Mendez 
himself recognises the model has no further application in any other forms of illegal 
economic activities. 
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 A different model dealing with the financial side of drugs is the Manolis Galenianos - 
Rosalie Liccardo Pacula – Nicola Pesico‘s model for the market of illegal drugs. The paper 
suggests that ―the drug economy crowds out the incentives to join the formal sector‖ and that 
trade in illicit drugs gives rise to an underground economy. However, I find irrelevant the 
authors‘ suggestion that the particular kind of participation in the informal economy promotes 
violence, crime and addiction and it elevates the incarceration rates. Those statements are not 
supported in the end by the model and they are extremely generic and absolute. The paper 
suggests, as well as others, the need for further regulation but the whole study is limited by 
virtue of the fact that the retail market of the illegal drugs leaves out of the equation the ―big 
business‖.238 
 Gary Becker, Kevin Murphy and Michael Grossman present another study, dealing 
with drugs but as a case study this time, which also includes the large scale trade and 
production. The paper concentrates on both the positive and normative effects of efforts to 
reduce quantities by making production illegal, and then punishing producers who are 
apprehended. The article also examines the added value of the endeavours to fight the illegal 
production and the illegal activities. It suggests that when the demand is inflexible, quantity 
reductions through enforcement against illegal producers is very costly, and it can be 
disastrous.
239
 The overall effects of the enforcement endeavours over drug trafficking in 
association with the economic output of the drugs are briefly explained by the fact that 
―enforcement cuts consumption by raising costs of suppliers mainly because they risk 
imprisonment and other punishments. The increase in costs leads to higher prices, which in 
turn induces lower consumption. But if demand is inelastic - as the demand for drugs seems 
to be - then higher prices leads to an increase in total spending on these illegal goods”240 
Also the authors note that any avoidance of inspection is partly because of the fact that state 
officials are bribed through the vast sums of money that are accumulated through this 
practice. Another paper which presents its recommendations on a similar basis of the 
aforementioned article is Dennis M. Lormel‘s White Paper on terrorist finance. The specific 
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paper, even though it is concentrated on terrorism networks, provides an analogous 
recommendatory framework, intrinsically linked with various regulatory and enforcement 
institutions in the United States. However it becomes apparent that the assessment of the 
paper is produced by non-academic purposes, therefore, even though the recommendations 
are of a certain value the paper taken as a whole is a rather unspecific in opinion.
241 
 
Independently of the state responses towards the various illegal networks, their 
association with the state is indisputable and unreserved as it also depicted by the previously 
mentioned literature. In some cases like in Lebanon or Palestine, it seems that those networks 
have the capacity to replace the state in many aspects. In some other cases the wealth they 
accumulate and circulate is the lifeblood of the state‘s economy, whereas on other occasions 
they are just parasitic elements, corrupting the society and the well-being of the economy. 
Generally the theoretical part of the literature provides a rather mixed outlook on the 
illegal networks. Definitely, the literature recognises that the lack of a certain regulatory 
framework and the apparent lack of legal compliance are questions that are difficult to be 
addressed adequately, due to the intense interconnections of those networks with the state and 
other networks. Also due to the enforcement of compliance with certain regulations 
especially after September 11
th
, the existence of the networks feeds the informal economy at 
an unprecedented rate. Presumably, due to the illicit and unstable nature of those networks 
and the morally questionable practices they use, the basic hypothesis is that their overall 
contribution to the economy is, if not harmful, probably not accommodating for sustainable 
growth. 
 
Pragmatic Concepts 
It is absolutely necessary to go beyond the limitations of the theoretical concepts regarding 
the illegal networks as this issue is embedded within the societal web. Those networks 
constitute a phenomenon which is impossible to describe and address only through wise 
recommendations. This is the reason I need empirical secondary material which stems from 
the street experience of journalists and academics with insight. The basic disciplines which 
will be examined in this section compose the core of more-or-less all of the illegal networks, 
not only in Lebanon but throughout the world. Those disciplines are smuggling, drugs, illegal 
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arms sales and weaponry, trafficking, terrorism and the link of all the above - money 
laundering. 
  
Prostitution 
One of the most characteristic occurrences of the illegal networks operations is the trafficking 
of sexual workers and prostitution. Prostitution, the so-called oldest profession in the world is 
probably the most common illegal practice deeply entrenched within the informal economy. 
The academic views on prostitution vary. According to Lena Edlund and Evelyn Korn 
prostitution apart from its unusual feature, meaning that, ―it is well paid despite being low 
skill, labour intensive and it is a multibillion dollar business that employs millions of women 
worldwide‖242 Also a recent study by the International Labour Office estimated that in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, between 0.25 and 1.5 percent of the 
female population work as prostitutes and that the sex sector accounts for between 2 and 14 
percent of the gross domestic product.
243 
 Lebanon is no stranger to the mentioned above practices. First of all Lebanon is a 
haven of freedom and liberation in comparison to other Middle Eastern societies. One of the 
reasons for this quite apparent difference is the legality of prostitution. While illegal in most 
countries of the region and many other countries of the world, prostitution is actually legal in 
Lebanon. However, most of the prostitution occurs illegally.
244
 Apart from the often 
occurrences in the refugee camps in the South, it is quite widespread as an integral part of the 
nightlife in Beirut. It must be noted that the principal motivation that leads those women to 
prostitution are various socio-economic factors with poverty being the main one.
245
 The vast 
majority of the women are objects of exploitation through rings of organised crime. Another 
derivative of the high degree of corruption in Lebanon regarding trafficking of sex workers is 
the fact that the particular women arrive in the country under the guise of a legal ―artist visa,‖ 
which of course is aided by the corruption of government officials.
246
 Given that the status of 
most of these women is often slavery, sometimes the argument that at least they make a 
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living is eliminated. However, one of the most common excuses of the women involved is 
that they are ―resigned because of financial need, abuse and fear of what people will say‖247 
There are occurrences where women do not belong to an illegal network but this is extremely 
hard to be recorded or traced. Also a common reason for conflict between the networks is the 
possibility of a girl moving to another competitive network.
248
 According to a spin off article 
of the latter, Lebanon has a certain hierarchy in prostitution on the top are situated the 
―various illegal networks promoting girls to nightclubs and their well-off clientele. Lebanese, 
Egyptian, and other Arab sex workers come next, many working the seedier places such as 
the older bars of Hamra. Further down the ladder are the less known facets of prostitution 
(child prostitution i.e.) and even further down are involved the family aspects of the 
business‖249 Regarding the interconnection of prostitution with the illegal networks and the 
vast financial input in the informal economy, the same article notes that ―overlooking, 
encouraging, taking bribes, setting visa categories, and perpetuating the depraved conditions 
makes the oldest profession in the world one of the most flourishing businesses in 
Lebanon.‖250 
However, despite the few selected individuals who are financially advantaged from 
this practice there is the view which suggests that for the deprived areas, other aspects of 
informal economic activity constituting a major resource in areas where resources are in short 
supply.
251
 Of course, the authors of this actual policy shaping article suggest that apart from 
employment in illegal trades such as drugs and prostitution there is also the other forms of 
informal employment as describe in a previous chapter, which they are capable of 
contributing to in the ―coping‖ strategies of geographically specific areas.252 Nevertheless, 
this article at the end suggests the long standing point of view of Alejandro Portes regarding 
informal economy as means of survival but as a more localised theme. 
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Smuggling, black markets and weaponry 
While prostitution rings are usually concentrated in more localised constituencies, the illegal 
import-export business thrives in a cross-border level dealing with all sorts of goods, drugs 
and arms. Russia, Liberia and to a great extent many of the Middle Eastern countries 
participate in a world-wide network of illegal trade; from petty-crime illegal contraband 
transfers, to cross-border smuggling of oil and weapons. In Afghanistan it is believed that 
more than a quarter of the foreign trade must be attributed to smuggling.
253
 In the Middle 
East the problem is particularly prominent due to the presence of various free trade zones 
where the existing regulatory framework has little effect due to the manifold de jure liberties 
(investment incentives and tax holidays)
254
 they enjoy, and due to several de facto practices 
such as corruption as a means of business (sometimes the purposely even slower bureaucratic 
processes). Throughout the Mediterranean basin the situation in customs and ports is similar. 
In Lebanon, with its two free trade zones (one in Beirut port and one in Tripoli) the situation 
is chaotic. Due to the various incentives offered by the government to attract foreign and 
domestic firms and the tactic of operating on a Build Operate Transfer (BOT) basis, the lack 
of transparency and the need of investment combined, provided an explosive mix of black 
marketing.
255
 As I will show in a following chapter, the harbour and the customs etiquette of 
workers and business as well as the free trade zones, have a heart of their own. 
 The old view mostly in the 1970s regarding smuggling, especially for small 
countries like Lebanon, was predominantly favourable as they thought that smugglers 
circumventing tariffs sold their goods at lower rates therefore it was good for the welfare.
256
 
However this view was quickly abandoned, as they soon connected smuggling with 
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corruption, intimidation of the rule of law and vast revenue losses for the state.
257
 However, 
there are still advocates of this notion like Marie Thursby, Richard Jensen and Jerry Thursby 
who suggest that ―the market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling 
improves welfare if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost‖ they continue that ―the 
welfare effect is directly related to the degree of competition‖.258 On the other hand Jagdish 
Bhagwati and Bent Hansen provided a study which shows that when smuggling has no local 
representation it is not beneficial for the welfare of the country that experiences smuggling.
259
 
Also Joossens and Raw write that when the product (cigarettes i.e.) is not of an illegal nature 
like drugs or arms, the final beneficiary is not the smuggler or the informal sector‘s 
middlemen but the firm that produces the goods, as this technique is an alternative market 
entry strategy.
260
 The correlations with the informal sector do not stop here as many 
unlicensed street vendors as described in a previous chapter, constitute one of the main 
channels of distribution of those goods. As we will see in a following chapter it is quite 
interesting that in a rather close-minded way people deliberately choose to buy something –
usually software or other pirated goods- via an illegal street vendor as a reaction to the 
corporate world. According to Janet MacGaffey, from an anthropological point of view, 
especially in the Middle East and Africa, smuggling was the only way to practice bartering 
techniques used prior to the colonisation of those regions. Janet MacGaffey also suggests that 
smuggling is the source of capital for a nascent bourgeoisie that enjoys a middle-class 
lifestyle.
261
 The truth is that in Lebanon as well as in other Mediterranean countries the dream 
of most people is to get a job in the government to enjoy the gains of the relative safety of 
insurance and to exploit and influence the informal sector‘s gains, or to resort to an illegal 
profitable but risky endeavour. As I have discovered in my interviews the need for a less 
arduous and exploitative way of making money is extremely widespread to the point of 
worry, as the vast majority states that if legal repercussions (especially for the societal 
humiliation) were not the issue they would have joined an illegal network or would conduct 
unlawful business. 
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 However, no matter how academically obsolete the welfare contribution idea is, the 
reality indicates otherwise. For example in Lebanon, thousands of farmers heavily relied on 
the production and smuggling of drugs, such as cannabis. After the governmental restrictions, 
farmers who returned to the production of fruits and vegetables faced poverty due to the 
collapse of the prices in exports. Also the grants Lebanon received for the assistance of those 
farmers satisfied only 5% of them.
262
 Officially the government is strongly committed to 
prevent a return to illegal crop growing, however silently they no longer take the initial strict 
measures. From one of my interviews, an ex-farmer claimed that in an event of a wild-fire the 
fire department would cautiously look after the crops that make the most money first. On the 
other hand, the various illegal networks are the main beneficiary of this re-emergence, 
because they act as the central middleman. Similarly in Afghanistan the remarkable 
comeback of opium production has devastating effects. According to a recent BBC article 
―Afghanistan produces 92% of the world's opium, with the equivalent of 3,500 tonnes leaving 
the country each year‖. According to Antonio Maria Costa ―the Afghanistan/Pakistan border 
region has turned into the world's largest free-trade zone in anything and everything that is 
illicit - drugs of course, but also weapons, bomb-making equipment, chemical precursors, 
drug money, even people and migrants.”263 He also mentions the direct involvement of 
various international illegal networks as well as “the direct Taliban involvement in the opium 
trade which allows them to fund a war machine that is becoming technologically more 
complex and increasingly widespread.”264 
 Consequently the various illegal networks with a more precise ideological 
orientation may use the accumulated wealth to purchase arms in order to achieve specific 
political goals, while other illegal networks solely cope with the trade of arms and weapons 
throughout the world. What is more, it must be noted that arms deals also take place through 
formal defence companies or through government-to-government deals and despite the 
possible absence of illegal networks in the affair they entail a relatively high degree of 
informal practices and a rather impressive show of a lack of ethics as well as a rather notable 
profit for the buyers side and the various middlemen.
265
 Of course there are more complex 
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implications regarding the armament of various groups and organisations like Al-Qaeda or 
the military wing of Hezbollah, as the situation is not a simple seller-buyer scenario. For 
example, complexities occur with situations like the train derailed by PKK guerrillas in 
Turkey which was bound from to Iran to Syria full with arms allegedly headed for the arsenal 
of Hezbollah.
266
 In another occasion Syria ―struck a procurement deal with a Russian 
company to acquire SA-18 air-defence systems. Unbeknown to the Russians, Syria allegedly 
plans to transfer the shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles to Hezbollah” or according to UN 
officials in another case ―Lebanese authorities stopped a truck carrying Soviet-made Grad 
missiles bound for Hezbollah in the Bekaa Valley near Baalbek.‖267 In the happenstance of 
governmental involvement, as I mentioned above, informal practices may also lead to 
detrimental situations and radical changes. A quite representative example is Iran in the 
1970s which bought millions of dollars of arms from the USA as an element of regional 
stability and to maintain mutual friendly status with the US, but according to Keller and 
Nolan ―outrageous government expenditures led to spiralling inflation and, in the eyes of the 
Iranian public, about the only people making a decent living were corrupt government 
officials skimming off defence contracts and American technical advisers‖ and they 
concluded that ―even when arms sales were crafted within the confines of foreign policy, the 
results were not always predictable‖.268 Also I mentioned earlier, Stohl suggests that rebel 
groups and terrorist organisations take advantage of these illegal networks and use the profits 
from these commodities to purchase weapons and fund their operations. Another vibrant 
example is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) which earns roughly $500 
million US through its drug operations, much of which is in turn spent on weapons. Between 
1995 and 2001, Colombia‘s military seized more than 15,000 small arms that were 
circulating in its black market, along with 2.5 million rounds of ammunition.
269
 Also Stohl 
recognises that crossing into the world of the black market, these arms become part of a much 
wider shadow economy in which weapons are just one of many commodities.
270 
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 Generally it is hard and maybe impossible to estimate the input of those transactions 
in the informal economy. Nonetheless, according to a recent survey due to the vested interests 
of thousands of people in the process, the informal economy obtains a rather robust dynamic 
at least in terms of usage and it is definitely facilitated by the whole structure. The same 
survey in order to make the previous point more valid also mentions that Afghanistan in the 
early nineties was sustained due to the support of Iran, Russia and Pakistan but largely due to 
sub-economy of weapons trade and opium.
271
 With regard to the other illegal networks that 
deal in small and big arms the principle is the same. They use the same channels of 
distribution and the same outlets of corruption, probably the clientele is also similar and those 
who are specifically engaged in selling or buying drugs or arms will need extra cash rewards 
to offset the risks. Thus as Samuel Brittan suggests there is no early end to corruption in the 
foreseeable future other than measures to reduce the size of the trade by operating on the side 
of either demand or supply, or preferably both.
272
 The problem once again stems from the 
symbiosis which can be observed between political insurgency, contraband trade, and arms 
proliferation.
273
 Instead of a conclusive remark I will quote R.T. Naylor who writes that ―the 
general result of the combination of new arms dealers and the spread of underground 
economic activity is that covert arms deals are likely to take place within a matrix of black-
market transactions. Weapons might be sold for cash; bartered for teakwood, hostages, 
heroin, or religious artifacts; or countertraded for grain and oil. The deals can be transacted 
by go-betweens who are equally at home in smuggling gold to India, trafficking in counterfeit 
computer chips to the United States, or shipping toxic waste to Somalia. The ships hauling 
the arms are probably registered in a flag-of-convenience country boasting commercial 
secrecy, low registration fees, and the opportunity for rapid name and ownership changes. 
The payments can move through a series of coded bank accounts in the name of a global 
network of ghost companies and are protected by the banking and corporate secrecy laws of 
one or several of the many financial havens around the world.”274 This quote lays the ground 
for the analysis in the following section regarding the details of the capital flight and the 
association of the various illegal and more ideologically radical networks. 
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Terrorism and money laundering 
Another kind of illegal network which may integrate all the mentioned above practices is the 
various ideologically radical organisations and groups. As I mentioned earlier on, it is rather 
challenging to characterise a group or organisation as ―terrorist‖. First of all, I suppose the 
term is accurate only when the group or organisation is actually self-proclaimed as terrorist, 
but the Al Qaeda, the Shining Path, the Grey Wolves, the 17
th
 November none of them 
actually guilty in their rhetoric of accepting the term terrorist, nevertheless they all are 
actually underlying terrorists. Apparently they are proscribed by the international bodies as they 
demonstrate certain behaviours that fit criteria defined as terrorist since various international laws 
were passed in the wake of 9/11. 
Other organisations like Hamas or Hezbollah even though they are officially recognised as 
political movements, are by significant parts of the bibliography identified as primarily 
terrorist organisations. Of course the frequent use of violence through their military fractions 
is often more than controversial, however for the sake of political correctness I prefer the 
term ―ideologically radical‖. Additionally the usage of such a term for movements like 
Hezbollah is more than derogatory and especially in Lebanon, it would be characterised as at 
least inappropriate. 
The financing of those networks stems from various sources. Those sources may be 
legal as legitimate businesses, illegal as all the mentioned above practices as well as direct or 
indirect funding from certain states or charitable funds. A characteristic example is Al Qaeda 
which according to Mark Basile is built on an extensive financial structure which secures the 
interests of the organisation. Basile also adds that Al Qaeda operates a significant financial 
network, approximated at over $300 million in value, dispersing between $30 and $40 
million per year.
275
 The three financial factors that support Al-Qaeda are the following: 
 Firstly, Al Qaeda has built a strong network of financiers, operatives and businesses 
legitimate (honey trading) or illegitimate (diamond trafficking)
276 
 Secondly, it has learned to effectively leverage the global financial system of capital 
markets. Small financial transfers, under regulated Islamic banking networks and informal 
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transfer systems throughout the world make it almost impossible to stop Al Qaeda from 
moving money, and 
 Thirdly, Al Qaeda has built a significant base of Islamic charities. Saudi Arabia’s 
royal family funds the largest.
277 
Al Qaeda in much the same way as other radical organisations is managing their revenues. 
Charities are also a very important factor as they may have a legitimate structure and legal 
objectives of support; however like most of the charities it is controversial if the gathered 
funds are used for the purpose of the charity. Generally Naylor suggests, referring to the 
sustainability of the Grey Wolves in Turkey via charities by the Turkish Diaspora in 
Germany, that the ethno-religious solidarity plays a vital role as a sponsor. Another example 
is Hezbollah, which raises funds through zakat and sadaqah contributions as well as direct 
funding from Iran,  estimated about 60 – 100 million dollars per year. It must be noted that 
donations are largely anonymous. In addition Hezbollah receives money from the Shiite 
Lebanese Diaspora in West Africa and North America and the Triple Frontier, meaning the 
junction of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil. In the Triple Frontier, due to the absence of 
effective border control, the zone is a haven for drug and arms trafficking, which undoubtedly 
go some way in raising funds for Hezbollah.
278
  Naylor is in agreement with Basile as he 
suggests that the regional and global networks based on extended family or ethno-sectarian 
loyalties can exercise their strategies more efficiently than less homogenous ones.
279
 Costigan 
and Gold recognise the vital importance of charities and the diversion of funds from 
legitimate businesses to the vaults of the various organisations, however they stress that 
raising funds through illegitimate activities still represents the bulk of the funding 
resources.
280 
 On the other hand Wannennberg suggests that radical organisations like Al Qaeda 
only resort to illegitimate practices like smuggling etc, as a second best solution due to the 
tightening of the regulation framework after the 11
th
 September attacks and the loss of 
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Afghanistan as a safe haven. Wannennberg focuses on the fact that the authorities have a 
disjointed view regarding intrinsic links of those groups with smaller petty crime networks.
281
 
This becomes quite apparent due to fact that despite the stricter regulation framework, 
organisations like Al-Qaeda still have plenty of cash.
282
 The nexus of those organisations 
with the aforementioned illegal activities like smuggling and trafficking is also strenuously 
identified by Tom Diaz and Sharon Meltzer. Diaz mentions that according to the former US 
Treasury official Matt Levitt, up to 60 percent of terror organisations are suspected of having 
some ties with the illegal narcotics trade.
283
 On the other hand Meltzer focuses on cigarette 
smuggling basing her case study on a North Carolina Hezbollah cell that used this particular 
practice to raise money.
284 
 Apart from the indubitable nexus of those organisations with other illegal networks 
and illegitimate practices and the deep-seated links with informal economy, we must 
calculate the added or ―subtracted‖ value of terrorism as an incidence. Besides the given 
revenue loss on behalf of the state we must estimate the actual financial damage or gain 
caused by the acts of those networks. The bibliography on that seems to be on pretty much 
absolute consensus. Apart from the actual informal input originated from the networks, there 
is a macroeconomic impact associated with their actions and the general formal and informal 
economic activity. Generally economic activity is impaired and possibly diverted to more 
informal norms by conflict. According to Blomberg et al, apart from the social disturbance 
the illegal networks may cause, they are to be blamed for several economic disruptions to the 
point of reallocation of the economic activity away from productive resources.
285
 They also 
add that ―the incidence of terrorism may have an economically significant negative effect on 
growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and less persistent than that associated with 
either external wars or internal conflict.‖ 286 On a similar macroeconomic scope Adam et al, 
add that the effects are proportionate, for each society, to the resilience of the individuals, the 
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market or the regional economy. Also they mention that the potential political costs that may 
occur can contribute to further economic fragility.
287
 For example in Lebanon the frequent 
status of turmoil facilitated an on-going financial disruption, placing formal and informal 
economic practices in a continuous entanglement. 
 The primary channels that sponsors use to transfer the supporting funds, according to 
Costigan and Gold is shell banks and offshore facilities in Europe and various other informal 
banking systems like Hawala in the Middle East and Asia, while in the US the situation 
became more difficult for most of the arguable entities.
288
 The abuse of remitting systems like 
Hawala creates a lot of controversy regarding the measures that will deteriorate money 
laundering and dubious transfers without harming the innocent remittances. Of course, the 
task is clearly easier said than done. Also, since money laundering consists of three phases: 
placement, layering and integration, Hawala as a remittance system can be used at any phase. 
Many Hawaladars also speak of a certain distinction between the Hawala transactions, white 
Hawala for remitting and black Hawala for illegal businesses; this might be the basis of the 
much desired regulation on the informal dealings.
289
 This situation is indeed a Delphic sword, 
as on the one hand the informality is part of the cognitive financial behaviour in the Middle 
East with the potential to bring forth notable results, however on the other hand it is 
vulnerable to illegal involutions with severe security and social implications. 
As portrayed above, the various illegal networks are intrinsically linked with various 
financial havens which can facilitate the manoeuvring of the informal capital. All illegal 
networks in most cases need to legalise the funds raised via smuggling, drug trafficking, arms 
deals, extortion, embezzlement etc. Without money laundering techniques the illegal 
networks cannot flourish as Arlacchi suggests.
290
 According to Sfakianakis the laundered 
capital could reach one trillion dollars per year while the lower estimate is roughly equivalent 
to the total annual economic output of Spain.
291
 Money laundering is probably the key 
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operation in the informal economy which glues together all the financial transactions of the 
illegally gained money in a single spectrum. 
 Lebanon was probably one of the first countries to implement an anti money 
laundering enactment but despite several initial positive results it seems that it was more like 
a show of good faith towards the international community. For example, Sfakianakis writes 
that during the Lebanese civil war the Bekaa valley generated more than (500) five hundred 
million dollars annually from the production of opium and cannabis, and it still produces 
remarkable quantities of drugs,
292
 nevertheless Interpol praised Lebanon for its efforts in 
combating organised crime because Lebanese authorities raided a house in the village of 
Kensa near the city of Baalbek in eastern Lebanon, seizing three kilograms of cocaine.
293
 
This is but a drop in the ocean. Also as a supporting argument, the anti money-laundering 
laws, as Ruehsen mentions, had several gaps in their interpretation.
294
 However, Ruehsen 
recognises that despite Lebanon‘s ―spotty‖ enforcement records, they are nonetheless more 
impressive compared to other states in the region.
295
 However, despite the minimal steps 
forward, according to Sfakianakis, Lebanon due to its Swiss-style banking secrecy has 
achieved notoriety for its money-laundering facilitations. Sfakianakis also mentions that 
Lebanon, acts like a hub for drug trade and due to its competitive yield on dollars, it attracts 
lucrative clients.  Much of the embezzled funds from political elites from Africa and 
suspicious profits from gold and diamond businesses have been invested in Lebanon since the 
1950s.
296 
 But despite the wide-spread presence of money laundering, which is the actual 
consequences of its incidence?  An International Monetary Fund factsheet suggests that 
―money laundering and terrorist financing activities can undermine the integrity and stability 
of financial institutions and systems, discourage foreign investment, and distort international 
capital flows.”297Alexandro Pansa subjoins on that view and he suggests that money 
laundering causes destabilising effects in other sectors too, like the labour sector and business 
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markets and he stresses the fact, as Joosens did earlier, that money-launderers exploit 
criminal resources to gain access to new markets.
298
 Pansa mentions with regard to the effect 
of money-laundering on financial and legal systems, that those two sectors are set on a never-
ending shift of regulations, rules and initiatives and he also suggests that the analysis of 
money laundering, from a financial perspective only, would not be adequately 
comprehensive.
299
 Pino Arlacchi agrees with Pansa on the constant legislative alterations but 
he focuses on the fact that money laundering may cause market disruptions and facilitate 
other ―criminogenic asymmetries‖ like corruption, as well as take advantage of cracks 
between state rules and the committing of crimes without law violation.
300
 This is probably 
one of the most significant parameters of regime and elite corruption where under the guise 
of legitimacy and the lack of transparency they carry out manifold scandalous financial 
dealings while they keep the appearances. Josiah McConnell Heyman as mentioned earlier 
points out that state agents and ruling elites are more than often the culprits of extended 
corruption or leaders of illegal organizations. For example in Lebanon, the ruling elites, even 
prime figures like Rafik Hariri have been accused for money laundering and various other 
unlawful activities, extremely harmful for the public welfare. John Sfakianakis for example 
makes quite clear the involvement of Hariri into various economic scandals and portrays him 
as the conductor behind business deals in the detriment of the state. Also it is quite 
widespread amongst several well interconnected illegal networks that launder not only the 
illegally gained capital through legal gaps but the criminal activity itself.  According to 
Sfakianakis in the Middle East this is even more deep-rooted as the line dividing legal and 
illegal money-making activity is quite indefinable and the extensive and unchanging 
patronage system is clandestine and lacking in accountability.
301
 Arlacchi suggests that the 
flow of this money into the legitimate economy harms real economic growth.
302
 In parallel to 
Arlacchi is Fernando Romero who proposes that the financial input of illegal networks 
contribution is a drag on the formal economy and it actually prolongs poverty by allowing the 
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economy to go unfed.
303
 In the same train of thought with Arlacchi is Brent Bartlett who 
suggests that, even though it is impossible to quantify the effects of money laundering, 
―allowing money laundering activity to proceed unchallenged is not an optimal economic-
development policy because it damages the financial institutions that are critical to economic 
growth, reduces productivity in the economy's real sector by diverting resources and 
encouraging crime and corruption, and can distort the economy's international trade and 
capital flows to the detriment of long-term economic development.‖304 With a more dramatic 
perception is Baker, who suggests that ―money laundering drains hard currency reserves, 
heightens inflation, reduces tax collection, worsens income gaps, cancels investment, hurts 
competition, undermines free trade and saps growth while It leads to shortened lives for 
millions of people and deprived existences for billions more.‖305 Baker despite his 
cataclysmic standpoint generally looks on the macroeconomic effects of money laundering 
focused on its impact in the North America region. 
 Money laundering is, as shown, intrinsically linked with terrorism and the debate has 
become even more popular after the events of September 11
th
, however the vast majority of 
the laundered capital stems from drug related capital which may or may not be linked with 
organisations other than just criminal, with the utter goal of immense quick profits. Definitely 
the associations are many, however no one should neglect the manifold illegal networks that 
infest the state apparatus and hamper the economy. The vast majority of literature agrees on 
the same thing that apart from all the microeconomic and macroeconomic challenges 
mentioned above, the overall assumption is that growth is impaired by money laundering and 
sustainable development has another obstacle to overcome.   
 
Conclusion  
In the theoretical part of this chapter, the bibliography by the use of econometric papers and 
other theoretical secondary material has shown that the lack of regulatory framework and the 
intense interconnections of those networks with the state, are the basic parameters that need 
to be addressed. Also the bibliography established the negative input of the illegal networks 
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on the formal and informal economic level and at the same time it ascertained the not so 
accommodating nature of those networks for sustainable growth. The secondary material that 
dealt with the resources dedicated itself to more pragmatic disciplines of the networks, which 
has shown similar results. The bibliography established that the criminal practices the illegal 
networks use such as prostitution, smuggling, illegal arms sales and drug trafficking are 
multi-billion dollar businesses with extended associations with other ideologically radical 
networks, with a rather diverse outlook on the status of their interpretation. The combination 
of all the variables in this chapter leads to the unanimous conclusion that despite the potential 
micro-interests of certain individuals the input of the illegal networks has, apart from the 
proven devastating effects on any state‘s economy and sustainable growth, significant impact 
on the stability and welfare of the social web. Also their infiltrating capacity on the political 
system, with the addition of the unseen added value of other minor or major effects which 
cannot be estimated or resolved sufficiently, is overwhelming. 
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CHAPTER 6 Analysis of secondary material on Lebanon’s informal 
economy 
Introduction 
In order to fully establish the links of the previous chapters with the rest of this project, and 
after examining the literature surrounding the main key drivers of the informal economy in its 
wider scope, additional analysis of the secondary material has focused exclusively on 
Lebanon. This is significant and necessary in order to comprehend the deeply entrenched 
roots of informal economy in the country and provide the historical and analytical 
foundations for the following research.  
The first section of this chapter will briefly investigate the historical background of 
Lebanon in order to establish the necessary chronological framework which contributes to the 
better understanding of the political, societal and economic complexities of Lebanon that 
paved the way for the adoption of a laissez-faire economy after the ―proper‖ independence of 
the country. The second section analyses the elements of Lebanon‘s past and present, which 
assisted in the formation and expansion of the country‘s sizeable informal economy and also 
briefly displays several causes that facilitated this expansion. The last section focuses on the 
contemporary aspects of the informal economy in Lebanon giving support to the argument 
that the country is possibly not the champion of how informal practices can compliment 
development in the world but does exhibit some unique features. 
 The process of attempting to theorise Lebanon‘s historical and contemporary formal 
and informal economic framework in this chapter paves the way for the following empirical 
research and analysis of the informal practices in Lebanon. This will fully determine the 
genuine significance of the informal economy in the country as it puts in context all the 
following testimonies, anecdotal evidence and records. 
 
A brief historical overview  
The extensive trade links throughout the known world and Lebanon were as Braudel pointed 
out ―an early example of world economy‖.306 The latter is a characteristic of the fact that 
Lebanon managed to maintain through time its population, which is still noted for its 
commercial enterprise.
307
 Lebanon in its present form emerged out of the ashes of the 
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Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman military defeat by the –initially- Triple Entente during the 
First World War produced a radical power balance shift in the Middle East.  Owen writes that 
the victorious powers carved up the ex-Ottoman provinces and Lebanon as well as the ‗new‘ 
Syria came under French control,
308
 which, according to Rafailides, already had a significant 
and influential presence in the region since 1736, when French missionaries settled there,
309
 
while Fish suggests that France had a special position in Lebanon -even earlier- since the 
ninth century.
310
  On the 1
st
 of August 1920 the new state of Lebanon was proclaimed, as 
Field states, after tempestuous negotiations and plots.
311
 However, it remained a protectorate 
of France and it would remain one until 1943, when Lebanon became an independent state 
and abolished its status as a French mandate. Nevertheless, the French presence and influence 
has remained in Lebanon. 
 Lebanon is a special (change special to a synonym that is more objective) country 
with unique characteristics. Maintaining till the present day the strong commercial and 
trading features of the ancient Phoenicians, Lebanon of the present is constituted by a multi-
religious mosaic in its demographics. Some scholars may suggest that Lebanon is probably 
facing an identity crisis, since it is not the stereotypical Arab or Middle Eastern country, 
neither a conventional Western influenced country, nor an Asian one.  Lebanon is an eclectic 
mix of various religious groups and sects with vast social divergences. Maronites, Orthodox 
and Catholic Christians along with Sunni, Shiite and Druze Muslims constitute the basis of 
the Lebanese population divisions. However, there is a notable presence of Palestinians in the 
country. According to Baraka, almost half of the Palestinians live in refugee camps in the 
South of Lebanon, while the remaining ones are scattered throughout the country.
312
 It must 
be noted that the Palestinian presence is characterized by the obscurity regarding their status 
within the country and by the various obstacles for their social integration.  
Muhammad Faour writes that the allocation of governmental positions in Lebanon is 
driven by the demographic prevalence of the dominant communities. The Maronite Christian 
community (the most populous group) controls the most important public positions while the 
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other sects occupy the remaining positions on 6 to 5 ratio. Meaning that for every six 
Christian public officers there must be five Muslim ones appointed.
313
 Most of the literature 
recognizes this complex situation in the term of confessionalism, which is the system of 
government that distributes political and institutional power according to the relative 
demographic composition of religious groupings in a society.
314
 However, the Maronite  
dominance in Lebanon is persistently challenged due to the absence of a formal census since 
1932,
315
 and of course, because of the continuous power struggle between the groups; which 
has been exacerbated by the high degree of political corruption and the historically embedded 
differences. An estimation in 1956 showed that in a total population of 1,411,416, Christians 
accounted for 54% and Muslims, 44%. Expectedly, the estimate was contested because it was 
based on figures derived from a government welfare program that tended not to include 
Muslims in areas distant from Beirut.
316
 Consequently, the census became an exceedingly 
vital political issue in Lebanon, because it constituted the apparent basis for communal 
representation. Even though there is no strong race consciousness, as mentioned in earlier 
chapters, the religious differences are sharp, constituting the foundations for political 
perception.
317
  
However, it is perhaps those differences that constitute extremely difficult a 
unanimous resolution in manifold critical affairs within Lebanon. The conflicting interests –
not necessarily within the state apparatus- seem to undermine the state‘s capacity to deal with 
the emergence of miscellaneous issues concerning the economy and the society.  
Paradoxically it is this complex synthesis of its population which has constituted the 
basis of its relative economic evolution, and it can be speculated that this is the base of its 
downfall as well. As Ayubi pointed out, the Maronites – assisted by the strong relations with 
the Vatican and France- established a prosperous political economy and therefore managed to 
maintain a relative autonomy towards their Ottoman rulers. This opening westward and their 
commercial accomplishments reinforced their self-image of Phoenician trading origins.
318
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What is more, Lebanon is undeniably characterized by the constant conflicts. During 
the intervals of relative peace and stability, the country was able to show its potential for 
swift reconstruction and exceptional economic performance, despite the domestic and 
regional socio-political restraints that never cease to affect the country and its economy. It 
was and still is during these peaceful intervals that Lebanon earned a reputation as a financial 
haven and gave the impression of a ―progressive‖ Middle Eastern country. In the next 
section, I will analyze the roots of the informality in the Lebanese economy and society. 
 
Back casting the informality 
From the end of 19th century to the threshold of the Second World War  
It was arguably inevitable that Lebanon would be exposed to informal economy practices. 
According to Estellie Smith, from an anthropological point of view, informal economy 
thrives during conflicts, famine and scarcity of goods and products.
319
 Lebanon throughout its 
history meets all of the criteria when it comes to the unfortunate combination of these events, 
which it has experienced several times in the last century. According to Andersen et al, 
Lebanon has a long history of commercial activity and it has enjoyed higher standard of 
living in comparison to other Middle Eastern countries, serving as a center of commerce and 
finance.
320
  
Lebanon, as I mentioned in the Introduction has always been laissez-faire, meaning 
market rather than state led. As Milton-Edwards mentions the lack of natural resources and 
the large amount of immigrant population contributed to the development of economic 
practice based on the services sector, a view also supported by Fish who suggested this as a 
recommendation for the ―newborn‖ Lebanon‘s future in his 1944 article. Nevertheless, the 
economy collapsed due to the perennial problem of corruption and of course due to the 
devastating civil war.
321
  However, which specific stages in Lebanon‘s history characterized 
its course along with the financial ups and downs? Which factors contributed to these 
economic highs and lows and led to today's informal economy structure in Lebanon?  
An important aspect is that Lebanon even during the ―golden years‖, when it acquired 
the nickname ―pearl of the orient‖ and it was perceived as a hub between East and West, was 
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strongly characterized by informal practices. Of course, most of the Mediterranean countries 
had high levels of informal economy and still do, suggesting that informal practices could be 
part of the stereotypically perceived Mediterranean – Middle Eastern behaviour. 
Nevertheless, Lebanon given some favorable circumstances in an undeniably unfavorable 
framework projected a short-term but robust economic boom and an unexpected resilience 
towards the current economic crisis. 
According to Gaspard, the second half of the 19
th
 century is the actual beginning of 
modern Lebanon‘s economic history. Towards the end of the 19th century, when the conflict 
between the Druze and the Maronites started to settle down and the Ottomans provided a 
relative autonomy to the region, the various religious groupings focused on economic and 
cultural development. For example, as Gaspard writes, in late 19
th
 century we have the 
appearance of the mugharasa, a form of contract which allowed the farmers within 5 to 10 
years to acquire a quarter or even half of the land they were using. The farmers though were 
still reinforced by the continuous remittances from emigrant relatives. It must be noted that 
since the 19
th
 century, remittances were an important economic phenomenon. The relative 
industrial growth –hugely supported by French capital in Lebanon- was partly derived by the 
massive silk industry. Gaspard also notes that almost 10%-15% of the population lived off 
the activity centered around silk.
322
 According to Gaspard who quotes Issawi, it is because of 
this that Lebanon at the end of the 19
th
 century had relative economic prosperity with a rather 
small percentage of poverty coupled with a small percentage of rich people. Issawi suggests 
that Lebanon at that time was one of the most equalitarian countries in the world.
323
  
 Between 1860 and 1914, a quarter of the population (approx. 100.000 people) 
emigrated to Egypt, the Americas and West Africa. Predominantly this was due to high 
population density, secondly the low agricultural productivity and thirdly the desire to escape 
from the Ottomans.
324
 After the Great War the decline of silk trade and emigration (due to 
policy restrictions) led to a fall of remittances, however the output significantly increased due 
to  access to better education, communications and the absence of capital shortages.
325
 
Agriculture still occupies a relatively large percentage of the working force but the overall 
national economic contribution is minimal, as stated in Chapter 4. Gaspard writes that the 
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economic expansion of Lebanon without being an exclusively capitalist economy may be 
imputed to the fact that the country had capital abundance because of the French element. 
This was coupled with strong foreign demand, the advance of the industrial sector due to 
mechanization of production processes and capital transfers domestically and overseas, 
particularly for the lower income groups. Gaspard additionally notes that the extended family 
institution (and all the unrecorded benefits that it may entail) has vastly contributed to the 
augmentation of the Lebanese economy during the end of the 19
th
 century until the beginning 
of the Second World War.
326
 
In a more sociological approach, Lebanon has advocated clientelism to the point that 
it is regarded as a matchless case by some scholars.
327
 Clientelism has been used to describe 
informal ties in which services and goods are exchanged between people of unequal status.
328
 
It is extremely widespread in both shores of the Mediterranean basin; Ayubi particularly 
makes an excellent and inclusive reference on Lebanon regarding that matter as he views the 
Lebanese state and its sectarian and informal politics as an incomplete capitalism with a less-
than-mature class structure. He also suggests that the state operates as a ―financial caste‖ 
aligning itself with the forces of political feudalism. 
329
 Nevertheless, he also mentions that 
clientelism of this kind must not be perceived as a Lebanese or a Middle Eastern peculiarity 
as it has been exercised even in the most developed countries in the world, however it is in 
Lebanon that it is perceived as a mainstream device.
330
 Additionally, Lebanon is facing –as a 
remnant of its hybrid feudal system- a large degree of nepotism. It is so widespread that it 
acts as a counter-motive, especially among the young people, even for higher education. 
Some of which believe that there is no point in pursuing senior positions or government 
careers as jobs are taken even before they are advertised.
331
  Therefore, the aforementioned 
exchange of favors gradually led to an absence of civic conscience and as aforementioned, 
the lack of financial maturity coupled with the ever-existing virulent corruption, has 
contributed to the chaotic result of today's Lebanon. 
As Gaspard notes, this period is also characterized by the break of the feudal system 
while according to Rafailides it became the starting point of the creation of a Western type 
economy interlocked with the capitalist modes of production, and an Eastern type economy 
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associated with the Asian modes of production. Which Karl Marx describes the economies as 
that have not been through the stage of the Western type feudal development?
332
 The 
economic paradox of Lebanon has to be attributed to the coexistence of the two economic 
models. However, whether this paradox has negative or positive result is a matter of the 
individual‘s point of view, possibly even related interests. On the one hand Gaspard and 
others interpret the situation as a complex combination that showed endurance and resilience 
over the years, while Rafailides deduced that Lebanon is a noncommittal and vague 
environment which clearly is an indication that this coexistence is detrimental. The reality is 
that it is impossible to inherit one of the two conditions as both hypotheses have certain 
aspects of truth. Both conditions apply to Lebanon as both are a simultaneous result of 
complex, arduous and lengthy processes that have shaped the present status of Lebanon.  
From the rejoice of independence to the sorrow of civil war 
Since the proclamation of the Lebanese entity in the 1920s, the establishment of a 
laissez-faire economy became more conspicuous as the industrial resurgence created a new 
environment of demand. According to Gaspard, post Second World War the Lebanese 
economy faced the vigorous opening up of the economy but some less favorable 
developments also occurred.
333
 Gaspard writes that, especially in the period between 1958 
and 1964 when Fuad Chehab‘s regime provided a more efficient framework for the 
functioning of the market, Lebanon‘s liberal economic and political environment was unique 
among the other Arab countries.
334
 However, for Owen and Pamuk, despite Chehab seriously 
trying to alter the economic orientation of Lebanon and restore the socio-economic 
inequalities, several powerful individuals and the conflicting interests stemming from this 
reform, did not consent to the developments and the potential adjustments.
335
  
In any case, it was a period where trade and specifically transit trade, increased due to 
the improvement of the Beirut harbor and its free zone. The adoption of a laissez-faire 
economic direction, according to Gaspard was a natural choice due to the multifaceted socio-
political panel that constitutes the ruling elites. Despite that fact, the particular choice also 
allows Lebanon to operate in a looser framework where rules and regulations have the least 
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possible restrictions. It can be argued that this fact is the ―certified‖ foundation stone of the 
establishment of informal practices on behalf of the state in the future. The unstable 
regulatory framework lays the ground for further corruption, money laundering, smuggling 
and the canonization of informal economic practices and transactions. As Carolyn Gates 
suggests, deregulation and liberalization were among the top priorities of the Lebanon‘s 
government soon after its independence.
336
 It is De Soto that suggests that only a full 
informalization of the economy can cure the stagnant Latin American economies. Similarly 
Lebanon fifty years before De Soto‘s theory implemented a progressively free exchange 
market in order to harness the flourishing black market. The relevant legalization of the black 
market exchange, as Gates mentions, allowed Lebanese capital to move freely throughout the 
globe.
337
 However, the result, as history depicted, was not successful. Neither Lebanon‘s 
laissez-faire model achieved sustainable development, nor the informal economy harnessed. 
As Gaspard mentions, during the favorable period of 1950-1974 the economic growth of the 
laissez-faire was not as remarkable as it claimed to be, when in comparison to the 
performance of other Less Developed Countries or other countries in the region. This 
situation seems to be even more disappointing according to Gaspard, if it is taken into 
consideration that Lebanon was in a higher level of income, skills and capital in the post 
Second World War period than the other regional countries.
338
 
Despite the aforementioned, according to Carolyn Gates, by 1951 30% of all private 
international gold trade went through Beirut.
339
 In 1956 the adoption of the Swiss style Bank 
Secrecy Law, allowed Lebanon to attract –legally and illegally gained- vast amounts of 
capital. Lebanon due to this development attracted wealthy Arab immigrants and the inflow 
of capital, which augment Beirut‘s reputation as a financial safe haven.340 Additionally, 
according to Owen and Pamuk, the Gulf elites preferred to invest their newly gained capital 
with the assistance of Lebanese middlemen whom they trusted more than the bankers in 
London or in New York. Also the closure of the Suez Canal diverted trade through Beirut, 
expanding even further the capital accumulation in the country and amplifying illegal 
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practices in the free zone. Despite the huge influx of capital in Lebanon, the general 
population was not in a corresponding level of income. As Gates writes, the main 
beneficiaries of the status quo were approximately one hundred families of the ruling elites. 
Those families monopolized the state resources, while the population faced poverty and even 
lack of basic goods.
341
 While the ruling elites fostered political corruption to unprecedented 
levels, establishing a monstrous bureaucracy which in turn incubated a flourishing informal 
economy on all the ranks of the state apparatus, other levels in the social stratification also 
embraced informal economy as a result of this oligarchy. This situation coupled with the 
constant tendency of the ruling elite not to officially measure the state‘s capital and resources, 
suggests a vast amount of capital slipped the official channels under the table.
342
 
It can be deduced with confidence that even though the period following Lebanon‘s 
independence is not to be held entirely responsible for the country‘s informal sector, it surely 
acted as a facilitator of a cognitive process that was assisted by the constant turmoil in the 
country throughout the 20
th
 century. It may have also constituted the foundation for the 
emergence of a bureaucracy which left little room for other more normative options on behalf 
of the population and state officials. Meaning that, it probably was the coup de grace to an 
already weary politico-socio-economic environment. However, the Lebanese economy was 
hit by the additional blow of the civil war which inevitably led to -as any war to does- an 
additional expansion of the informal norms.  
From turmoil to reconstruction  
The 1975-90 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon's economic infrastructure and it cut the 
national output by half. What was perceived as a cultural, financial and trade center of the 
Middle East almost ceased to exist. Also as Owen and Pamuk note, the inflation skyrocketed 
with more than a million people migrating the only compensation for the dramatic reduction 
of income and output was the continued remittances.
343
 As happens during any war, the 
scarcity of products and the inability of the government to provide certain supplies led to an 
additional expansion and further establishment of the black market and the informal 
economy. The massive loss of skilled manpower coupled with the diverted expenditures to 
the military, along with the massive subsidizing of necessities like wheat and petrol, also 
supported the entrenchment of the informal sector and corruption. This situation was further 
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exacerbated by the increased unemployment and the exploitation tendencies that flourished 
due to the circumstances of the period. According to Gaspard, the ―government power 
weakened and the tax base eroded in favor of numerous illegal ports that were scattered along 
the coastline of the country and citizens were forced indirectly to pay illegal taxes that were 
being levied by various militias on commercial transactions‖.344 This whole situation led 
firstly to the complete lack of auditing because of the weak governance and secondly, 
coupled with the general turmoil, led to the de facto creation of a new status quo in the way 
everyday transactions and official bureaucratic engagements are conducted.  
 The unrest in Lebanon invited the Syrian military presence. The Syrian presence in 
Lebanon as described in Chapter 2 is also associated with significant informal employment 
levels, especially in the northern territories. According to Meir Javedanfar, ―Syria's presence 
in Lebanon had a number of positive and negative impacts on the Lebanese economy. On the 
positive side this ―included the availability of cheap Syrian labor which allowed some 
Lebanese businesses to produce goods at lower costs. Cheap Syrian imports also provided 
savings to the Lebanese consumer as they had to pay less to purchase their needed goods. 
Furthermore Syrian businessmen and laborers are believed to hold close to five billion dollars 
in savings and deposits in Lebanese banks.‖345 However, the downside was that ―Syria's 
leaders -meaning the Assad family- bought the loyalty of Syria's intelligence organization, 
top generals and businessmen by offering them influence and business opportunities in 
Lebanon's economy. Therefore in many cases the Syrian officials abused their influence in 
Lebanon by conducting deals and passing laws which were to their interest and at the expense 
of the Lebanese economy.‖346 In general Javedanfar notes that the informal economy in 
Lebanon -a great part of which had Syrian involvement- was damaged by the loss of tax 
income for the Lebanese government which is estimated to be between $25- $30 billion over 
the last 29 years.
347
 
Despite the catastrophic results of the fifteen years of war, occupation, internal strife 
and financial collapse, Lebanon showed vital signs for its reconstruction. The reconstruction 
was also assisted by the remittances, which by the end of the war in 1990 and until the 
present day account for around a fifth of Lebanon's economy. Its robust banking sector has 
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also acted as a major pillar for state finances and hugely supported the recovery after the war. 
Additionally the resilience of the small and medium size business assisted the recovery 
process; however the debate is ongoing whether this resilience is a result of the Lebanese 
flexibility or as a result of the informal economy interconnections. Besides this the basic 
economic structure of Lebanon, based on a long tradition of free market economy, was even 
after the war still strong enough to support a firm recovery. As Kari Norkonmaa mentions, 
the undisputed informality of the Lebanese economy coupled with the acknowledged assets 
located in the low level of personal and corporate taxation, along with the absence of 
discriminatory tax barriers to foreign investments, the unrestricted currency convertibility and 
the absence of capital controls has acted as the driving force of the remarkable ability of the 
country to re-emerge after problematic phases.
348
 As Gaspard notes similarly to Norkonmaa, 
Lebanon proved to be a strong attractor of people and capital against a background of 
political instability and economic dirigisme.
349
 Once again the informal economy in Lebanon 
appears to be a paradox. On the one hand we may assume that it facilitated the economic 
downfall especially during the various phases of unrest and turmoil, and on the other hand it 
can be assumed that it assisted the reconstruction after those periods.  
Generally, Lebanon exhibited extraordinary resilience towards hardship and financial 
crises. Perhaps, it occurred due to the well tested economy, because of the frequent conflicts 
– which the population became somewhat sensitized to -   the general political instability and 
the constant high risk economy. Lebanon absorbed rather stoically, the after-shocks of the 
global economic meltdown after 2008.
350
 As the IMF states, ―the Lebanese economy, despite 
its vulnerabilities, has shown a remarkable macroeconomic performance. Lebanon‘s public 
debt-to-GDP ratio remains very high, its large banking system is highly exposed to the 
sovereign and dependent on nonresident deposit inflows, and the country lies at the 
crossroads of regional political tensions.‖351 Additionally, remittances were seriously hit 
because of the crisis, but they remained a vital injection to the Lebanese economy 
maintaining the vast percentage of input they have obtained since the 19
th
 century. However, 
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the IMF also states that despite Lebanon‘s success in recent years, the wrong set of 
circumstances could easily translate into severe financial troubles. This projects that Lebanon 
apart from the exceptional flexibility that it displays, can also be extremely -if not vulnerable- 
sensitive to international and domestic economic variations and downturns. It is certain that it 
was not sheer luck that assisted Lebanon through the various crises but the knowledge that 
the likelihood of future shocks was a possibility and avoiding an over-reliance on the factors 
that have preserved Lebanon.  
Conclusively, there is no breakpoint between the early informal practices and the 
current experiences of informality. The continuation of those practices is deeply entrenched 
in the mindset, not only of the Lebanese people but almost in the entirety of the 
Mediterranean nations.  In general all the foretold events and processes, shaped Lebanon‘s 
economic present and determined the intensity of the current informal economy levels.  
The conflicting interests throughout the state apparatus and the societal web seem to 
have undermined the state‘s capacity to deal with the emergence of miscellaneous issues 
concerning the economy and the society. They also led to the various conflicts and the 
emergence of robust political mobilization and the establishment of social, political and 
perhaps confrontational movements like Hezbollah. 
In the next section, I will briefly analyze the current status of the Lebanese informal 
economy, displaying the elements that nourish its expansion. 
 
The informal economy in Lebanon and its components: Conceptions and 
misconceptions 
 
In earlier chapters I analysed the four key drivers of the informal economy as they are 
presented in the wide-reaching context by international literature. Those four key drivers 
constitute the core of the informal transactions in any given state. Even though, glimpses 
from Lebanon‘s point of view on those key drivers have been referred to, this section will 
solely look at the aspects of the informal economy in Lebanon from a contemporary 
perspective. The following analyses the components of Lebanon's informal economy whilst 
clarifying the potential conceptions and misconceptions regarding the informal practices and 
transactions in the country. This section draws its content from secondary material and it will 
provide the foundation for the following research chapter which analyses the same key 
drivers and aspects of the informal economy by the primary material gathered.  
108 
 
 So, what characterises contemporary Lebanon in terms of the informal economy? 
Lebanon over the years has developed various names and distinct reputations. Most of those 
characterisations were not for reasons that someone would regard as flattering, however 
despite its consecutive wars and upheavals Lebanon has shown a remarkable capacity for 
rapid reconstruction. In the previous sections of this chapter, I have examined the reasons 
behind the emergence and expansion of the informal economy in Lebanon. In this section 
light will be shed onto the intensity and nature of the four key drivers as referred to in the 
previous chapters. Also I will attempt to analyse the various micro-components of those key 
drivers. Those micro-components can be traced for example in the implication of the diverse 
social stratification of the country in the wider informal structure.  
 In Lebanon today, officially one in four people are below the poverty line.
352
 
However, those figures can be extremely misleading since there is no accurate consensus and 
Lebanon is probably among the first recipients of formal and informal remittances. As 
mentioned in the remittances chapter, Sabri estimates that the total remittances transferred in 
2004 which were approximately 188 billion dollars, makes Lebanon the probable biggest 
recipient with 5.6 billion dollars in 2006.
353
 According to an article of Robert Worth, the 
Lebanese Diaspora supplies Lebanon with about fourteen hundred (1.400)  dollars per capita 
every year, which is one of the highest rates of remittances in the world. Worth also adds that 
those transfers are one of the pillars sustaining the consumer economy, but they do not 
contribute to the country‘s soaring public debt or to the lack of long-term investment here.354 
Also, according to Gaspard the overall external trade balance continues to rely on the 
workers‘ remittances. He continues that many lower income groups complement their low 
incomes and therefore avoid joining the ranks of waged employment.
355
 This also 
demonstrates the ease by which many Lebanese workers are able to join the ranks of the 
informal employment and commerce sector without being worried about the risks and the 
potential disadvantages. Their livelihood is maintained by the support of the remittances and 
the tax-free income earned though their involvement in the informal sector. However, this is 
not the case for all the remittances recipients but it is a rather characteristic example of the 
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reliance which parts of the society adopt which lead to greater economic good. Apart from 
that, as Kapur mentions, remittances acted as an insurance mechanism especially during the 
civil war when inflation, black market and the vast job losses significantly affected large 
parts of the society.
356
 The informal remittances, which are largely transferred through 
unconventional transfers systems like hawala, have been funnelled by the recipients to 
various causes as described in chapter 2. However they also provide the necessary means for 
further involvement in the informal practices, as many in the population see remittances as 
constituting the needed income for bribes and unavoidable petty corruption. Understanding 
the size of informal remittances is mind boggling, as according to Sander and Maimbo, 
remittances can even reach 85% of the total receipts.
357
  
The vitality of informal remittances for Lebanon can be also explained by the fact that 
due to frequent upheavals when the formal apparatuses are disturbed, informal channels are 
the only system that can still operate unhindered.  Also as shown in chapter 2 remittances 
entail macroeconomic and microeconomic effects. The macroeconomic effects cannot be 
seen clearly as the lack of specific figures for most of the indicators in Lebanon, is a major 
problem. However, as mentioned above as well as in chapter 2 the macroeconomic effects of 
the remittances constitute a battlefield for the literature as some authors identify a certain lack 
of long term contribution whilst others foresee contribution at least regarding the balance of 
payments.  On the other hand, the microeconomic effects in Lebanon have vital importance 
as the remittances are mostly channelled directly to the maintenance and support of the 
households. Not only in terms of basic needs and goods but also in terms of unscheduled 
financial needs, that frequently occurs due to the insubstantial state apparatus and the 
inability to access services without strengthening the existing informal patterns.  
Which brings us to another major component of the Lebanese informal economy; 
corruption. Despite the relatively open economic environment and capitalistic façade of 
Lebanon‘s economy, the fathomless levels of corruption in the country comprise a serious 
restraint to sustainable development and an obstacle to the investment opportunities which do 
not wish to adopt bribery practices. According to Brownsberger, sociological and cultural 
factors such as customs, family ties and high levels of clientelism, also constitute potential 
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sources of corruption which has found acceptance in the social psyche and behaviour.
358
 
Corruption in Lebanon is deeply entrenched to each and every aspect of daily life. Corrupt 
practices stem from every level of the social stratification, from political scandals involving 
the ruling elites to small facilitating bribes which can be engaged by almost any citizen. The 
problematic case of Lebanon stems exactly from the aforementioned fact. Some countries 
which are perceived as corrupt have a relatively high degree of grand corruption, meaning 
state officials exploit the state‘s resources for particular interests. Other countries have higher 
levels of petty corruption. Lebanon portrays extremely high levels on both types of 
corruption. 
The numerous scandals revealed over the last few years damaged the credibility of 
Lebanon on the world stage, but they have potentially attracted back door investment 
opportunities which would otherwise be lost. However, since there is credible data to make 
these estimations it is rather debatable if the overall input can offset the official losses in 
terms of state revenue and long term returns from the actual growth. Unfortunately most of 
the scandals do not contribute to the overall growth, not even marginally, as they represent 
pure losses on behalf of the state. For example, the loss of money at the state-run Electricite 
du Liban or the mismanagement at the financially unstable Al-Madina Bank,
359
 as well as 
specific examples of political corruption even involving top officials like the Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri who allegedly –according to Sfakianakis- used the banking system to launder 
money from his foreign-based companies and facilitated deposits from his close friends.
360
 
An intermediate situation stems from the state contracts and licences as both the ruling elite 
and senior and junior state officials could be involved. For example, for a state construction 
or licensing contract this could be arranged by the regime elites, but the in-between dealings 
involving suppliers etc are dealt with by lower state officials who draw on state funds or 
grants and loans received through international bodies. The situation becomes more dramatic 
if we consider that according to Transparency International, Lebanon‘s economy  heavily 
relies upon foreign aid and support for post-war reconstruction.
361
 Those two elements are 
grey areas for financial abuse and embezzlement. For example according to Sfakianakis the 
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accumulated funds regarding the mobile network licensing was more than 2.3 billion dollars 
and the main beneficiaries were the ruling elite, several businessmen and some bankers. 
Sfakianakis also notes that one of the two licences was eventually awarded to the son of the 
minister of defence who is married to Hariri‘s stepdaughter.362 This situation is also assisted 
by the lack of government transparency and the lack of rule of law. According to Yacoub 
private sector investors would only enter a market if they had cut deals with governing 
elites.
363
 Moe and Esfahani mention that according to the UN over 43% of foreign companies 
in Lebanon "always or very frequently" pay bribes and another 40% "sometimes" do.
364
 As 
the National Integrity System Study mentions ―the perennial concern as regards law 
enforcement in Lebanon is that those in power will use it as a political tool to protect the 
interests of the elites: sectarianism, as in all parts of the political process, is embedded into 
the leadership positions of security agencies.‖365 Nevertheless, sectarianism is a widespread 
problem in Lebanon enhancing the clientelism, favouritism and nepotism in the country, to 
the extent of becoming a social problem as meritocracy due to this situation is almost non-
existent. 
The situation is quite similar when it comes to petty corruption in Lebanon due to the 
aforementioned sociological aspects - as explained by Brownsberger earlier - contribute to 
the light hearted views on corruption and the extensive use of it by the Lebanese population. 
As Moe and Esfahani note, it seems that most Lebanese, regardless of their religion, social 
status, location, political affiliations or wealth, are unwilling to change the present system, 
not because they are ignorant of its consequences, but because they have developed a stake in 
maintaining it.
366
 This is the result of the relative convenience that corruption offers within a 
state that portrays vast inability to provide essential bureaucratic services. On the other hand, 
in a more social perspective as Al-Azar mentions, the beast of corruption in Lebanon seems 
to be so invincible that the people of Lebanon have become resigned to the problem.
367
 Most 
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of the surveys conclude that in Lebanon vast amounts of money being spent on bribes,
368
 
constituting corruption is probably the most -hard to be dealt with- negative component in the 
informal economy. It is no wonder how Lebanon leaped from the 102
nd
 position to the 130
th
 
in the 2009 Corruption Perception Index drafted by Transparency International. The major 
problem seems to be that even though the general population arranges daily transactions in 
that particular manner, the whole situation leads to a further expansion of exploitation and 
enhances the establishment and application of those practices. I will not provide specific 
examples from the daily encounters with corruption as in the research chapter I have gathered 
a significant amount of first hand evidence which will offer a convincing outlook on the 
current situation in Lebanon. Instead of a conclusive remark I will quote Moe Farida and 
Fredou Ahmadi-Esfahani as I did in the literature review chapter which dealt with 
corruption.―...corrupt practices in Lebanon are at the core of the political system to the extent 
that even the most optimally designed institutions might fail in combating corruption as 
society‘s norms appear to rationalise taking bribes, and the country‘s elites regard politics as 
an arena for self-enrichment.‖369 
On a similar notion, based more or less on the same motives as described above, 
Lebanon over the years developed a rather strong base of informal, small and medium 
businesses or formal businesses. Which informally occupy workers and an even larger base 
of self-employed who constitute the foundation for the informal employment and commerce 
sector, possibly the backbone of the entire economic structure of Lebanon. A significant 
number of the Lebanese workforce works and functions in the informal sector according to 
the ILO, 61% of Lebanese workers work informally.
370
 This is another attribute which 
participates in the informal economy structure in the similar twofold perspective as 
corruption. On the one hand, employers save money through tax evasion and administration 
fees while the state loses significant revenue,   impacting on the quality of social security -
which in the informal sector is non-existent- which in extension does not really trouble the 
population as they think that the state - due to the high levels of corruption - will spend the 
money on irrelevant ventures anyway. Of course, according to an ILO study the majority of 
the concessions stem from the workers who are obliged ―to accept lower terms and conditions 
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of work as they are forced to compete with foreign migrant workers. Additionally they cannot 
rely on the various trade unions, which are fragmented and consumed in political party 
struggles‖.371 However, the situation becomes even more complex as a significant percentage 
of the informal workforce in Lebanon is self-employed, therefore employer and employee are 
simultaneously the ―exploiter‖ and the ―exploited‖. Of course, those self-employed people 
(and partly the waged ones) are also divided between those who work in the informal sector 
because of their reliance on remittances or because they already have a job in the formal 
sector (moonlighting), and those who work in such a manner because it is the only means of 
survival.  
Another parameter that supports the expansion of the informal sector is the legislation 
vacuum regarding the Palestinian refugee presence. Many authors support the notion that 
Palestinians are regarded as second class citizens. The reality is that they are not even 
citizens. It was not until 2005 that Palestinian refugees had official rights to work in Lebanon. 
There was clear projection of discrimination as the Palestinians thrived during the golden 
years of Lebanon as bankers and entrepreneurs by supporting the economy with a massive 
influx of capital.
372
 Evidently, it goes without saying that Palestinians are actually barred 
from getting jobs in the state bureaucracy.
373
 
 As a result, the majority of the Palestinian workforce in Lebanon increasingly resorts 
to the informal economy as the only means of support. The problem in Lebanon regarding the 
Palestinians can be partly attributed to the principle of reciprocity.
374
 Apart from the 
aforementioned principle, the legislation vacuum offers very limited options to the 
Palestinians. According to Baraka, those options are firstly to work by membership in a 
syndicate which is practically impossible because Lebanese nationality is a prerequisite and 
only a small minority of Palestinians are granted one. Secondly, to work by attaining a work 
permit, but the extensive level of the bureaucracy involved and the relatively high cost of 
obtaining one makes the procedure unapproachable. Lastly, there is the obvious option of 
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working in the informal sector where no permits are granted or laws   exist.
375
 Palestinian 
involvement in the informal sector is also assisted by the fact that the Palestinian Authority 
which was responsible for the maintenance and financial support of the refugee camps, in 
which almost half of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon lives, has been deteriorated and 
coupled by the minimal contribution of the Lebanese state, these people seek refuge in the 
ranks of the informal economy.
376
  
Palestinians constitute an important part of the Lebanese working force regardless of 
the fact that their contribution will not be included in any formal economic assessments. This 
situation does not seem to improve despite efforts to simplify the issue. However, lately 
certain moves on behalf of the government seem to head towards a more elastic arrangement. 
The last major component of the informal economy is criminal activities. Of course, 
as mentioned in previous chapters the informal economy as a whole could be characterised as 
illegal, however since a strong element of survival is involved, there are some sociological 
and possibly psychological concessions made. Consequently criminal activities are only 
perceived as those actions performed by organised crime organisations, terrorist groups and 
other illegal and legal networks which carry out questionable transactions. Lebanon due to its 
laissez-faire economy managed to attract throughout the years, various dubious figures which 
used the country for necessary capital flight in order to launder their ill gotten gains or base 
their illegal activities since it always acted as a hub for those transactions. Also, as shown in 
previous chapters, money-laundering and drug trafficking along with smuggling comprised a 
significant part of the informal labour and commerce industry, therefore contributing 
significantly on the survival of various social groups and exploding the informal economy 
activities, which consequently cost the  state absurd amounts of revenue. Of course the 
situation is still assisted by state officials and the intensive interconnection of the state with 
groups and organizations of specific ideological orientation, practising illegal or corrupt 
activities. Hezbollah for example, despite how the Lebanese view them, is perceived by a 
sizeable portion of the literature and several international actors as a radical Shiite 
organization with nefarious connections with Iran.  The Hezbollah case is special as it has 
combined, as David Thaler mentions, political participation with armed resistance and 
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terrorism,
377
 but the peculiarities of such statement were discussed in the illegal networks 
chapter. However, as Karazik and Bernard support, Hezbollah is a beneficiary of the drug 
business and specifically from poppy crops in the Beqaa valley.
378
 Generally, Karazik and 
Bernard continue that all the illegal networks capitalise on cigarette, diamond or weaponry 
smuggling, and   many organizations are involved from Lebanon –including Hezbollah- as 
bank accounts have been discovered linking those groups with the particular activities.
379
 Of 
course, all the aforementioned criminal activities use the sophisticated formal and informal 
banking systems in Lebanon to launder their capital, taking advantage of the status of 
Lebanon as a safe haven for such activities. Also they are attracted by the relative ease which 
state officials will look the other way for the correct price. Apparently the role of Hezbollah 
is not restricted on those activities. As explained in the following chapters, Hezbollah play s a 
prominent role in the political scene of Lebanon and also acts as a provider of social services. 
It is probably the systemic inadequacies within Lebanon that promote the emergence of 
radical social -or not- movements like Hezbollah and compel them to step in and replace the 
partial and insufficient governmental capacity to provide. However, it is not uncommon for a 
social benefactor or a charitable entity to be involved in rather shadowy affairs.  
Additionally, apart from the aforementioned criminal activities, which in their 
majority portray a transnational predisposition, there are the manifold local criminal networks 
which drive the prostitution rings, the extortion networks. Especially for night clubs and 
similar businesses and the common thievery networks including the dealers of stolen goods. 
Of course Lebanon does not behold the reputation of Dubai, for example, which is the main 
attractor of smugglers, traffickers, and terrorists as well as transnational organised crime 
groups since the use of the alternative transfer system like hawala is widely acceptable. 
Nevertheless, on a similar basis Lebanon is a well established ―washing machine‖.  In a 
probably deliberate manner the state allows the existence of such activities within Lebanon as 
certain interests are served.  
It is quite apparent from this that despite the positive or negative aspects of the 
informal economy components, one feeds the other in a perpetual vicious cycle. Remittances 
are vital but the use of informal transfers systems assist radical groups and facilitate money 
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laundering processes. Additionally the informal employment and commerce sector on the one 
hand is assisted by the partial reliance on remittances and on the other by the legislative 
vacuums and high levels of corruption. This in turn also aids the progress, expansion and 
sustainability of many illegal networks which support the informal sector to some extent. It 
seems that the very features which assist the country for its rapid reconstruction and its 
remarkable ability to overcome serious socio-economic problems are the same features which 
undermine the country and feed its destabilising elements. For example Lebanon at the 
moment has significant cash abundance in the middle of the financial crisis. The presence of 
the various illegal networks coupled with the high degree of political corruption, assists the 
capital flight in the country. As an IMF survey notes the ―remarkably stable deposit inflows, 
mostly from the large Lebanese Diaspora and foreign investors‖380 act as a shock absorber for 
the sudden economic disturbances in the international markets. However, as mentioned 
earlier this is not a sign of robust and sustainable economic performance.  
This vicious circle has actually led to a series of conceptions and misconceptions 
regarding the effects of the informal economy. Chen et al in their book, illustrate the old and 
new views of informal economy. The dissection of the views they have attempted has been 
used by almost every scholar and author who deals with informal economy. Literally, it can 
be found in hundreds of references. In this section, I will reassign those views from the 
perspective of Lebanon.  
The old view that the informal economy is obsolete and the technological 
advancements will weaken it, never applied in the case of Lebanon.
381
 On the contrary, 
Lebanon throughout the years has projected an expansion of its informal economy. However, 
according to Chen, the contemporary view proposes that the informal economy is highly 
productive and it is a major provider of employment.
382
 This is partly true, but only if we see 
the informal economy as a single entity. For the lower social strata, the informal economy is 
only marginally productive and it only provides the necessary means of survival. It mostly 
benefits the corrupt ruling elites and strengthens the illegal networks. 
 Also, Chen et al view the contemporary informal economy from a rather structuralist 
point of view, while the old view suggested a purely dualist perspective. In Lebanon, the 
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society and the economy run in multiple speeds, as the socio-economic inequality is vast. 
Meaning that, there are manifold occurrences –usually on a small scale- where the informal 
economy in Lebanon projects a rather autonomous formal sector position, while in other 
cases it is part and parcel. Additionally, in Lebanon due to the lack of equal opportunities in 
the formal sector, many people resort to informal employment. However this does not 
suggest that there is a surplus of labour –as the old view suggests- or that Lebanon has been 
keen on   informalization of previously formal employment relationships as the new view 
supports.
383
 The reality legitimises both views as valid in Lebanon‘s case.  
What is more, the old-fashioned view suggested that the informal economy is solely 
consisted of street vendors and small scale producers.
384
 In this instant, Lebanon is in 
absolute conformity with the new view which suggests that the informal economy is 
consisted of a wide range of informal occupations, as well as, the existence of the illegal 
networks which represent a huge fraction of the informal economy in the country. 
Nevertheless, another aspect of the new view proposes a rather limited percentage of illegal 
activities involved and it suggests that the informal economy is constituted mainly by the 
working class. However, as mentioned above and in previous chapters the illegal activities 
are abundant, and there is a rather significant presence of the ruling elites in the informal 
norms. In this instance Lebanon is a case in its own right, as it is not adequately represented 
by either of the two views, neither from the old perception nor from the newer one.  
Lastly, the final distinction deals with the effect of economic policies on the informal 
economy. The old view suggests that since informal economy exists only for survival 
purposes, there are no underlying effects due to any economic policy alteration. While the 
new view suggests that the informal economy is not only for survival purposes but also 
grounds for stable enterprises and dynamic growing businesses, which is affected by most of 
the economic policies.
385
 First of all, the informal economy is not solely reflected by the 
informal labour. Secondly, it can be argued that in both views potential economic policy 
alterations –if substantial- could affect the informal economy even if it was only a tool for 
survival.  
Finally, the informal economy in Lebanon is not affected by any economic policies as 
corruption and the other illegal practices are for personal gain, thus no matter what the 
                                                          
383
 Ibid 
384
 Ibid 
385
 Ibid 
118 
 
economic framework suggests, people will always be self-seekers. Even if we assume that the 
issue is stricter legislation and firmer regulation, the problem for the policy makers and the 
regulators is that the informal economy is stronger than the usually weak political decision. 
The informal economy has immediate application and effects of whatever it dictates within 
the society and the economy. The instantaneous results are the factors that make the informal 
economy being preferable, admirable and penetrative. People - even though they usually want 
to believe the empty promises that stem from the politicians -   always take their own 
measures to support and prop up their livelihoods. This is in part because in their minds they 
know that promises will remain promises. Nevertheless, there is another view which suggests 
that even if the promises were not futile and Lebanon had a healthy state apparatus, the 
Lebanese population would still choose to function in the same way that they do now. This 
view will be discussed in a following chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
Lebanon since ancient times was at the epicentre of the economic activity of the known 
world. With a long-standing tradition in commerce, the country managed throughout the 
years to be established as a focal point for financial services, trade, as well as trafficking and 
money laundering. Its laissez-faire economic orientation, assisted the formulation of a highly 
productive and profitable economic environment and yet an exceedingly failing corrupt state 
apparatus. This condition was assisted by long-lasting interventions of exogenous influences 
in the country (Ottomans, French), by the exorbitant sectarian status of its society and by the 
incessant conflicts and subsequent havoc. The latter particularly, probably constitutes the 
most fertile ground for the emergence of informal practices. The recurring theme of war and 
upheaval in the country crippled the state apparatus numerous times setting the clock of 
development back time and again. However, despite the regression that the various wars have 
inflicted on Lebanon, the country showed an astonishing resilience towards the global 
financial crisis from 2008 and on, which was preceded by another major conflict. 
Generally, the present economic conditions in Lebanon along with its broad informal 
economy are the result of the long-lasting fermentations of traditional and modern which 
include the cultural characteristics of the region, coupled with the strong institution of the 
extended family and kinship. These antiquated characteristics, coupled with the extra 
complications set by the extensive sectarianism in the Lebanese society, provide a volatile 
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and capricious politico-economic environment susceptible to corruption, defiance of the rule 
of law and informal ways. 
Although, Lebanon is certainly a unique case due to its complex socio-economic 
features it represents the archetypal model where all potential aspects of informal economic 
activity may occur. Lebanon is an eclectic mix in terms of societal divergence, economic 
balance and income distribution. Each of the four key drivers, which represent the mainmast 
of the informal economy, blends in Lebanon in a remarkably interconnected and 
interdependent way. In the next chapter I will closely look at the aspects of the informal 
economy in Lebanon as mentioned earlier via the primary material   gathered.  
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CHAPTER 7 Research Methodology 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to explain the research methodology of this thesis, which assisted 
in the elaboration of the secondary and primary data. The basic analytical tool, which links all 
the chapters together, is Force Field Analysis. In order to establish all the objectives of the 
research, I have disbanded the informal economy into four different variables. Each variable 
or key driver stimulates the core of the Force Field Analysis in proportion to its input. The 
input of each key driver is examined and analysed through the primary and secondary 
material of this research. This section, apart from the analytical methods of this paper also 
provides the data collection methods and the coding process and analyses the respondents 
groups according to their properties as well as the difficulties, which occurred in the process 
of the research mostly due to the delicate and controversial nature of the thesis.  
 The primary objective of this thesis is to establish the balance of the informal 
economy within the Lebanese state and society through a situational and empirical form of 
research, which displays the beneficial and detrimental aspects of the informal economy for 
the Lebanese state and population. Also the secondary objectives of the research explore the 
overall perceptions and theoretical background of the informal economy in Lebanon, which 
would acts as the base of the informality in the country. Furthermore this enables an 
understanding of the settings within which informal economy operates and provides a sound 
understanding of its components. Additionally, the secondary objectives include the 
assessment of the contribution of the informal economy in Lebanon and also consider the 
determination of the interconnections of the components of informal economy within the 
state and the society. Lastly the determination of the theoretical framework on which the 
informal economy expands and fuels its operation will be analysed via the loose 
implementation of the grounded theory, and the association of analytical methods of the 
thesis.  
 
  
Analytical Method; Force Field Analysis 
In the beginning of my research I have gathered tons of material that needed classification. 
The vague idea of informal economy had to be dealt in various levels. I wanted to include all 
the important factors that influence the informal economy without being disoriented by less 
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important ones while at the same time the analytical method will allow me to determine the 
beneficial or detrimental values of those components. Initially it was rather difficult to 
establish the importance and weight of each component or key driver. For example, in the 
initial stages of the interviews I was convinced that corruption in Lebanon is not so bad after 
all and that is actually needed. When I gathered all the material I divided the data into the 
respective key drivers. In the first phase were more than four. For example, a key driver 
named zakat (charities) was included in the spectrum. However, in the process it was proven 
that the zakat could not be a standalone key driver. The overall impact as an economic 
activity was not so significant to influence the entire economic structure. Thus it was briefly 
included in the appropriate sections. A preliminary bibliographical scan pretty much paved 
the way for the main key drivers. The main core of informal economy for most of the 
academia is situated in the informal modes of production, employment and trade. As those 
components are vastly interconnected employment and trade had to be investigated under the 
same banner. In the research, I realised the informal employment and trade could be a unique 
body of water. Informal workers could be traders at the same time. Therefore, in order to 
avoid confusion and the existence of two similar chapters in the literature review, the 
informal trade and employment is presented as a single chapter.  It was obvious from the very 
beginning that remittances (informal or not) play a significant role in the Lebanese economy 
and they deserve to be a component on their own. Corruption also provided vast amounts of 
books and articles and during the field research the data gathered for corruption alone were 
overwhelming. The illegal networks were more complex as I ended up including Hezbollah 
into the same key driver and the variables within this category were manifold. The inclusion 
of an adequate sample of the illegal activities was probably one of the most arduous tasks in 
this thesis.  However, for the sake of balance I managed to display the illegal organizations‘ 
and Hezbollah‘s dubious activities under the same banner.  
The technique of Force Field Analysis as developed by Kurt Lewin,
386
 belongs to the 
family of soft analytical techniques that have originated from social and psychological 
sciences. The approach permits a ‗situation‘, individual or area of interest to be examined by 
analysing the forces or key drivers of change that impact on the condition of the subject. 
These drivers of change can be innumerable, and will depend solely on the analyst‘s 
requirements in considering the subject space. It is said to represent a ‗tug of war‘ type 
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system whereby positive and negative factors hold the subject in balance (see diagram 1). By 
shifting one or more of these balancing factors the subject area changes, changing the 
equilibrium, and thus reflecting a new environment (see diagram 2). The similarities of Force 
Field analysis with the qualitative factor analysis are not from first glance staggering. 
However, why using this method over a more well known one? First of all, this was the main 
reason. I wanted to use a tool that looks like qualitative factors analysis; it has most of its 
advantages and most importantly most of its disadvantages. Also the lack of association of 
the force field analysis with mathematical models really suited the rather informal approach I 
used in the field research and the lengthy literature review. I thought that Force Field would 
be an appropriate method to model such an intangible and subjective area. Also Force Field 
analysis provides a relative autonomy in the examination of the key drivers as some of them 
could be disconnected from each other but intrinsically connected with the main theme. Force 
field analysis really complements my theoretical background and interests and I felt really 
comfortable and liberated using it. 
 
 
With regard to the scenario development the process has been taken forward an extra step by 
the British Ministry of Defence. Rather than focusing on the balance of power the interest 
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shifts to the changing nature of the subject once the forces have altered. This produces a new 
dynamic to the force field and thus permits the analyst to consider alternative futures based 
on the key drivers of change, modifying the balance (see diagram 2). This can be done as 
many times as necessary and on many levels of granularity, or until the analyst has exhausted 
the number of changes possible using the drivers. Additionally, it has proven useful to ensure 
that some assumptions are also laid down; these assumptions may focus on a global situation, 
regional considerations and for a specific country, the force field would consider the 
assumptions made regarding the internal situation. These assumptions then allow the analyst 
to consider the probability of the scenario taking place; a recommendation is to refer to the 
language of 
probability.
387
 
 
By previously considering the key drivers and what their changing nature may result in, a 
narrative can be produced using the subject as the nucleus (this will of course be supported by 
extensive research into the subject area by use of subject matter experts and other sources of 
information). Other means by which Force Field Analysis can be used is by: 
- investigating the balance of power involved in an issue 
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- identifying the most important players (stakeholders) and target groups involved in an issue 
- identifying opponents and allies 
- identifying how to influence each target group (driver) 
 
 
Secondary Material Research 
The secondary material in this research represents an active component of the analysis and 
evaluation, as it not only provides the theoretical development and literature review of the 
project but also offers a dynamic input into the findings and results of the research. The 
available literature provides the necessary tools for the deep understanding of the informal 
economy and its key drivers in the international stage as well as in Lebanon. Also, as shown 
in Chapter 6, it also provides the theoretical background for the detection of the foundations 
of the informal economy in Lebanon and assists in the production of the findings in alliance 
with the primary material as shown in Chapter 9. The range and diversity of the secondary 
material was not only used throughout the thesis to support the author‘s analysis, but also to 
provide an extensive understanding of the theoretical concepts of the informal economy. 
Primary Material Research 
Direct and indirect respondents 
The primary research included individual and collective interviews of the different 
respondent groups. The respondents –independently of the group in which they belong- are 
divided into two different categories: 
 Direct Respondents 
This category represents all the respondents who were actively involved in the informal 
sector of Lebanon. It predominantly includes the fifty six (56) members of the public since 
they were the primary users, but also includes ten (10) government officials who openly 
stated that they have participated in one or more of the key drivers of the informal economy. 
Also apparent in this category are included those who have firsthand accounts of informal 
practices.  
 Indirect Respondents 
This category includes all (10) the academics, and six (6) of the government officials who 
had no direct involvement in the informal economy of Lebanon. Their involvement could be 
theoretical or literally indirect as they might be exposed (or be in close proximity) to informal 
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practices, as their input in this research stems from their academic capacity or from their 
close involvement in the wider context of the Lebanese state apparatus. Also in this category 
are included the members of the public opinion who have participated in this research 
through other people‘s situational accounts and examples of which there are approximately 
twenty five (25), while some of them provided me with firsthand as well as second-hand 
accounts. Therefore, I placed in this category a few individuals who also provided firsthand 
accounts, but judging by their overall contribution the second-hand accounts were probably 
more prevalent.  
Size of sample 
The data was collected in London (UK), in Athens (Greece) and in Beirut (Lebanon). 
Although relatively small in comparison to other studies, given the circumstances and the 
nature of the research, it may be considered adequate. The sample in this thesis consists of 
one hundred and seven respondents (107). Eighty one (81) of them were users or members of 
the public, ten (10) were academics or of academic background and sixteen (16) were 
government officials. A considerable percentage of the public opinion remained anonymous 
for two reasons. The first was because they were simply afraid to reveal their identities due to 
the sensitivity of the research and the responses, especially in the sections regarding 
corruption and the illegal networks. The second reason was due to the casual approach of the 
interviews. Some of the interviews were literally conducted in the middle of the road, or in a 
spontaneous and random manner and consequently some respondents were not ready to be 
subjected to an interview like that. Also several interviews were abruptly interrupted for 
multiple reasons, thus I was unable to properly register them. All the academics agreed that 
their names could be disclosed in this research, apart from one who works in the British 
Ministry of Defence and kept his/her anonymity for security reasons. Also several of the 
government officials, especially those who are still on duty in Lebanon kept their anonymity 
for obvious reasons. In the following charts I display the participation of the sample in each 
key driver. 
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Chart 1: Overall sample size 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2: Remittances Respondents Analysis 
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Chart 3: Corruption Respondents Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 4: Informal Employment and Commerce Sector Respondents Analysis 
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Chart 5: Illegal Networks Respondents Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6: Income or Occupational Status of the Users/Public Opinions Respondents 
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Primary Research Procedure 
Questionnaire design  
The variable and frequently erratic circumstances of each interview would have rendered the 
use of a structured hand-out questionnaire inefficient, despite the post-event realisation that 
the use of a structured questionnaire would have been much more preferable in terms of the 
data analysis. Nevertheless, the interviews were based on a fixed core of questions which 
depending on the case, was shifting, expanding and maybe becoming more penetrative and 
indiscreet.  
 The core questions included the predilection on each key driver, the effectiveness of 
each key driver, also the links with the other key drivers and the impact of each key driver 
and the informal economy as a whole to their living standards, to the society and towards the 
macroeconomic level and the state. All the other questions were situational and depending on 
the degree of willingness of the respondent to participate in the research. 
 In other words the majority of the remaining questions had an overall direction 
towards the objectives of the research with a few improvised queries -each time- depending 
on the case, the individual situation of the respondent, the time available and the interview 
location. 
Translation – Language 
The interviews with respondents in the UK were exclusively in English as all the respondents 
had a basic grasp of the language, however the interviews in Greece had to take place in some 
broken English, Greek and Arabic with the assistance of two trusted interpreters. The pre-
arranged interviews in Lebanon were by large in English, while the street interviews and the 
personal encounters took place in Arabic with the use of one the two interpreters from 
Greece, who accompanied me to Lebanon. My fellow interpreter or I, in turns wrote down the 
majority of the responses in notes mostly during the interviews. Sometimes the written down 
responses would undergo a brief revision right after the interview to add elements I may have 
neglected to note. All the notes were taken in Greek or English. 
 
Sampling and difficulties 
The respondents due to the diversified data collection approach had multileveled 
contributions in this research. Meaning that, some of the respondents provided a very 
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marginal or unclear input into the research due to their unwillingness to participate or to 
provide derogatory and controversial information to a foreigner like me or they would simply 
be uncommunicative. For example, from the total number of public opinion/users 
respondents on the informal employment and commerce sector only a few of them fully 
participated in the whole process of the interview. Many of the respondents only provided 
snippet answers and they did not answer all of the relevant questions. Also the indirect 
responses, with the emphasis on the government official and the public opinion, as Nick 
Duncan mentions, were more likely to be subject to inflation through perceptions.
388
 
Furthermore, I frequently encountered disbelief and rejection as the would-be respondents 
distrusted my motives regarding this research or were suspicious of my origin and intentions. 
 The criterion for the sample choice was pure randomisation regarding the initial steps 
of the data collection on the public opinion and users‘ sample. However, since the 
preliminary selection was concentrated in one area of London and Athens, the first thirty (30) 
respondents were labour intensive and low paid workers. Especially for the remittances key 
driver (and possibly corruption), such a prospect would have provided a rather monocular 
outcome on the predilection and use of the additional income. Later on, in order to balance 
the social stratification of the sample I selected respondents based on the income in order to 
provide a holistic societal outlook on the subject. As a result, in the later stages of the sample 
selection I was excluding people, who were underpaid or unemployed, in order to acquire the 
perceptions of people with admittedly low and high income and maintain the balance. The 
only criterion for their financial background was their occupation and their potential avowal 
of their returns, since I had no other obvious signals for their financial status. (See Chart 6.) 
 Additionally, based partly on the grounded theory of qualitative research, the 
categories and some of the classification of the respondents emerged in the process of the 
interviews or in the process of the theoretical development of the research in the literature 
review, for example the self-employed category and the waged category in the interviews of 
the informal employment and commerce sector.
389
 
 The main categories of the sample are:  
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a) The actual users or the public opinion, which represents the end users of each key 
driver which constitutes the informal economy in Lebanon and reflects the core of the 
Lebanese society perception on informal economy; 
b) The government officials who were divided in Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
officials, which represent the governmental input of the informal economy. Also the 
Lebanese officials are potential users of the informal economy, therefore more prone to 
biased responses. For this reason, I have included few non-Lebanese government officials as 
they may well have the adequate knowledge on the issues of the research, but without the 
bias and the risk of their position;  
c) The academics, which represent the notional and estimated primary input in this 
research as the predominant indirect respondents on the informal economy. For this reason, 
they also represent the most impartial and neutral group of the respondents in this research.  
Data collection methods  
Even though the methodology has certain inductive characteristics, unlike Singleton‘s et al 
suggestions, my situational and empirical approach detaches the notion of ―situation‖ from 
―reality‖.390 Meaning that, the situation as described by the respondent is not necessarily the 
truth. Therefore, I had to substantiate the credibility of the responses, by trying to validate the 
data with another respondent. If the process of this validation was unfruitful more than likely, 
I would have to exclude the responses of the particular respondent from the analysis. As 
Silverman suggests the direct involvement attempts to ―grasp reality at its 
accomplishment.‖391 However, my direct involvement was only partial as I was present at 
several informal transactions as an observer and even fewer as a participant. However, this 
approach offered me invaluable data and allowed me to confirm the validation of manifold 
previous data ―from the horse‘s mouth‖.  
 Given the sensitivity of the subject, the extraction of the data needed a very careful 
and delicate approach. According to William Miller the obtainment of data regarding 
sensitive issues like corruption should not contain a strict definition of my objectives, but it 
should provide manifold clear and explicit questions on the topic in order to locate the 
                                                          
390
 Singleton, Chris -  Beech, John ―The psychological assessment of reading‖ Routledge, London: 1997 citation 
found in Silverman, David ―Doing qualitative research: a practical handbook‖ SAGE, London: 2005, p.85 
391
 Silverman, David ―Doing qualitative research: a practical handbook‖ SAGE, London: 2005, p.84 
132 
 
possible inconsistencies.
392
 I partly followed Miller‘s approach; however soon I realised that 
Duncan‘s approach was rather preferable as the questions had to be indirect and general. Still, 
the questions should be manifold for cross-referencing of the reliability, but Duncan stressed 
that people in the public sector should not be approached, as their perceptions will be 
challenged.
393
 Indeed, the public officials were the most problematic group of the respondents 
regarding their credibility, but the responses that qualified as persistent were extremely 
valuable for the arrival at a safe conclusion.  
 The initial approach exclusively included the public opinion, meaning the actual users 
of the informal economy. Due to the casual approach of the sample, I used no questionnaire 
or tape recorder. I was always carrying a digital recorder but in most cases the use of it, was 
declined by the respondent as too time-consuming, too official, too permanent. Besides, in 
many cases the sample was interviewed in their working environment thus time was of the 
essence. The initial data was collected by random visits to Lebanese owned shops and 
restaurants in Central London to locate and discuss with potential respondents. Some of the 
visits were repetitive, which allowed to me additionally validate some of the responses. The 
objective was to establish a network of respondents with potential extensions to Lebanon. I 
followed exactly the same procedure in Athens and by the end of this process I had 
assembled a respectable network of contacts, which paved the way for my first visit to 
Lebanon and meet the corresponding contacts of my initial sample. Also, with the invaluable 
assistance from members of the Greek Arab Chamber of Commerce and personal contacts 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens, I managed to arrange contact with key 
individuals in Lebanon, something that provided me with delicate and important data 
regarding sensitive aspects of the research.  
In Lebanon, more or less I applied the same random approach in shops, bazaars, 
restaurants etc. However, in order to expand the network of the respondents in Lebanon, I 
resorted to the use of other medium, which contributed significantly on the establishment of 
further extremely important contacts in Lebanon, which allowed me a closer insight into the 
state apparatus of Lebanon. After all, according to Harvey Russell Bernard, direct 
observation –without being completely false proof- does provide more accurate results than 
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the reported one.
394
 Also the use of websites of social networking offered a rapid expansion 
of my sample as I managed to arrange group meetings in Beirut. Most of the sessions took 
place in the Cherry Pub in Beirut, where I managed to extract a large bulk of my data and 
develop additional contacts, who eventually escorted me to various public institutions and 
introduced me to additional contacts, who represented the core of the government officials 
sample and the academic sample from Lebanon.  
Most of the non-Lebanese respondents situated in Athens and London, who 
represented members of government institutions and academics were formally approached 
according to their field of expertise and the relevant involvement in the objectives of the 
research.  
Data coding 
The questions were not designed to include the coding of the data, as most of the questions 
were improvised in each session, apart from the basic core, which was in constant flux as 
well. Of course, the lack of a structured questionnaire rendered the coding process rather 
difficult, as I had to approximately formulate a hypothetical fixed structure of questions in 
order to proceed to the coding process without neglecting any of the data. The coding process 
would be done later, to guarantee that the qualitative information would be in the analysis. 
Apparently, due to the application of the coding breakdown in the latter stages of the thesis, 
the use of computer software was inapplicable; therefore the coding process took place in a 
manual and time consuming mode. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter clearly outlined the research methodology used. It explained the analytical 
methods used and exactly how this was done. It also outlined the methods that I have utilised 
to collect the primary material in order to filter it through the Force Field Analysis, which in 
turn aided the accomplishment of the objectives as described in the introduction. 
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CHAPTER 8 The Interviews 
 
This chapter deals with the primary research material gathered over a period of two years. 
The interviews project the views of a diverse sample of respondents regarding each 
individual key driver concerning the input, the participation and the significance of those 
components in the informal economy matrix of Lebanon. This section provides the bulk of 
the opinions, outlook and situations which constitute the informal economy in Lebanon 
according to the diverse sample I have examined and my personal encounters with the 
informal practices. 
Throughout the chapter the respondents are represented in three categories. 
Originally, I interviewed the individuals who are actively engaged in all four key drivers, 
possibly with the exception of the fourth key driver; the illegal networks. Those individuals 
are the actual users or the directly involved groups with the informal practices as represented 
by the Forcefield analysis in the previous chapter and they represent the public opinion 
views. This category probably offers the most contradictory set of views on the informal 
economy, as the general public is influenced by a wide range of biases regarding the informal 
practices. The public opinion is highly vulnerable to distinct indoctrination, ideologies and 
personal micro-interests which affect the objectivity of their judgement. However they are all 
based on true life events and situations; therefore are highly important. 
The second category is represented by government officials. Those officials are 
divided between Lebanese state officials and foreign officials directly involved with 
Lebanon. The Lebanese officials demonstrated a tendency to offer rather vague and 
contradictory statements, perhaps due to the danger of being misjudged and exposing 
derogatory aspects of Lebanon. However, the Lebanese ex-officials who are detached from 
the perils of misconduct provide a rather more convincing outlook regarding the informal 
practices in Lebanon. The foreign officials similarly, selectively expose certain aspects of 
Lebanon‘s informal tendencies according to the depth of their involvement in the processes 
of the country‘s formal and informal mechanisms. They often resort to inconsistency in order 
to safeguard their status and position by altering circumstances, however occasionally the 
validity is restored and their point is still worthwhile. 
The third category of the respondents has a predominantly academic background. The 
academics and the researchers, probably represent the most objective group of respondents 
since there are no conflicting interests involved. The purely academic respondents due to 
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their remote association with the four key drivers provide factual knowledge on the issues. 
Some of the researchers had certain ideological orientations and active involvement in 
opinionated organizations; however they were still able to provide accurate estimations on the 
questions regarding the informal economy in Lebanon. 
Each driver‘s subsection structure is formulated according to the responses and the 
issues emerged by the interviewees. The only exception is the illegal networks interviews 
which are structured according to the respondents‘ background. In this instance the first 
category‘s respondents –meaning the informal economy users- represent only the views of 
the public opinion as affected by the networks and not as actual members of those networks. 
Interviews on informal employment and commerce sector 
Introduction 
Lebanon for a country predominantly Arabic and Middle Eastern has a significantly less 
obvious amount of illegal street vendors and various other informal sellers of goods. 
However, the more someone draws away from central Beirut or the mainstream coastal roads, 
the chances to meet or to be approached by someone who wants to sell you something 
increases dramatically. In the bazaars the situation is more or less similar as in any country in 
the Mediterranean; harassment towards the naive Westerners, endless haggling and of course 
total absence of receipts of the transactions. 
In my attempt to check out and to deal as much as possible with the state apparatus 
and its rules I endeavoured to get the VAT from my purchases reimbursed. The goods that 
could fit in the luggage, if followed by a receipt signed by the seller with his address and his 
VAT registration number and with the completion of a form you could potentially have your 
VAT reimbursed at the airport.
395
 However, obtaining a receipt was merely impossible. The 
most common excuse was that the final price is below the cost and therefore, it is outrageous 
to ask for a receipt as well. Those few who reluctantly agreed to provide me a receipt 
mentioned that now I should pay for the VAT and they would approximately charge me an 
extra 20-25%, even when I mentioned that I am aware of the fact that the VAT rate in 
Lebanon for retail goods is 10%. After a point, especially at the places I have re-visited, the 
avoidance, the suspiciousness and the cold shoulders I received was astonishing. Also there 
are selectively situated - especially around mosques -  hundreds of beggars who are given  
alms, sometimes very generously, depending on the commerciality of their spot. Generally 
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speaking, the levels of tax evasion and the informality in employment and trade are extremely 
high. 
 This section deals with the primary material gathered from interviews from various 
shop assistants, labour workers and my personal observations in the streets of Beirut, as well 
as the material collected by the interviews of three academics. The first part of the section 
identifies the peculiarities of the employment sector in Lebanon and the second part displays 
the informal practices applied in the formal and informal commerce sector. This section will 
attempt to project whether the informal sector is indeed beneficial for the public interest and 
detrimental for the state. Of course this is a paradox as in the long run, the state will project 
an additional inadequacy to meet the expectations of the public. According to George 
Pavlopoulos, the informal sector generally has adverse consequences on the economic 
structure of any given state. Even though, the resolution of this situation will be presented in 
the following chapter, the impact of the informal sector is not purely economic but 
intensively social too, as will be highlighted further down. 
 
Informal employment sector 
The informal employment sector in Lebanon is rather diverse. The informality is intensified 
due to the high levels of corruption and the relative lack of the rule of law in various 
segments of the society, where proper auditing never takes place. In other words, it is 
relatively easy for a civil servant to hold two or more positions (moonlighting) in the public 
sector and sometimes in the private as we saw in the corruption interviews with the doctor. 
However the majority of informal labour is primarily divided among those who work for 
themselves and those who work informally under a waged status in formal or informal 
businesses. The secondary categorization is only for analytical purposes since all of the 
workers ultimately belong to one of the two primary categories. 
The situation in Lebanon is more complicated as there is an undisclosed amount of 
refugees and immigrants for Palestine and Syria who in their majority work informally. 
According to George Pavlopoulos, informal employment boosts the estimations for the long 
term unemployed workforce figures, obviously because they work in the shadow. Lastly, 
there are those who as their main profession have certain illegal activities. Therefore, they 
could be included in the informal employment section too, as another additional parameter of 
tax evasion. Also, unregistered workers who do not participate apparently in the taxation 
system, with the exception of course, of the criminal elements who operate with the aid of a 
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legal facade. Those elements will be discussed in the following part with the illegal networks 
interviews. 
Primary employment divisions 
Self-employed 
The basic core of the primary material regarding the self employed informal workers was 
drafted by the use of a house keeper, two builders, a bazaar seller and an informal used cars 
trader. The other participants had only a marginal –but vital- contribution in the process of 
the interviews. The most crucial problem for all the self-employed workers is the lack of 
social insurance. Of course, the impression that the self-employed workers in their majority 
have significantly lower income is not necessarily truthful. Several occupations provide a 
remarkable income, especially in their informal status. Indeed the lower income workers face 
the expected predicaments as described in Chapter Two, especially those who are not in the 
privileged position of receiving remittances. 
As in most of the informal practices the main reasons of operating in the informal 
stages of employment are focused on the two parameters as explained by Portes;
396
 survival 
and exploitation. The house keeper, who works on an irregular level in various houses, is 
completely insecure regarding what the future holds. The total lack of social insurance poses 
a major problem regarding her pension and the irregularity of her occupation challenges the 
sustainability of her livelihood. Similarly, the builders have an additional problem, which is 
generated by the harsh competition which stems from the Syrian builders mostly. Even 
though many of the Lebanese builders work informally, there is an unwritten law which 
suggests that the locals have slightly higher day-work pay than the immigrants. 
Therefore, the foreign informal workforce poses, for them at least, a constant threat 
which puts downwards pressures on the already low wages. The only salvage for them, at the 
moment, is situated on the fact that due to the never-ending reconstruction in Lebanon and 
the manifold construction projects, the demand for builders is still quite elevated. The 
prospect of joining an organised group of builders under a contractor does not attach any 
additional security. The contractors tend to use informal builders as well and the pay is not 
improved. Also formal and informal construction firms tend to under-report the number of 
employees and the hours they worked. 
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 The street vendor likewise prefers to stay in the informal level, since as he suggested 
his turnover did not allow him to obtain the necessary permits, and he evades taxes for the 
same reason. Besides, it is quite acceptable to operate near open air markets for example 
without paying the fee of participating in one, even though it is illegal. On the other hand, the 
informal car trader has enough revenue to join the formal ranks; however the car trader 
suggested that there is no reason to lower his income by paying taxes or by maintaining a car 
dealership since business is good as it is. Also when I suggested if the practice of operating in 
the informal level offsets the benefits of being formal, he fiercely objected by pointing out 
that ―formal or informal he would still have to bribe the customs agents and the other 
bureaucratic middlemen‖. Perhaps, he would have to be less corrupt and spend less on bribes 
if he was a formal car salesman, but he still prefers to pay an extra ―baksheesh‖ than dealing 
with the bureaucracy. 
The other respondents were rather uncommunicative and I was unable to make clear 
estimations on how much they could earn and what are their motives and purpose of being in 
the informal sector. However, a young shoe shiner, after a generously paid shoe-shine, 
claimed that he adopts an almost ragged appearance and background story to appeal to his 
customers and especially the tourists. His earnings vary from day to day but they are just 
enough for his cigarettes and his contribution to the family. His involvement to the informal 
sector stems from his lack of education and the need to work from an early age. It seems that, 
as in the formal sector, the earnings are dependent on the type of work. The more business-
related jobs apparently offer an increased revenue, for example the car dealer had a more than 
adequate income while the labour intensive jobs like the almost beggar shoe shiner have a 
marginal income. Nevertheless, the motives of the low paid self-employed workers are 
unclear. Besides the survival purposes which are clear, not one of the respondents could 
provide a solid answer regarding his or her involvement in the informal sector. Probably the 
clearest answer came from a man who was quilting carpets, who said that it is the only thing 
that he knows how to do.   
Waged 
The other dominant informal employment type is working under a waged status. 
Unsurprisingly, manifold informal workers could be potentially occupied in the public sector 
like most of the cleaning personnel in the Ministry of Transportation. The primary 
respondents regarding waged informal employment were a delivery van driver and a sales 
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representative from a formal electronics business, a nurse from an informal clinic for the care 
of elderly people and a waiter in a restaurant of unknown status. 
 Even though all the informal occupations of the respondents had legitimate status, 
none of them were registered, licensed or insured. Specifically the two employees of the 
electronics firm were actually told that they were insured. When they asked after several 
months of work for the details regarding their national insurance the truth was revealed but 
due to the lack of an alternative they were both obliged to maintain their positions 
indefinitely uninsured. This is a clear example of exploitation; however the sales 
representative who was aware of the financial status of the small company mentioned that the 
business was potentially incapable of having its workers insured due to the limited turnover. 
The business, even though was properly registered and licensed most of its staff was 
informally occupied. Nevertheless, the driver and the sales representative have satisfactory 
salaries and especially the salesman could afford to pay for private insurance. Even though 
they are both unhappy for being unregistered, as long as they can adequately sustain their 
families they will remain in the particular company. Even supposing that they could search 
for a formal job they assume that the pay would probably be less. Indeed, the equivalent pay 
for a van driver was approximately 15%-20% lower than in the informal sector. On the 
contrary, the pay for the nurse would be significantly higher if she was occupied in the formal 
sector; however that seems to be an impossible prospect given the corruption regarding 
nursing positions in the formal sector. The working hours are above the weekly average and 
the working conditions are revolting. However, since she cannot rely on the remittances from 
her siblings in the UK, she needs to complement her income by using the first aid training she 
had from school. Similarly the waiter has a steady income –even though paid on various days 
of the month- from the restaurant owner and during the summer months he almost earns 
double because of the tips. However, the waiter realising the negative prospects of his 
occupation, in order to accomplish his ambitious plans for his future and his family, needs the 
security of a formal job. Nevertheless, despite his attempts to join the formal ranks his efforts 
were unrewarding. The only viable prospect is to join the public sector; however the process 
of acquiring a permanent position there would almost exclusively be a product of bribing, 
especially for a man without any particular skills. His family is actually saving up in order to 
bribe a government official they know via vague kinship ties for a position that he did not 
wish to reveal to me as part of his prejudiced beliefs. 
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 Also, without having the chance to speak to the actual people, one of my most 
trustworthy sources from the Ministry of Transportation, claimed that the majority of the 
ministry cleaners are unregistered. Of course, this is not a product of an outrageous 
governmental policy but a result of the highly corrupt status within the Ministry. The official 
also claimed that the administrators, who are responsible for the management of the cleaning 
personnel, embezzle huge amounts of state funds with this practice. On the one hand they 
extort money in order to hire them and on the other they embezzle the funds with fake 
certifications. He also mentioned that other state agencies use similar methods to embezzle 
the state‘s resources but in a rather more complex manner in order to be less observable. 
Nevertheless, at the end I managed to partly substantiate those allegations as relatives of the 
interviewed had indeed worked under informal status in the public sector as handymen and 
maintenance staff for years. 
Secondary employment divisions 
Moonlighters 
Another common practice with manifold levels is moonlighting. There are numerous 
examples in Lebanese society with people who have one formal and one informal occupation. 
For example, as I discovered from the contacts I made when I was examining corruption in 
the Port, one of the employees from the Port of Beirut, was also the underground owner of a 
restaurant in central Beirut. Since there was a legal incompatibility with his occupational 
status in the Port and other private endeavours, he would illegitimately own and work in the 
restaurant which was registered to a third trustworthy person. 
Similarly other government officials or members of the public might be subletting 
businesses (a bar for example) in order to enhance their income. As Nazi Richani mentions ―a 
plumber or a taxi driver could be employed in one of the Progressive Socialist Party offices 
or recruited in the army and at the same time practice his profession in his spare time. One 
example of this phenomenon is provided by the Office of the Secretary-General of the PSP. 
In the summer of 1987, at least 15 employees worked in that office, 10 of whom had other 
jobs after hours. Party officials confirmed that holding two jobs is typical of most of the 
party's rank and file.‖397 
In another case, a senior manager of the Electricité du Liban electric company was an 
undercover and informal representative for the Central Bank of Lebanon regarding 
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foreclosures. His job was to secretly bid on behalf of the bank on confiscated properties and 
commodities in order to ensure an uncertain repossession. Due to the extensive clientelistic 
and corrupt modes of Lebanon‘s public sector, similar examples are ordinary. However, the 
burden of moonlighting seems marginal in comparison to the ostensible size of the informal 
labourers, the illegal immigrants and the refugees. 
Immigrants 
In the same way that Lebanese civilians work in the informal sector either as self-employed 
or waged workers; the thousands of illegal immigrants would work in similar manners. For 
the Lebanese people the immigrants are a twofold constituent of the informal economy. On 
the one hand immigrants could potentially deprive jobs from the locals and push the wages 
downwards, however on the other hand people show some specific preference to foreign 
workers due to the lower demands. 
One very characteristic example, as described by an owner of a farm in Beqaa valley, 
is the caravans of buses from Syria during periods of the orange harvests and other 
agricultural products. Also the same happens during the season of collecting illegal products 
like cannabis or poppy. For the duration of the harvest, hundreds of Syrian cheap labourers 
would flood the few fertile plains of Lebanon and the Beqaa valley in order to offer their 
cheap labour. As a result of this practice, it is almost impossible for a Lebanese worker to 
participate in this process but on the other hand the production and the profits have increased 
due to the lower costs. 
 The same situation stands for the regular jobs also, as described in the previous 
sections. The conventional wisdom in the streets of Lebanon suggests that the foreign 
working hands are of inferior quality, however due to high levels of poverty the preference of 
unskilled labour for potentially skilled jobs is prevalent. 
 Since the situation in Lebanon regarding the Palestinians refugees is extremely hazy 
as described in a previous section and the difficulties of obtaining legal work permits for all 
the foreigners are usually impervious, thousands of immigrants are forced to live in Lebanon 
illegally. This creates a workforce that will accept the most insecure working conditions as 
well as lower salaries. Nevertheless, we cannot neglect those entire sections of the Lebanese 
economy which base their profits on the exploitation of these people like building companies, 
restaurants, textiles, and agriculture.
398
 This is probably the dark side of the informal 
economy‘s beneficial attributes. However, according to George Pavlopoulos, this is another 
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example of Lebanon‘s pluralism and liberal economic theory. Despite this progressive view, 
in my opinion, Lebanon‘s situation -including the peculiarities stemming from the Palestinian 
presence- is no different from any other country with heavy foreign labour existence. 
Criminals 
According to Sabine Elharouny, from a theoretical point of view, the workforce occupied into 
criminal activities is impossible to be estimated. However, there are thousands of people who 
find waged employment in illicit activities. Despite the risks, according to Elharouny‘s study, 
there are large segments of the Lebanese society, especially males under 28 years of age, who 
would willingly participate in criminal activities given the opportunity. The lack of faith and 
expectations, among the younger generations, has created a wide-spread concept of tolerance 
and desire towards illegal activities. Apparently the ease of generating untaxed profits and the 
indirect display of repugnance towards the state which is unable to universally provide 
sustainable sources of revenue and employment, is attractive to them. 
 Also according to Elharouny, Lebanon is the dominant paradigm of an extended 
nouveau riche social stratification. This situation is also administered by the extended 
corruption and the immense amounts of informal and illegal revenue of large parts of the 
society. Especially to rural areas which are more poverty stricken, when someone has an 
incomparably enhanced income of unknown origin in comparison to the other locals, there is 
a prospect that his income may be supported by illegal activities like the cultivation of 
cannabis. Besides, the locals - due to the small size of the communities - are aware the 
wrong-doings of their limited society. According to the same farm owner from the previous 
section, the local fire brigade initially protected the land of a local benefactor who was 
renowned for his extensive poppy farms.  
 In this instance due to the lack of adequate primary and realistic data, we can only 
assume the magnitude of the actual input of the criminal employment into the informal 
economy. However, it must be noted that this chapter is predominantly referring to business 
activities which do not completely comply with all the tax and regulatory obligations and not 
to exclusively criminal enterprises. 
 
Informal commerce sector 
The informal trade in Lebanon is not a means to an end, but the end itself. Apart from those 
who are involved in the informal sector for their survival, the majority of the respondents 
function in the informal trade sector mostly due to circumstantial reasons. The informal trade 
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embraces a broad spectrum of attributes. On the one hand, it is an additional component of 
the informal economy‘s survival features, at irregular intervals vital for the welfare of certain 
parts of the societal range, even during the frequent escalations of violence, when the state 
apparatus stalls or procrastinates. On the other hand, it constitutes the necessary smokescreen 
for severe law violations, tax evasion and for the amplification of the bonds between the 
public sector, the informal sector and the illegal networks under the prism of corruption. 
According to Ibraheem Khlel‘s study, the informal trade distorts healthy competition and 
pressures the market prices upwards, however according to the public opinion; informal trade 
generally offers cheaper products with the exception of the various periods of severe 
conflicts. Also the majority of the public suggested that they cannot possibly imagine their 
lives without informal trade. 
Informal trade via unlicensed street vendors 
According to formal shop owners around Beirut, the presence of street vendors who offer 
pirated goods is a scourge.  The sale of pirated software, replicas of expensive bags and 
clothes and various other accessories is increasingly problematic. According to a shop owner, 
occasionally those street vendors will sell their goods right next to the shop which sells the 
originals. Lebanon showed a remarkable resilience towards the financial crisis and the market 
for luxury goods maintained its high performance. However, the presence of street vendors 
and shops with counterfeit products sold as originals represents one of the most crucial 
problems of the market in Beirut. 
 From a theoretical point of view Frago Kourandi suggests the existence of informal 
trade and the street vendors is harmful to not only the shop owners and formal production 
firms but for the consumers too, since the quality levels deteriorate and the companies lose 
significant market shares affecting the competition levels. However, this is not necessarily the 
case as many of the respondents perceive that the presence of informal trade in the streets of 
Lebanon is in their interest, despite the unlawful extensions that this situation might entail. 
 According to the Greek-Arab Chamber of Commerce, street vendors represent the 
main channel of distribution of contraband. The street vendors could be potentially unaware 
of the illegality of the products they sell, despite the fact that they largely operate without a 
license and more than likely they have an unlawful status. Street vendors exist in every 
corner; their majority is unregistered and apart from the tax evasion and all the fees, such as 
stamp duties, Commercial Register fees and notary costs that the state loses,  are entangled in 
corrupt schemes with the local law enforcement. For example, when a shop owner protests 
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against their presence, the police would scare them away, however the moment the police 
disappear, the street vendors will return to their previous positions. In many cases, the 
unlicensed street vendors maintain their hotspots with the tolerance of the police; a tolerance 
which is actually bought. However, this tolerance is occasionally provocative as the police  
do nothing to stop them or dismiss them. Additionally street vendors, apart from a major 
channel of distribution for contraband and smuggled goods, constitute the core of the 
advocates of the black market in Lebanon. Especially during periods of turmoil and while 
certain products are in scarcity, those black marketeers provide those products in abundance. 
Of course, the costs will be considerably increased, however the street vendors-black 
marketeers sometimes settle for a barter transaction, usually something else in scarcity or a 
valuable object. 
Nevertheless, purchasing products from the bazaars and the various street vendors 
could be proven rather advantageous since the products could be notably cheaper. Therefore 
those vendors make available -to the lower strata as well- products of inferior quality but 
potentially of an advanced stylistic approach, which is much desired in the nouveau riche 
Beirut. Thus the street vendors evade the taxes and they enhance the petty corruption 
practices while constituting a scourge for  formal retailers; however they offer a relief for 
some parts of the society with lower incomes. Finally being a street vendor is occasionally 
the only employment option as described in the previous section. 
Informal trade via unlicensed or unregistered enterprises 
Similarly to the street vendors, there are manifold unlicensed or unregistered businesses and 
entrepreneurs, like the unlicensed clinic for the elderly people which operates informally, as 
described in a previous section. Of course the quality of the care is by far inferior to other 
formal homes, but the cost of maintaining a disabled person or an elder is significantly less. 
To be more specific, according to a nurse who works in the clinic the cost --depending on the 
severity of the prospect patient- could even be 80% less than in any another similar average 
clinic. It goes without saying that the quality of the services is more than inappropriate. 
Another very distinct example is the informal car trader as mentioned earlier on. The 
particular car trader, whose main profession is lorry driver, would frequently fly to Germany 
to bring used luxury cars acquired as a personal asset and then resell to a pre-arranged 
customer. Of course, the cars mileage more than likely would be altered. The car when it is 
officially imported into the country will be conveyed to the customer. In each trip, the 
informal trader would be accompanied by several friends who do exactly the same. Therefore 
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in every trip more than three cars will be imported in Lebanon; the average profit for each car 
is around ($14,000) fourteen thousands US dollars. Apparently each car is marginally taxed 
via the corrupt practices in the Port of Beirut or Tripoli and sold without VAT charges and 
other relevant fees. 
One more example illustrates the case of an unlicensed beautician, who was registered 
as a cosmetics retailer. Firstly, beauticians belong to a slightly different taxation scale than 
retailers and all the beauty services are shown to the tax office as sales of cosmetics 
products.
399
 Secondly, all the legal transactions that were eventually taking place were only 
as a pretext to maintain a seemingly legal operation of the business and not to attract any tax 
auditors. In this case, we have a legally functioning business, with an additional informal 
activity. The formal activity provides a cover towards the informal. It must be noted that this 
irregularity was evoked due to a complicated legislation vacuum regarding officially trained 
and licensed beauticians. This hybrid situation is not unusual in Lebanon. Many small firms 
will take advantage of legislative vacuums in order to enhance their sustainability. Someone 
may suggest that they still operate under a hazy almost informal status, however this is not 
the case, those entrepreneurs are actually registered, they do pay taxes –even if it is in a 
tailored manner- and generally they do contribute to the economy and not just for themselves. 
Probably this is the most representative example of Portes‘ third category of the informal 
economy which suggests growth of small firms even if it is based on corrupt practices.
400
 
However, according to Frago Kourandi, the major problem regarding this view is that none of 
those entrepreneurs or businesses are actually legal entities, therefore they are hardly ever 
able to borrow from formal credit institutions and banks and they usually resort to loan sharks 
with all the perils that this entails. 
Informal trade via formal and informal businesses; undercharges and fake invoices 
All of the entrepreneurs I discussed with admitted that they frequently resort to undercharges 
of certain products and they also frequently issue fake invoices. This is slightly different than 
the Chinese invoice vendors, who offer receipts used for tax purposes. Such invoices, as 
China Daily writes, could cause huge losses in tax revenues and could feed illegal activities, 
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such as smuggling, money laundering and corruption.
401
 Nevertheless, the result for the state 
revenue for China and Lebanon is in parallel. 
 What many Lebanese entrepreneurs do after a buyer-seller agreement is to 
undercharge certain products in order to reduce the VAT charges. For example, whenever it 
is possible, the seller - usually after the request of the buyer - would offer a certain product at 
an undercharged price. The seller would also occasionally issue an invoice for another client 
who might be in need of fake purchases. The third party usually pays only the value of the 
VAT to the seller. Also it is more than common for small and medium sized businesses to sell 
goods without issuing an invoice at all. Of course, when the transaction is not arranged for 
cash upon delivery but on account payment, this situation entails risks when the seller needs 
to claim the money, since there is no proof of delivery. However, this practice is extremely 
wide-spread despite the risks. However, according to Frago Kourandi the practice of 
undercharging is also the starting place of the creation of certain cartels within the market in 
order to proceed into price fixing schemes, bypassing the commands of healthy competition. 
 Also there is another category with various businesses exchanging invoices, to avoid 
taxes and other annual charges, as well as exchanging cheques and cashing them in advance 
in various banks. Two entrepreneurs would exchange post dated cheques of thousands of 
dollars and they would cash them in advance at their respective banks on commission and 
interest. In other words, they were generating money out of thin air, since all the invoices 
were fakes which were instantly issued and then cancelled just to prove to the bank that it 
was not a fake transaction or money laundering. The only commitment is to pay each other‘s 
cheques on time; nevertheless it was quite frequent that one of the two parties or the bank 
would not honour the cheques and they would bounce. 
 
Summary 
Officially, there is no clear estimation or body of statistics on the numbers of how many 
people are involved in the informal sector. Despite the efforts of the government to tackle the 
high informal levels in employment and trade, the results are very unrewarding. The informal 
employment sector is indeed a buffer -not necessarily for the labour surpluses, which vary 
from industry to industry-, for the unskilled workers of Lebanon, for those who cannot 
participate in formal ranks of employment and for the foreign workers who by an unwritten 
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law are usually paid less than the locals- especially the Palestinians or the Syrians that 
frequently come to Lebanon for harvesting etc. Lebanon has an abundance of street vendors 
and various self employed informal workers who show a rather surprising preference 
regarding their informal status. For example, the informal car dealer who prefers to pay an 
extra bribe than dealing with the state and paying taxes. On the other side, waged informal 
workers are wary of their status due to the uncertainty of the continuum of their employment 
and the lack of social security, however in many occasions they are more than certain for 
their employment as the employer could be the state itself, as it happened with the cleaning 
personnel in the Ministry of Transportation. Of course, those employees are more prone to 
exploitation but the difficulty to join the ranks of formal employment or the frequent 
unrewarding situation in the formal sector renders them almost permanently in their current 
situation and occupation. The most widespread dream among the younger generation, who 
desire to stay in Lebanon, usually is a position in the public sector. As they say, in the public 
sector you may have your stable salary; your social insurance –no matter how bad it may be- 
and then you can anything else you desire. However, the moonlighters, meaning those who 
occupy more than job in the formal or informal ranks are quite detested among the 
respondents. On the other hand, being a moonlighter is an ambition for most of the 
interviewed.  
 Characteristically those actively involved (users) in the informal sector proposed 
biased and unbiased opinions, which were in direct correspondence with the intensity of their 
personal interests. However, the views of the academics also had a distinct divergence 
regarding the input of the informal employment and commerce sector. 
The motives of being involved in the informal sector are manifold. A distinct 
percentage would be join the informal sector as an informal worker –self employed or waged- 
due to the poor living standards and the lack of prospects and alternatives. Another reason 
could be the general frustration and dissatisfaction towards the corrupt state. This could 
potentially motivate someone to join the informal sector as a criminal element. However, 
apart from the criminals, other waged or self-employed workers perceive as beneficial and 
profitable their involvement in the informal sector. Also the working conditions are not 
always the stereotypically exploitative ones. Many self-employed workers, especially in 
Beirut, would enjoy admirable levels of income and working conditions.  Possibly the most 
privileged category is the moonlighters who work simultaneously in two separate jobs, 
usually one in the formal sector and one in the informal. Unfortunately, the vast majority of 
148 
 
the informal workers are indeed employed under exploitative working regimes, they are 
underpaid and they work under dreadful working conditions, challenging even the health of 
the employee. This could also be the case for those operating in the organised crime. Some of 
the respondents admitted that it would appear as a business opportunity to work in the 
organised crime. The lack of expectations and opportunities among the younger generations 
has created a wide-spread concept of tolerance and admiration towards illegal activities. If 
someone wanted to use two words to describe the informal employment in Lebanon, those 
words would be: necessity and preference.  
 On the other hand the informal commerce sector is characterised by the aggregation 
of unlawful and corrupt practices in order to maintain a productive and potentially 
advantageous market alternative for the working classes, even though several academics 
would disagree. For example, the informal street vendors – unaware of their unlawful 
extensions- are harmful towards the mainstream shop owners, especially in Beirut, and 
definitely affect competition. Also the street vendors of Beirut represent the main channel of 
distribution for contraband. The state tolerance according to many of the shop owners is 
remarkable. The police seem to be indifferent towards them and do nothing to dismiss them 
or stop them. However, one policeman said to one of my protesting respondents that it is 
better in this way because if those people are caught or stopped in any way will eventually 
turn to crime. This is a clear projection of the failure of the all the systemic attributes and 
government efforts in Lebanon. 
 However, the methods they use and in particular the evasion of fiscal and regulatory 
obligations, including value-added taxes, income taxes and labour market obligations is an 
additional burden for the government. Nevertheless, several enterprises who offer services, 
for example, the unlicensed nursing home, despite the inferior quality of services they 
provide are way more affordable than the licensed ones, therefore more preferable. However, 
the most problematic issue is the association of those informal businesses not only with other 
formal firms but with the state itself. Many informal enterprises are seemingly legal as they 
do not attract auditors but when they do, the situation will be arranged with a small bribe. The 
state, due to its gigantic bureaucracy and corruption trends, could possibly facilitate the 
existence of informal employment and trade even within its underbelly. Even the situation 
with the post-dated checks, the undercharges and the fake invoices is indeed a scourge for the 
state revenue but it is also a practice commonly used from within the state agencies as 
described in the corruption sections. The links between the informal sector and the state in 
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Lebanon through corruption support the emergence of an unbreakable chain of 
interdependence and tolerance. 
Generally, the informal employment and commerce sector affects the entire spectrum 
of the economy and society in Lebanon. The public opinion views it as a buffer for the 
underprivileged workers and most importantly as an access to commodities; however they do 
recognise that it affects the overall input to social welfare. The academics ascertain it as a 
distorting element for most of the economic indicators in Lebanon and as confusing factor for 
the standardization of the market conditions, while the government official admits that the 
tolerance of the state and the vast interconnections support every aspect of the informal 
employment and commerce sector.  
 
Interviews on Remittances 
Introduction 
The collection of the primary material regarding the individuals involved with the remittances 
was based on a triple plus one axis. Firstly, I gradually came into contact with the actual 
remitters; the senders. Secondly, I contacted several businesses and individuals who acted as 
the informal transfer medium. Someone could characterise them as 'hawaladars', however 
none of them accepted the term. Besides, only a small percentage of them solely worked as a 
hawaladar. Most of them were owners of small sized businesses like kiosks, mini markets, 
telephone centres and only one was a restaurant owner. Thirdly, I got in touch with the 
recipients of the funds; the end users of the informally transferred capital. Lastly, I 
interviewed several representatives from the Greek-Arab Chamber of Commerce, the Greek 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Foreign Office. The reason behind the lack of 
Lebanese official contacts is based on the fact that I was unable to meet any relevant officials 
in Lebanon regarding this matter and on the fact that I needed an objective estimation and 
judgement regarding the factual impact of remittances on the Lebanese economy. 
 The basic hypothesis suggests that the informal remittances, despite their unofficial 
nature and the subsequent loss of the various taxes on behalf of the state, have a constructive 
effect on the individual level as well as on the state level. The secondary hypothesis regarding 
remittances is the notion that the remittances are preferably transferred through informal 
systems as opposed to the use of conventional banking systems due to comparative reliability. 
Plus the other comparative advantages as shown in chapter two. 
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The generic predilection and the consistency of the informal transfer systems (I.T.S.) 
This section establishes the relative preference and resilience of remittances via informal 
transfer systems to Lebanon. It also projects that despite the infrequent cases of counterfeit 
transactions, the general predisposition of the user is still in favour of those informal systems. 
The sample of remitters was constituted by 18 individuals of different social and occupational 
backgrounds. The majority of the interviewed senders were located in London and in Athens. 
Most of whom were occupied in labour intensive jobs as turn-spits in restaurants, cleaners, 
builders etc, while a few others, due to the extensive Lebanese banking and finance sector 
were shipping consultants, solicitors and financiers. Other immigrants are deprived of the 
luxury to practice their true profession in a host country. However, it must be noted that the 
senders who held capital intensive positions (in Athens mostly) were not immigrants but were 
legally installed by their respective companies. Of course, the need to send money back to 
Lebanon to family members (not necessarily of first degree kinship) was constant. In my 
endeavours to locate remittances senders to Lebanon I met several different nationalities from 
the Middle East such as Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians and Algerians as well as (Eastern) 
Europeans which included Polish, Albanian,  Bulgarians and Russians who extensively remit 
back to their countries. It must be noted that predominantly the Lebanese senders were 
occupied in higher profile jobs, particularly in Athens. 
 Most of the remitters in their initial attempts to send capital to Lebanon used official 
channels to transfer it. As soon as they felt settled, the need for easier and cheaper ways of 
sending remittances became evident for all the senders, independently of their background 
and income. Additionally, the red tape involved, the time consuming procedures and most 
importantly the high percentage of fees levied on the funds sent, vastly contributed to the 
decision to send the remittances through informal transfers systems like hawala. The informal 
transfer systems were also preferred due to the fact that apart from the remittances sent on a 
regular basis, impromptu transfers could be carried out any time of the day without any 
questions asked. Most of the senders agreed on the fact that the informal transfers bypass the 
queues, the occasionally excessive fees from the banks and most importantly the speed of the 
transfer is impeccable. If needed it could be instant, for the right price of course. Half of them 
also enjoy the fact that they bypass the official channels and therefore they do not support 
―the blood-sucking‖ institutions in any manner. In special emergency cases the remitter might 
use a more ―specialised‖ hawaladar, who with the use of a mobile phone can execute the 
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transfer in seconds. Lastly, a matter that should not be overlooked, even though it was not 
projected as a major issue and many interviewees attempted to diminish -probably in order to 
maintain their prestige-, was the fact that most  labour intensive workers who remit back to 
Lebanon did not speak the local language, Greek and English in particular. It was indeed 
ironic that several of the interviews were conducted in Arabic via an interpreter. 
 However, the majority of the senders prefer informal systems because of their 
inability to obtain a bank account, for the reasons that they usually work informally and a 
visit in the bank in the morning, especially in Greece, is almost impossible for them.
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According to George Pavlopoulos, in Greece it is a quite common practice of many bank 
clerks to dismiss countless foreign immigrants in need of a banking service (like remitting) 
on the pretext that the system is not working, or the particular branch does not offer the 
specific service, in order to avoid the frustration of the problematic communication and 
possibly the demanding requests of those clients. Therefore, it is much easier to walk in their 
local phone centre or mini market and send money to any country than to visit a bank with its 
lengthy and costly processes. Lastly, it is also preferred by the recipients to receive their 
money from a designated shop or individual in the neighbourhood than in at any bank. 
On the other hand, the recipients similarly to the senders might not have a bank 
account to facilitate any potential transfer. However, there is a distinct distrust amongst 
several banking institutions in Lebanon and due to the constant conflicts it seems more 
logical that there is a regular money transfer, based on the trust and personal familiarity 
between the sender, the informal transfer dealers and the recipient. Indeed, all the informal 
practices continue unhindered and are potentially enhanced during the periods of conflict. 
Therefore, the senders and the recipients feel immune from the frequent system crashes and 
the likelihood of a bank collapse during a war. Generally, both sides –senders and recipients- 
are of the same opinion regarding the main reason of preference of the informal transfer 
systems and that is the lower cost, meaning more money for the recipients to spend when the 
remittances will be received. 
However, several of the recipients also show some inexplicable distrust towards their 
local hawala dealers. Some are convinced that they will be cheated in any case; whether that 
is from a conventional bank or a hawaladar. When faced with the notion that no matter which 
sort of channel of transfer they choose they will be surely deceived, they show specific 
preference to the system that deducts the least from the final amount of money; which is 
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usually hawala or something similar. However, regarding the reliability of those systems, at 
least half of the recipients never receive the money as expected. Sometimes it is the full 
amount that fails to reach its destination and sometimes only a percentage of the money sent. 
However, they still recognize the informal transfer systems as the preferable way of 
remitting. This particular tendency portrays that the preference of the informal transfers 
systems is not exclusively linked with the reliability. Even though the consistency is 
supposed to be one of the most praised attributes of the system, at least according to the 
literature as shown in Chapter Two, for most of the actual users it is not one of the 
comparative advantages. 
The fact that despite the infrequent losses and ―unintentional‖ errors, the system still 
constitutes a trustworthy alternative to the conventional banking transfers is noteworthy. 
Besides, several outrageous stories are circulated regarding transfers through official 
channels, involving recurring payments due to supposedly unexpected fees without receiving 
at the end the money at all. Of course, the reliability of those stories is debatable; however the 
doubts regarding the bankers and the banks are quite widespread, especially among the lower 
income classes. Also, the informal senders will occasionally use the official banking system 
to transfer funds to Lebanon; however this occurs only sporadically due to their alleged hectic 
lifestyle or lack of spare time. 
Lastly, the entire sample of the senders and the recipients agreed on the fact that the 
remittances have not declined over the last five years or so. Even senders, who reside in 
countries which have been significantly affected by the economic crisis from 2008 have not 
reduced the amounts of money they monthly transfer. The rare occasions when remittances 
actually showed a certain decline, can be attributed to individual peculiarities and mishaps, 
such as the loss of a job due to personal fault and not due to obligatory redundancies as 
someone may have expected. In other words, even the low-paid labour intensive jobs 
especially in the construction sector, which were mostly affected by the crisis, managed to 
maintain the threshold of the monthly transfers. Situations like the aforementioned have 
actually been discussed during the various interviews; however the references were 
exclusively in regard to third parties, absent during the time of the interviews. 
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Actual and hypothetical use of the remittances 
Very early in the research process I came across the problem of the validity of data. In order 
to verify the credibility of the interviews it became obvious that I had to locate both the 
recipient and the sender of the remittances. However, this practice proved to be a very 
arduous task. Possibly the issue stemmed from the fact that I commenced the research by 
contacting the senders first. Some of the recipients were difficult to track down in Lebanon, 
as the locations of their residences were in areas that I was unable to visit for a variety of 
reasons. Also, some other recipients were unwilling to speak to me and lastly some other 
senders were generally unenthusiastic and declined my request to visit their relatives in 
Beirut. As a result I managed to interview only a fraction of the recipients that were directly 
linked with the senders from London and Athens. However, in order to fill the gap of the 
sample on behalf of the recipients I managed to locate several other remittance receivers in 
Beirut, without being in contact with their senders at all. This situation initially seemed to be 
uncomfortable due to the verification restrictions; however most of the interviews were 
surprisingly honest. 
 There are two basic categories of recipients, those who are in utter need of the 
remittances as their living standards are very poor or they have deteriorated due to various 
unfortunate circumstances, and those who have moderate need or (rarely) no need at all of the 
remittances as they represent a surplus to their income. 
A crucial discovery regarding the receipt of remittances is recognized on the 
exaggeration and lack of truth regarding particular needs and the actual use of the money. 
Most of the senders claim that they remit in order to maintain the livelihood and to aid the 
survival of their families, relatives and sometimes of their friends. Only a small fraction 
admitted that the remittances –even though regular- were superfluous and marginally 
supplementary to the income. However, it was evident that in some cases this statement was a 
product of counter-productive pride and an attempt to safeguard the dignity of the family. 
The vast majority of the senders are usually under the impression that the remittances 
are the tool for survival, a means for the purchase of basic commodities and potentially the 
only source of revenue. Even though, this is probably an accurate estimation, according to the 
sample of the recipients it is a widespread practice to ask for more than is actually needed, 
especially from the well-established immigrants. The presentation of a far more desperate 
condition in the home country is more than usual. It is also common practice to funnel -the 
otherwise needed- remittances to wasteful commodities and unnecessary purchases. For 
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example, one of the families I interviewed -where only the mother was working as a self-
employed seamstress- would use the remittances for the regular purchase of luxurious 
groceries as well as for the continuation of an extravagant lifestyle, when it was evident that 
the money should be invested on the lacking education of their children and to complement 
their almost non-existent income. Another two examples demonstrated that the irregularity of 
the reception of uncertain amounts of money, led the families to spend the capital on 
luxurious and less necessary commodities, as they explained, this was the only time when 
they can slip out of their ordinary lifestyle and do something different or amusing. But even 
when the remittances were sent on a regular monthly basis, some of the recipients would still 
portray slighlty careless consumption behaviour. In another case, which I was unable to 
confirm, the remittances were exclusively used to the modification and enhancement of the 
family car. Similarly, two other teenage recipients of respectable amounts of money for the 
Lebanese standards would almost exclusively spend the money on lavish lifestyles and 
entertainment. The behaviour towards the sender was unethically demanding, in my opinion, 
as the teenagers used a kind of emotional blackmail, however it proved to be exceptionally 
fruitful. According to other senders, this particular behaviour especially from younger 
generations is not uncommon. They usually claim that they have been abandoned or that they 
are victims of dereliction, however when they are actually invited to the host country they 
always plead that they cannot abandon their school, their friends or their way of life. 
Generally, it was quite evident that those who exaggerate for the need of remittances, 
direct the money to lavish commodities and practices and they apparently lie as they are 
anxious for the reaction and approval of the sender. Of course, someone could say that they 
pose hyperbolic circumstances in order to trigger their relatives‘ pitiful and charitable 
emotions; however this was not the objective of the research, even though there were clear 
insinuations. Nevertheless, apart from those habitual cases, there are families who completely 
rely on the receipt of remittances for the payment of loans or other regular and irregular 
payments. For example, one family in West Beirut was heavily and exclusively reliant on the 
reception of remittances for the monthly payment of a foreign language teacher. Also, the 
remittances allowed to the family the additional income needed, which was funnelled towards 
the payment of certain bills (like mobile phones) and other irregular payments such as bribes 
and various other informal payments. This facilitated the acquisition of certain licences and 
paperwork necessary for the completion of a house in the outskirts of Tripoli. After the 
realisation that the extra income was important for the engagement with the bureaucracy, I 
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included the issue in my questions. Surprisingly, the vast majority of the recipients where in 
similar circumstances as it was common for the extra income to be used on analogous 
payments. Also, most of them were not fully aware of this fact. Meaning that, the realisation 
that the remittances are regularly spent on bribes and facilitating payments came only after I 
pointed it out. 
The average amount of remittances sent to Lebanon, as I projected in Chapter Three, 
is relatively high in comparison to other countries in the world. However, Lebanon as a 
developing country is exceptionally expensive. Beirut particularly offers the basic 
commodities at much higher prices than in the rest of Lebanon. Also the prices do not 
correspond to the average income. As a result, profiteering is quite widespread and only 
remittances, for most of the interviewed families, offset the imbalance. Almost all the 
recipients agreed on the fact that without the remittances they would not be able to live a 
normal life. 
The feeling of an unfair taxation and the constant need for informal payments and 
bribes is so extensive that those who cannot fully rely on remittances are obliged to resort to 
informal practices in order to avoid fees, taxes and other payments towards the state. Other 
families with marginal income attempt to combine remittances with other informal practices 
in order to retain their income. 
Most of the remittances receivers, evidently funnel their remittances towards 
consumption and bribes. Others will split the money according to the monthly needs and 
circumstances. Those circumstances could be an addition on the household regular payments, 
the sponsoring of various activities and ventures, like house-building, starting or supporting a 
business, private education and other unexpected expenses like repairs or doctor fees. 
However, the tendency to save up and deposit the money into banks or other banking 
products is very limited. Only a very small percentage would use the remittances for 
investment purposes. This fraction without exception belongs to the minority who have no 
exclusive need for remittances, and therefore could afford to direct the capital towards other 
potentially more productive investments.    
Also the minority that saves up and attempts to create a bulk of cash is divided in to 
two distinct categories. Those who intend to return back to Lebanon as soon as possible and 
start a new life there with the accumulated wealth and those who are permanently settled in 
the host country and support parts of the family back in the home country. This comes in 
opposition to those who stay in the host country for an undisclosed amount of time in order to 
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support the relatives in Lebanon, independently of their intention to return. In any case, it 
seems that even the deposited money will be ultimately funnelled towards informal payments 
or bribes as any undertaking has a ―prerequisite‖, unless the recipient decides to reinvest or 
keep the money deposited. 
 
Non-Lebanese residents or citizens receiving remittances in Lebanon 
During the research process I have completely overlooked the populous Palestinian presence 
and the possibility that the Palestinians (refugees mostly) around Beirut and in South 
Lebanon could be recipients of remittances. 
 When I visited the Palestinian society of Athens which acts as an unofficial consulate 
for Palestinian immigrants, I realised that there are manifold Palestinian immigrants in 
Athens –of legal and illegal status- who frequently remit to family members who 
permanently reside in Lebanon. 
 Their majority uses informal transfer systems like hawala as most of them have illegal 
status in Greece or a semi-legal status as they are in middle of a time consuming process of 
obtaining political asylum seekers permit in the country. Due to the uncertain status of most 
Palestinian residents in Lebanon and the frequently illegal status of the Palestinians in Greece 
the use of an informal transfer system was inevitable. However, in the open discussion I held 
there, most of them agreed that they would prefer to use a more formal way of transferring 
money to Lebanon. Also some who have relatives in the various refugee camps, would send 
as a group, a prearranged sum of money in one go to their relatives via an independent 
medium usually outside of the camps. This tendency is perceived as a safer and more 
trustworthy way to remit instead of sending the remittances individually. However, I was 
unable to understand the rationale behind this statement due to time and linguistic 
restrictions. 
 Of course, I did not have the chance to visit the actual Palestinian receivers in their 
respective camps or residences. Therefore I could not examine whether the recipients have 
other needs than those stated to the senders, or to verify where exactly the Palestinian 
receivers spend the remittances. However, most of the senders strongly supported that the 
Palestinians, due to their unfavourable status in Lebanon and due to the stronger conviction 
that the Lebanese due to the institution of the extended family have very specific financial 
conditions, almost needlessly exaggerate on their needs. Despite this potentially partisan 
statement it seems that the Palestinian recipients would funnel their remittances in similar 
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directions as the Lebanese. Possibly the Palestinians are more prone to use the remittances for 
survival purposes and on the various bribes, not only towards the state but towards various, 
which were unidentified to me, in camp functions. 
 
Lebanon as a remittances-exporting country 
Even though this paper is focused on the informal practices in Lebanon, several times I came 
across the fact that many Lebanese and non-Lebanese residents send remittances from 
Lebanon to other, usually, Middle Eastern countries. However it must be noted that despite 
the remittances exports, according to Manuel Orozco and Anna Ferro of the USAID, the 45% 
of the remittances sent in Lebanon actually stem from the Arab Gulf states.
403
 
The obligation of the reference of such a practice is necessary as some of the 
remittances sent outside of Lebanon still extensively use the informal transfer systems. There 
is no available data in my research regarding the need and the use –factual or not- of the 
remittances sent to non-Lebanese destinations. However, it must be noted due to the use of 
informal transfer systems, which act as an additional attachment on the informal practices in 
Lebanon. Since Lebanon, as explained in a previous chapter, functions as a labour exporting 
as well as labour importing country, especially from neighbouring countries, it would go 
without saying that the rate for exporting remittances would be increased too.   
 However, it is probably easier to remit to other Middle Eastern countries –if 
necessary-for example, the United Arab Emirates which is more welcome to informal 
systems than any other country in the region. An interesting element is that those who remit 
to destinations like the U.A.E or Kuwait feel safer than to remit in other countries like 
Greece. Probably the links between European destinations are less fixed than in other 
countries, which can be more prone to this informal dogma, like Pakistan or the Gulf states. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that this is not an actual fact but probably a more stereotypical 
impression of the users. However, statistically speaking, the users mention that there are less 
unfortunate examples regarding transfers through informal systems between countries of 
similar cultural background like –Lebanon to Kuwait and vice versa- than between other 
Western European states and Lebanon. However some other more objective interviewees 
suggested that this is not necessary and the quality of the transfer is not based on cultural or 
customary criteria but on personal fairness and impartiality. 
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The informal transfers’ susceptibility to non-benefaction purposes 
The sample of senders and recipients as well as the few hawaladars I have interviewed for 
obvious reasons, projected a completely oblivious attitude towards the question of the 
happenstance of illegal transfers potentially sent for other reasons than the usual remitting 
motives. All the users of the informal transfers systems I have interviewed rejected the use of 
force for any kind of ideological principles. However they all admitted that the ease and the 
lack of paper trail could render those methods extremely vulnerable to any individual who 
wishes to abuse the system‘s relative freedom.   
Even though most of the interviewed use informal transfers systems to send 
remittances to Lebanon, few of them admitted that they have contributed money to certain –
unnamed to me- charities. Especially the Palestinians, due to their organised base in Greece 
having collectively contributed to various charities. This is in order to support certain families 
in despair, the funding of certain educational purposes in camps in the South of Lebanon or to 
contribute to the medical expenses of certain individuals or in order to fund the function of 
certain refugee camps and particular social groupings. 
On the other hand, the Lebanese I have interviewed showed significantly less 
charitable leanings. None of the Lebanese individuals I interviewed had ever participated in 
any charity. It was impossible to verify the truthfulness of their allegations, however none of 
them had obvious reasons to claim otherwise as the nature of the questions had an indirect 
hue. 
However, as is the case in most charity, none of the contributors were in a position to 
be aware of the exact time of the reception of the funds as well as if the money will actually 
end up to the stated charitable purpose. The entirety of the charity contributors I spoke with 
admitted that they indeed have no clue if the money they contributed will actually reach the 
final destination. They do it anyway as people are in their need and they hope that the money 
they have sent is used for moral and honourable purposes. However they recognise that due 
to the involvement of inappropriate persons there is a strong chance that some of the money –
if not all- could be potentially redirected to certain pockets or purposes. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned belong to the sphere of personal estimations. 
However, the observation that it is extremely easy to use the informal transfers systems for 
other purposes and that the system has a certain proclivity towards unclear transfers is 
apparent. In contrast to the mentioned above, when I interviewed the actual hawaladars and 
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whenever I was present at certain transactions I realised that the hawaladars try to extract the 
maximum possible information for the receiver, in order to protect and guarantee the success 
of the operation as they claimed. It seems that the local neighbourhood hawaladars since they 
allegedly make very small profit from those transactions and the corner shops they usually 
own are the epicentre of the local communities, attempt to safeguard the transfers for their 
own safety first. Despite the mentioned above, it seemed to me that it would be relatively 
unproblematic for the hawaladar to be approached by certain individuals and perform any 
kind of transaction without anyone ever finding out. 
 Generally, the whole affair is purposely preserved under a nefarious status regarding 
the processes and the specifics. Besides, it was common to deal with the reluctance and the 
suspiciousness of the interviewed despite the fact that in all the occasions I was escorted by 
someone the local community recognised. 
 
Remittances contribution hypothesis on a macroeconomic scope 
The basic hypothesis regarding remittances is focused on the claim that they represent a 
macroeconomic (and microeconomic) element of growth in the developing countries. Even 
though, this estimation has been challenged manifold times by the primary and secondary 
material, it needs to be established whether the benefits are adequate enough to 
counterbalance the disadvantages. 
It is evident that the vast majority of the remittances recipients funnel the funds 
mainly towards consumption purposes, independently of the fact that the remittances could 
be the necessary means of survival or a just surplus to the family income. 
The majority of the recipients suggest that despite the billions of dollars granted in 
Lebanon for its extensive reconstruction since the late 1990s, only a small fraction of the 
infrastructure has been adequately mended.
404
 I cannot personally compare the infrastructure 
situation of Lebanon and particularly of Beirut prior to my visits, however it is obvious that 
for the money Lebanon supposedly received, the infrastructure could have been in a much 
better condition. Undoubtedly, a great deal of reconstruction has been achieved, but most of 
the recipients-especially the low-income- suggest that without the remittances it would be 
impossible to rely on the government compensations or on the extensive transformation of 
Lebanon, for the restoration and rebuilding of their properties or assets. 
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Unquestionably the remittances supplement the family revenue and undoubtedly 
engage the public into expenditures and consequently enhance the supply and demand in the 
market. According to Hannah Charkour from the Greek-Arab Chamber of Commerce, the 
increased economic activity produced by the remittances, is so sizable and significant that it 
actually maintains and supports certain branches of the market and particularly the clothing 
sector and the construction sector.
405
  Also she continues that the large capital inflows are 
sufficient to equipoise the balance of payments of the state. Indeed according to Ferro and 
Orozco only the official remittances represent 25.8% of the Lebanese Gross Domestic 
Product.
406
 Additionally, according to a manager from the Middle East Desk of the Foreign 
Office and according to most of the remittances senders, limited decline has been projected 
during the financial crisis and during the recent conflict with Israel. It is noteworthy though 
that small sized community pressures tend to occur especially in more rural areas where it is 
obvious who and who is not receiving extra income. However, this is mostly linked with 
personal rivalries and the income inequality caused by the inflows of the additional capital to 
certain families and individuals. Nevertheless, it is a challenging issue as it affects a very 
large segment of the population. 
Furthermore, according to Nikos Sakkos from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the rough estimation of the amount of the informal remittances sent from Greece to Lebanon 
is approximately three times higher than the bilateral construction contracts in Lebanon. 
However, there is no official data to support this estimation which according to other circles 
in the foreign ministry could be even higher. Nevertheless, even the rough estimations are 
quite indicative of the importance and the magnitude of the informal remittances in Lebanon. 
Evidently all the remittances, informal or not, represent a colossal percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product, not only in Lebanon but in most of the developing countries and 
supplement the formal or informal economic activity in the country. 
However, the potential over-reliance on remittances as discussed earlier in the chapter 
may lead, especially the younger generations, to a more selective process regarding their job 
opportunities, indirectly increasing the unemployment rates and whatever that may entail. 
However, this is not the case for all the recipient families and individuals of the sample, but is 
not uncommon either. Probably the need of the senders to offer better living standards to their 
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families sustains these patterns. Obviously families with immediate survival troubles would 
not tolerate such behavior,
407
 although families with surpluses in their revenue frequently 
face similar problems. 
Generally, the remittances have a direct input into the economy of Lebanon, in 
opposition to the government efforts and the various grants, contracts and the FDIs, as they 
can be immediately circulated into the market and bolster the economy; however they may 
also contribute cut-rate growth as well. 
 
Summary of the remittances interviews 
The greater part of the sample, which was divided between senders, recipients and 
hawaladars of remittances, with the exclusion of the macroeconomic section, which was 
based on the views of certain officials, shows a considerable preference on the use of 
informal transfers systems for the remittances. According to the sample, the informal 
channels provide a comparatively vulnerable method of remitting as the formal channels. The 
only distinct difference is recognized on the fact that the informal channels are usually not 
interrupted during the periods of turmoil. Nevertheless, those informal channels display a 
certain propensity towards their abuse, meaning for purposes other than just the simple 
transfer of remittances. 
 The use of the remittances is divided between those with survival needs and those 
with the marginal need of a surplus to their income. However, the end users occasionally 
fabricate the intensity of the need of the remittances. The exaggeration of the need for 
additional income was not uncommon between the recipients I interviewed. In these 
occasions the funneling of the remittances was towards commodities not related with survival 
needs such as car modification or gadgets. It goes without saying that the sender usually is 
not aware of this situation. The remittances are predominantly funneled towards consumption 
or towards the defrayment of informal payments such as bribes among others. Very 
frequently it seemed that certain families cannot cope with the monthly duties without the 
additional income the remittances offered. In many occasions, the need for remittances was a 
facilitating payment towards the public sector, a hospital or even to get cheap cable TV. Also 
a respectable amount of remittances is sent into Lebanon from non-Lebanese citizens and 
particularly Palestinians. Additionally, Lebanon apart from being a primarily remittances-
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import country is also a remittances-export country, especially towards its adjacent countries. 
The main vessel for informal remittances in Lebanon was hawala. Undoubtedly, there are 
thousands who use the conventional banking transfer systems but the use of hawala was 
staggering throughout the entire social stratification. However, the poorer families tend to use 
them more. The distrust between informal and formal ways of transferring is quite 
widespread in Lebanon. The predilection towards informal systems is due to the fact that is 
cheaper and quicker, as both systems are not fault proof.  
 Surprisingly though, Lebanon seems to be, apart from a major remittances receiving 
country, a significant remittances-exporting country especially towards the East. Capital also 
flies from Lebanon to countries like Yemen, Pakistan and the Gulf states. Still, the main 
vessel for those transfers is hawala-like systems. Also another aspect that came to the fore 
and is quite in opposition with the bibliography is the fact that the hawaladars seem to 
attempt to extract the maximum possible information regarding the sender and the receiver. 
The stream of remittances is so obvious and often that is not an exaggeration the suggestion 
that it really complements the governmental efforts for reconstruction and economic 
transformation throughout Lebanon. Independently of where the remittances are funneled the 
accelerator effect they impinge on the economy is not negligible. Of course, I had no hard 
evidence of clearly suggesting that the remittances are intrinsically linked with other than 
positive directions, however all the respondents suggested that they are vulnerable to abuse. It 
was also evident that most of the families adapt their lifestyle according to their fluctuating 
income, especially the families that had no standard amount of money coming in. Despite the 
obvious beneficial attributes to life style, reconstruction and economy the overreliance and 
overconsumption the remittances create a potentially lethargic new generation.  
 According to the users and the government officials the overall contribution of the 
remittances on microeconomic and macroeconomic level seems to be favorable; however 
there are certain pitfalls that should not be overlooked. 
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Interviews on corruption 
Introduction 
In order to project a holistic view on the issue of corruption as part of the informal economy 
in Lebanon it was necessary to approach a diverse sample of individuals. In order to 
formulate an adequate picture on the petty levels of corruption I predominantly used the same 
people as I used for the remittances interviews, meaning random ordinary individuals with no 
specific educational or occupational background as well as those relevant to the topic, 
academics and government officials. Additionally in order to establish a more specific 
framework regarding the grand corruption I have approached and included in the interviews, I 
have included individuals with particular authorities who are heavily involved in the state 
apparatus. Only a few of them were not Lebanese residents or citizens; however they had 
direct or indirect involvement into bilateral construction contracts and others held essential 
positions in the Port of Beirut, the Ministry of Transportation and other state agencies 
responsible for the planning permissions; health etc. 
The societal environment and the economic situation from the moment I arrived in 
Lebanon was  worse than  expected and considerably more severe than its presentation in the 
literature as described in Chapter Four. Even though Lebanon has a selectively modern 
veneer which can be enormously deceiving, the moment you step out of the ordinary tourist 
locations the grim reality presents its self. 
Nevertheless, the anomalous reality in Lebanon is receipted by a wide range of views 
and attitudes. This section projects the sheer size of corruption in Lebanon and displays the 
high levels of its penetration in every aspect of the daily life, constituting it the key 
component of all the informal economic activities throughout the country. The three other 
key drivers are inexorably linked with corruption as it usually functions as a catalyst for the 
engagement into other informal economic activities. Such as the informal transfer of capital, 
operating into the informal sector, developing clientelistic relationships or simply achieving 
ordinary daily tasks. According to the economist George Pavlopoulos, corruption and 
inflation augment the divergence in the distribution of income in the country and deteriorate 
the living standards. Moreover, according to Ibraheem Khlel corruption is also associated 
with human behaviour, as also shown in a previous chapter. The outrageous and stereotypical 
perception of the psychology of marketing theory which suggests that the closer you get to 
the equator the more corrupt a country is, even though extremely generic and unscientific, has 
an element of truth in it. It just so happens that most of the world's developing nations are in 
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the 'south', distinct from the western industrialised nations. This concept is also referred to in 
World System Theory as the periphery. Pavlopoulos as well as Khlel suggest the corruption 
in the levels of Lebanon dissolves and weakens any potential genuine policy planning. 
Besides, the majority of the respondents also suggest that no politician will shoulder the 
political costs (and risks) for tackling corruption. Additionally, the academics and the public 
opinion propose that the first objections for a substantial plan against corruption will emerge 
from various political circles first.   
Undeniably, corruption is an everyday phenomenon in Lebanon. It is as familiar for 
the Lebanese as the air they breathe, which begs the question – is a western sense of 
corruption acutely different to that which is practiced with ease in Lebanon. For some it is a 
necessary evil and for some others a despicable habit. In the following section, various 
interviews are presented as are personal accounts regarding the wide range of corruption as 
part of an informal economic activity. 
 
Corruption for non-financial objectives on behalf of the donor 
The wider span of corruption primarily involving bribes, gifts and facilitating payments is 
probably at the core of informal economy in Lebanon. Every engagement with the state 
bureaucracy seems to be exposed to a bribery-deal just in order to be completed or to be 
accelerated. Also bribes are exceptionally common just in order to receive a service which 
usually belongs, as Khlel among others suggested, to the vested rights of every citizen. 
Health sector 
According to several ex-patients who have been treated in hospitals in Beirut and two doctors 
who work now in the K.A.T.
408
 hospital of Athens, the current situation in the public 
hospitals of Lebanon is appalling. There are approximately 25 public hospitals in Lebanon 
with extremely low bed capacity and around 170 private hospitals with average capacities.
409
 
The overflow of patients –which is constant- especially during periods of conflict, will be re-
directed into one of the private hospitals at the expense of the government. In order to obtain 
a bed in the constantly full public hospitals, it will be almost exclusively the result of a series 
of bribes to the administration staff, the nursing staff and the doctoral staff. Even when the 
costs of care are supposedly (and fully) covered by the state, several fees will absolutely be 
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necessary especially towards the nursing staff, this is just in order to provide the prescribed 
medication to the patients and for the doctors  to offer the necessary treatment or surgery on 
time. Most of the ex-patients concur on the fact that in the hospitals, there is a wide-spread 
prevalence of emotional blackmail, intimidation and extortion, in which bribes are absolutely 
necessary. 
In one case, the ex-patient described that when he handed to the doctor an imprecisely 
prearranged bribe in order to perform a surgery for a life threatening condition, the doctor 
realised that the money was less than the amount he implied, and he threw the money back to 
the patient, saying that he should be ashamed for giving him such a low bribe, even though 
everything else was already paid for by the state and the insurance. In another case, the 
patient‘s discharge delayed by three months so the family could gather the prearranged fee 
for the surgery. The patient it must be noted that attempted to escape from the hospital twice 
with all the cables and tubes still hanging from her veins. It was also surprising that when I 
mentioned those stories to the two doctors I interviewed, they stressed that the conditions in 
the public hospitals are tragic and the pay for their input is rather low. In other words, there 
were no denials and those situations indeed occur and the doctors‘ behaviour is justified. Also 
in private hospitals a fee towards the surgeon -on top of the fee of the hospitalization- is 
customary in the fear that the doctors will eventually discover an additional condition in order 
to perform an unfailing but unnecessary surgery. Furthermore, the two doctors admitted that 
the squander and the waste of the hospital resources and the over-charges of certain medical 
equipment are outrageous. For example, a firsthand account suggested that a gastric band is 
marked up by 2500% and a pacemaker about 1000%. The graft and the commission will be 
re-distributed among the cliques of the doctors, the maker‘s representatives and the hospital‘s 
chief administration. The doctors however confessed that the senior doctors from various 
Departments daily take to a public relations spree in order to attract patients to their private 
practices or the private hospitals that they also work. Another account suggests that the Head 
of one the biggest public hospitals in Beirut, who was also involved in supplies scandals and 
also held other public essential positions in the government, was unable to count the money 
that he was receiving on a daily basis and instead he would weigh the cash on a scale. 
Needless to say, that he made no effort to conceal this outrageous practice and he would 
arrive to the hospital in an exceptionally luxurious British car. 
Lastly, the public hospitals are hugely understaffed and underequipped due to lack of 
funding; as a result, the patients who can afford it are obliged to hire private –usually 
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untrained- night nurses for the serious cases and for the care of the patient‘s basic needs and 
frequently purchase themselves vital hospital provisions like gauzes, painkillers, bedpans etc. 
However, occasionally for a certain fee to the nurses, the lacking provisions can mysteriously 
appear. Even during the various periods of turmoil, a small bribe would resolve any problem 
that seemed unapproachable and inextricable. 
Bypassing the bureaucracy 
The state apparatus in Lebanon is by large, inflexible and monstrous. According to George 
Pavlopoulos, this type of corruption has become institutional in Lebanon and Ibraheem Khlel 
adds that the bribing in order to bypass the red tape is the dominant mind set in every 
transaction. The situation according to the economist Frago Kourandi, seriously affects the 
stability of the prices in the formal and the informal sector as well. Also, according to George 
Pavlopoulos the sustainability of the economy and the market is severely challenged. 
Ibraheem Khlel notes that the Lebanese tend to belittle the seriousness of their actions, as 
they assume that this practice has little effect on the overall economic structure. Indeed most 
of the respondents not only underestimate the gravity of their actions, but they also point out 
the inevitability of bribing. Without a doubt it is almost impossible to complete a transaction 
without bribing. 
For example, one thorny aspect in the state mechanisms is the issuing of various 
licences and permits. Whether it is a driving licence or planning permission the protocol is 
almost the same. Any restriction is possible to bypass, overlook and be erased. Outside of the 
Ministry of Transport as well as in other public bureaus, there are a large number of 
individuals, who for a fee -dependent on the case- can circumvent the official channels and 
bypass the queues in order to obtain the paperwork or the permit someone may need, even 
when the particular need is illegal. For example, one of those individuals for a respectable fee 
(around two million Lebanese Pounds) managed to issue a vehicle registration card for a 
vehicle not officially registered in Lebanon yet. Prior to 2007 it was also very easy to obtain a 
diesel car and register it officially in the country, even though it was strictly prohibited. 
However, after 2007 the legislation became stricter and it was also banned for tourists to 
drive their own diesel cars into the country. Still, if someone is caught there are ways to avoid 
the penalty, usually by bribing the officer. As one of the interviewed mentioned, he avoided a 
fine by promising an officer two bottles of whisky. The officer indeed two days later went to 
the house of the ―offender‖ to receive his alcoholic bribe. 
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 Also for a non-specific price a driving licence can be sent to your door step. This 
could also happen via a driving instructor; however, due to their large number it is less easy 
to find one with the right (and cheaper) connections within the ministry. Also a professional 
(lorry) driving licence could be obtained even over the phone. In one specific case, the lorry 
driver phoned his friend (the driving instructor) stating his need of an upgrade for a larger 
lorry. Within the hour the instructor called back telling that for 3000 US dollars the upgraded 
licence will be immediately at his disposal. Another similar story as described by the lorry 
driver himself, suggested that he obtained his driving licence without passing the necessary 
tests as he was severely colour-blind. 
Also due to the extensive reconstruction projects all the agencies involved in the town 
and urban planning as well as the Land Registry Agency, are obliged to issue multiple 
permits for a variety of purposes. In order to obtain a mortgage, for example, someone needs 
several permits, topographical maps, civil engineer‘s certifications etc. The gathering of all 
the necessary paperwork requires several days –if not months- to be obtained and manifold 
repeat visits to various different offices around Beirut. This process has certain stress 
inducing attributes and it is very time consuming. Therefore, those agencies are extremely 
prone to bribes in order to hasten the time consuming processes. For one signature or stamp 
for example someone may have to wait for over a fortnight. Even for the simplest request, it 
is common practice to enclose the fee when someone completes a form or an application and 
hands it over the clerk.  According to a junior office clerk, who works now as waiter in an 
Edgware Road restaurant in London, his supervisor, responsible for planning permissions, 
would no longer ask for monetary bribes but he would demand various material assets. Over 
the years he acquired a motorbike, a caravan and less valuable objects such as televisions, hi-
fis, cameras, watches, bicycles, gold coins etc. Of course, those gifts indeed could offset the 
wait and the formal fees required, but the nature of the request of those donations was 
awkward and demanding.. 
Once the paperwork is ready another circle of bribes commences usually involving 
the banks. A mortgage might be needed or the property could be potentially utilised, as de 
Soto explained in Chapter 3.
410
 The banker could facilitate the reception of a mortgage or any 
other loan for a percentage usually taken from the loan. The banker can negotiate the terms, 
the interest as well as the payment of the mortgage in one instalment which is highly 
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unorthodox for the banking practices. In one particular case a manager of a very well known 
bank in Lebanon, even circumvented the minimum age threshold and offered a very large 
mortgage to a 20 year old man with a rather controversial credit score. 
Generally the majority of the sample mentioned that in Lebanon it is almost 
impossible not to bribe someone in dealings with the state apparatus and occasionally with 
private agencies independently if they are associated with the state. Also during the war or 
other smaller scale conflicts when the state apparatus stalls, several people could still perform 
transactions and issue licences and permits and continue their dealings with the state as usual. 
Typically during the periods of unrest the most unusual, outrageous and illegal requests get 
through, even though the rates of a bribe, as a rule, increase. 
 
Corruption for (passive and active) clientelistic objectives 
In Lebanon the relationships between certain parts of the political elites and the public could 
be characterised as an awkward mix of affiliations. Even though it is more frequent for the 
public to approach the various officials for favours, meddling etc, (passive) there are certain 
cases usually before the elections that the officials will move towards the public in order to be 
re-elected and offer them money or promises (active). Especially in the more rural areas of 
the South where the financial conditions are in a lower standard than in Beirut, the cost of 
rigging the vote is relatively low for the politicians. The vote of a family can be bought in the 
villages east of Sidon for the price of $50 US. However, the more north you go the prices of 
affecting the voting preferences can be significantly higher, even in excess of five thousand 
(5000) US dollars. None of the interviewed had ever received money personally, however 
many of their immediate family members had indeed received moderate amounts of cash in 
order to vote a specific candidate and attempt to influence other members of their social 
circle to do the same. The academics also suggested that this practice is not unique to 
Lebanon, many developing countries with less corrupt governments resort to this particular 
practice. 
The patron-client relationship is exceptionally entrenched in the mindsets of the 
Lebanese people. Those who actually have access to specific individuals with authority will 
solely deal with them for every problem they could possibly have. One of the interviewed 
was referring to the Member of Parliament he voted for at the last elections as ―his MP‖. 
However, even though many have the feeling of closeness and personal contact with an MP 
or other members of the political elite, their requests will be accomplished in a very selective 
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intensity. Naturally, this tendency is not only applied to people in high places but in 
everyone. From the neighbourhood bank manager to the last employee of any public or 
private organisation or even store. 
All of the interviewed suggested that the most usual special favour that people would 
ask from the politicians is for a job. Also all the interviewed claimed that most of the people 
they know have also proceeded to similar requests. A very surprising parameter however 
shows that many of those visits do not always entail bribery. In one case, a Christian 
Orthodox mother would daily visit a senior manager in a stage coach company,
411
 so her son 
would be hired as a bus driver. In every visit the mother would offer to the manager (also 
Orthodox) an icon of a different saint or food. In other cases, localism –apart from 
sectarianism- would be a vital element of acceptance in the initial stages and in the secondary 
stages the favour will be evaluated accordingly to the amount of the bribe. To be more 
specific, the assessment of an application for a position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
stalled for one of the interviewed. His family attempts to meet someone with influence on this 
matter were unfruitful. However, when by accident the particular official, that the family was 
trying to approach for months, overheard that they descend from his village in the North-East 
of Lebanon, all of a sudden the whole behaviour altered and the family managed to arrange a 
hearing. Needless to say, that for approximately ten thousand US dollars ($10,000), 
everything was settled. Generally, the sample argued that localism is a powerful catalyst for 
favouritism and clientelism. It is also surprising that especially some people from older 
generations feel that the various state officials or the politicians they meet are obliged to put 
through their requests or demands, especially if they share the same religion or place of 
origin. 
In a more municipal level, candidates will frequently use a door to door tactic as part 
of their campaign, even in Beirut. During those personal encounters they commit themselves 
to a series of various outrageous favours, all of which they will be incapable of conducting 
once they are eventually in office. In a particular case, the father of the candidate visited 
hundreds of houses in a suburb of Beirut, and claimed that if his son was elected, he will be 
significantly cheaper than his opponent. 
The levels of clientelism as well as nepotism are extravagant in Lebanon. For 
example, several positions in various sections of the public sector had been advertised by the 
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government in specific newspapers. The majority of those positions were already occupied 
weeks and months before the advertisement. Characteristic is the example, of another man 
who was expecting the advertisement of a particular position for two years. When the 
government announced that soon specific positions will open, he also found out that his 
cousin, who was involved in an informal dealing with some officials, was appointed to his 
much desired position even before it was advertised. 
Generally, I was told many similar stories. Literally, every person I spoke with had an 
outrageous example to share.  During my second visit to Beirut I sat in a traditional tea shop 
to have a chat with several people that my contact had gathered in order to discuss affairs, as 
soon as the other customers realised what we were talking about they joined in, citing their 
own stories of corruption and bribery as part of a patron-client relationship. Some of them 
claimed that in times of emergency (health problem) or in times of special needs (accepting 
an inheritance) more than their monthly wages would end up in facilitating payments. 
Eventually, I have chosen only few of those stories as the most representative ones 
due to the limitations of this paper in size. I do broadly refer to the bulk and essence of the 
material gathered in the interviews in this section; however it was impossible to integrate the 
entire range of the interviews. 
 
Corruption for financial advantages and the evasion of contractual obligations 
Although corruption has a wide range of applications and influence its most characteristic 
propensity is acknowledged on the personal gain and general evasion of penalties, taxes and 
other legislative and contractual obligations. 
 This subsection probably includes the most important elements of corruption in 
Lebanon. The following primary evidence suggests that the political corruption in the country 
is only the tip of the iceberg. It seems that every person who has the slightest authority or 
jurisdiction on his (or her) hands will almost certainly abuse it. 
 On of the thorniest aspects in Lebanon is the issue of state supplies, as also mentioned 
in an earlier section.  One of my interviews provided a very characteristic and tangible 
example regarding the financial advantages. Mr Jad Daoud was a former senior employee in 
a multinational joint venture construction firm, which was responsible for the reconstruction 
of the paved road network in South Lebanon. Just before the initiation of the project he was 
approached by a team of managers from the Ministry of Public Works and several main 
suppliers of raw materials in order to discuss the specifics. The real purpose of the visit was 
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to discuss how they could re-allocate some of the raw materials in order to share the 
surpluses. The result was that each lane of a sixty three (63) mile (in total) stretch of tarmac 
was by one (1) foot narrower than the originally planned. On top of that Mr Daoud also 
agreed to accept a much more expensive offer than the competition could provide, in order to 
buy from a specific supplier. The amount of the informal commissions he received as well as 
the initial bribes, allowed him to purchase a property in Athens (where his brother lived) and 
launch their own information technology services company. 
 Another similar example according to Stephanie Aoun, is the background 
arrangements regarding the competitions for the undertaking of a project. The process of the 
selection of the most satisfactory offer is conducted in maximum three rounds. In every round 
the people responsible for the initial choice may declare the round incomplete due to the lack 
of an advantageous offer. When all the three rounds are declared as incomplete they have the 
authority to choose one of the disqualified participants. Usually it is the one who offered 
them the most. Also according to Aoun the timetables, the quality standards and the health 
and safety issues which are by large non-existent is not a matter of concern. It is relatively 
easy not to abide by the contractual obligations as various subterfuges could be presented in 
order to meet the contractual clauses which are unable to induce penalties. Every project 
seems to have a wide network of underground negotiations in order to squander the states 
resources and manipulate the funds provided from the state or other international sources. 
 One more problem regarding the corruption for personal gain lays on the fact that 
apart from those who bribe for their personal development, for example, bribing employees 
from the tax office in order to avoid inspections or affect assessments, there are certain state 
officials who operate like common blackmailers. For example, several small and medium 
sized business proprietors have mentioned that auditors from the tax office have visited them 
in their shops directly asking for money so that they will not intentionally notice any 
discrepancies. It seems fair for many people to bribe in order to complete a certain chore with 
the bureaucracy; however when the bribe is actually losing its customary nature it creates 
feelings of resentment and unfairness. 
 Of course, the taxation problem is not as one-dimensional as someone may assume. 
Corrupt tendencies alter the taxation scales and at the end no one actually pays tax 
corresponding to the personal income or the turnover of a business. Therefore every year 
several businessmen evade considerable amounts of tax and the tax office employees enjoy a 
relatively higher income than other civil servants and the state loses significant amounts of 
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revenue. Someone could also suggest that the tax evasion for the small and medium sized 
business could entail elements of a unique social welfare, since the profits are usually 
marginal; however, the tax evasion of larger firms has considerable effect on the finances of 
the state. For example, Josef Osman who is a chartered accountant in Beirut revealed to me 
that in 2008 the tax office performed an inspection to a very large refinery north of Beirut. 
During the inspection they discovered an unregistered tank full of crude oil. This meant to the 
state a $3 million US loss per month for unclaimed V.A.T, meaning roughly $36 million US 
per year just from VAT damages from a single tank from a particular refinery. The auditors 
were afraid for potential retaliation on behalf of the refinery owner and they eventually 
imposed only a symbolic fine to the refinery, approximately $100.000 US, and the whole 
affair was covered. Mr Osman mentioned that the creation of an environment of intimidation 
is not unusual. Several auditors even received life threatening calls and were generally 
harassed by similar large firms. Therefore, the annual losses for the state are actually 
immeasurable; since nobody has the courage to report the inconsistencies of a similar 
magnitude and the number of the non-discovered irregularities cannot be estimated. 
However, other large firms would resort to less aggressive methods and simply bribe the 
auditors. 
 Lastly, there is the Port of Beirut where corruption thrives in an acute web of bribes 
and fraud. Even though, Lebanon has possibly one of lower levels ad valorem tax and import 
rates, luxury goods could be significantly taxed and electrical goods would be taxed 
according to their technological levels.  Most of the commodities which are applicable to 
tariffs according to who is the importer could potentially have a preferential treatment. Also 
depending on the connections with other Port officials the various clearing agents in Beirut 
could alter the final value of a product (of a car in the particular case). Even though there are 
charts distributed among the shipping companies and the customs agents with fixed and pre-
determined rates about the prices, the exploitation is prevalent. For the same car depending 
on the agent that someone may deal with the prices might significantly vary. Also another 
usual scheme is the alteration of the country of origin, for example within the port there are 
small manufacturing industries which they may re-label, remodel and remake various 
products. However, this practice is well known according to Frago Kourandi and constitutes a 
significant element of mistrust regarding the entry of companies in Lebanon or affects the 
investment attempts of the forged products manufacturers. 
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However, one of the most interesting aspects regarding corruption in the port is what 
one of the stevedores called the ―pre-election periods of transparency‖. Usually prior to the 
elections there is the climax of favouritism and of most of the scandalous transactions, 
however in the port it happens exactly the opposite. Habitually after each electoral 
confrontation the senior managers in the public sector are transferred or replaced. During the 
pre-election period all the informal mechanisms freeze to the disappointment of the dock 
workers, the truckers and the harbour masters who profit from the port‘s illegal dealings. For 
example, one trucker mentioned that usually the average waiting time to load a container is 2 
½ hours, however just before the elections when everything is allegedly taking place 
according to the rules –and the general lack of bribes- the wait could be in  excess of eight 
hours, while the lorries are queuing up for miles. Apparently when the politicians are trying 
to impress by making promises and favours, the Port managers should display their integrity 
in an attempt to safeguard their positions. Similarly all the informal dealings become 
inflexible and they will only return back to the normal daily routines when all the managerial 
replacements (if any) are confirmed. Nevertheless, several port workers would find ways of 
delaying certain profitable transactions until the whole elections affair is over, in order to 
receive the bribe. Meaning that there are cases where specific port services have been directly 
denied for the above mentioned reasons. 
 In general, most of the state officials and most of the politicians cope with the state 
agencies and the state funds and resources as though they were their own private shops. As 
Abubakar H. Kargbo mentioned in a conference ―many politicians and the government 
activities, require an elaborate centralized administration, financing important public works 
and welfare programmes; while the competitive growth of political parties involves 
increasingly costly electoral contests. This also increases the opportunities for private 
gain.‖412 Although most of those corrupt practices involving the bribes and the gifts cannot 
be characterised as legal, there are other more terrifying and shadowy practices which entail 
ruthless criminal elements. 
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Corruption for illicit objectives 
Even though this section is more suitable for the following part of the interviews regarding 
the illegal networks, it must be noted that organised crime as well as other networks and 
politico-militant entities like Hezbollah, as a result of the high levels of corruption and the 
disobedience in the rule of law that this situation generates, are capable of expanding and 
establishing their capacity of their unlawful activities. 
 For example, Hezbollah managed to install a whole new secret underground 
telecommunications network throughout Lebanon.
413
  The declaration of this parallel network 
of communications as illegal, sparkled serious sectarian conflicts in Beirut, however a 
potential general escalation of violence was eventually averted.
414
 The rumours within the 
society regarding this matter are many; however numerous accounts have suggested that the 
secret has been revealed due to the unsatisfied demands of certain individuals. Other versions 
suggest that the discovery was accidental, or exposed by the secret services of Israel, 
nevertheless the point is that due to the influential and highly corrupt state mechanisms a 
whole network of telecommunications was successfully and operationally installed 
throughout the country without obstructions. 
 Therefore it is not surprising, how several illegal networks manage to bribe to silence 
the police or other law enforcement agencies in order expedite their operations. One night-
club employer in near Hamra Street, in central Beirut, claimed that his boss had regular visits 
by the insignificant local mobsters for protection payments. He eventually got away when he 
gave to them (as a loan, with no return) an unscheduled significant amount of cash in order to 
bail out of jail someone from their gang. As a display of gratitude the gang allegedly gave to 
the club several years‘ immunity to such payments. However, the police would not have the 
same gracious feelings and frequently would pay a visit to the club due to an anonymous 
complaint. In Lebanon, according to a police standing order, when a club receives three 
complaints within a month the police has the right to shut it down for more than ten days. 
According to the same employee, this usually happens when a night club has escaped the 
claws of the mobsters and the policemen are not receiving they shares. 
 The same club employer was later on caught red-handed with several grammars of 
cannabis in his pockets. He got away very lightly as the undercover policemen who caught 
him confiscated the cannabis, possibly for their own personal use and they let him go. 
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However, those particular stories since they stem from one individual are potentially truthful 
but impossible to verify, as not one of his co-workers (from the club) or any of his friends 
was able or willing to confirm the validity of his sayings. Nevertheless, I heard similar stories 
which circulate in Beirut by more respected people as well. The intensity of similar, less 
exciting but equally unlawful examples was extraordinary, to the point I felt rather insecure 
to walk around Beirut at night as I had completely lost my confidence and my trust in the 
relatively safe veneer of central Beirut. 
 Lastly, one trucker admitted his direct involvement in a smuggling ring of crude oil 
and he explained that the most profitable task is to be the first driver of the convoy who 
usually gets arrested and goes through all the unpleasant process that follows, or the scout 
who usually drives a regular car few miles ahead of the convoy to spot checkpoints and such. 
If the scout fails to warn soon enough the rest of the convoy, the first driver who would be the 
scapegoat would spend from one night in jail or up to four months depending on the 
corruptibility of the policemen or the judges. Over the last few years he had spent almost ten 
months in jail and this has allowed him to save up a significant amount of money which 
allowed him to recently start an informal business of  importing used cars from the US and 
Germany. His connections at the port also offered him a significant tax reduction during the 
customs clearance and the cars would obtain less mileage or earlier year of production. 
 
Summary of the interviews on corruption 
Undeniably as Maha Al-Azar mentions, corruption in Lebanon is a fact of life.
415
 The 
structure of the state apparatus has been converted to an immense network of exchanging 
bribes. Bribing has exceeded the boundaries of just being a facilitating action and it has 
become habitual and obligatory. For example, in the health sector it goes without saying that 
a bribe or baksheesh is needed even for the smallest service. The scale of the problem is vast 
as psychological or emotional blackmail could be involved by the doctors, the nurses or even 
outside the health sector by any official with certain authority. Academics, government 
officials and users agreed that it is almost impossible to conduct a simple, let alone complex, 
bureaucratic transaction without participating in this informal arrangement. Services could be 
potentially refused or indefinitely postponed until the graft is deposited. Corruption in 
Lebanon is able to set in motion or terminate the whole spectrum of the country‘s means and 
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capabilities. Corruption is able to buy the consciousness of the common people. However, it 
seems that people frequently desire to be bought off. The main argument of the respondents 
was that corruption is the only way to battle corruption, meaning that in order to bypass the 
corrupt state apparatus is to maintain it. It is impossible for corruption to achieve these levels 
of penetration without the tolerance and participation of the public.  The downside is that it 
creates a perpetual environment of corrupt tendencies and it boosts the lack of meritocracy 
and undermines the capacity of people with real capabilities. Some respondents suggested 
that the relative ease to buy off your driving licence over the years has created fleets of really 
dangerous and reckless drivers. Also this situation has led to the monstrous and unstructured 
web of buildings in many areas throughout Lebanon as the permits was just an issue of 
money. It appears that every public contract is eligible for exploitation from the political 
elites and all the people directly involved in it. However, many respondents suggested that 
corruption may also attract capital in Lebanon, as it operates as a catalyst for certain firms 
and companies. Nevertheless, no one can argue that the same situation may also repel 
investments and contracts. 
Efforts are actually made to improve the situation but nothing really substantial, as no 
politician will shoulder the political costs of eradicating corruption. Also the impression that 
even if someone decides to act as major actor against corruption the system, the regime and 
the elites will prevent it from happening as it will shake the foundations of the status quo 
within Lebanon. Unsurprisingly the public opinion views any attempt to tackle corruption as 
futile. 
Also key institutions of the Lebanese economy have been converted to corruption 
havens like the Port. Due to the uncontrollable exercises and the lack of gravity the rules and 
law have, the Lebanese economy is losing immense daily amounts of revenue. For example, 
as mentioned earlier, a local refinery managed to hide a single silo-tank which caused to the 
state losses over 3 million dollars in VAT alone. It must be noted that when discovered the 
whole thing was covered up with a symbolic fine of 100 thousand dollars only. Profiteering 
and innumerable scandals regarding supplies and contracts in the public and private sector 
occur every single day. The construction and health sector according to the interviews tend to 
be the most prone sectors to abuse, embezzlement and profiteering.  
Another parameter that occurred during the interviews was the potential of corruption 
to undermine practically the notion of democracy within Lebanon. The often occurrence of 
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candidates of buying off the voters has resulted that the richer candidate eventually gets the 
seat in the parliament or in the local council. 
 Lastly, corruption is partly responsible for the broad organised crime networks 
operation in the country, since both sides, meaning the illegal networks and the state, are 
tangled in a complex structure of interdependence and profit. Hezbollah is also intermingled 
in this spectrum as some of its functions are not perceived as entirely legal. Hezbollah for 
example managed to install an underground network of telecommunications throughout 
Lebanon. Apparently an endeavour of that size cannot be achieved clandestinely. Besides, as 
one respondent said jokingly everyone in Lebanon is guilty of corruption until proven 
otherwise.  
On the macroeconomic level corruption in Lebanon results in loss of revenue and 
taxes, it enhances the inflation, alters the decision making process, undermines the 
democratic structures but also is an indispensable tool for the regular and normative operation 
of the state apparatus with the public. Interestingly though, among the respondents no one 
seems to be willing to admit his or her accountability on corruption. Everyone feels as the 
victim as the system and the state apparatus are established in such a way where it is 
impossible to act otherwise. The public tends to belittle its importance when they personally 
involved but when they are completely unrelated the faults tend to be political, bureaucratic 
and ascribed to the elites. The vast majority of the public when actually admits guilty of 
bribing, embezzlement etc shows no signs of remorse as they feel that they acted as they 
should since the system or the government owes them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
Interviews on illegal networks 
The size of organised crime and illegal networks in Lebanon is a component of economic, 
political and social disruption. Its implication and input in the informal economy has major 
significance and the growth of the networks seems to be relentless due to the inexorable links 
with corruption which allow further penetration and involvement in the economy and society. 
 Since it was practically impossible to approach people actively and admittedly 
involved with any illegal networks, I moved towards people with interest in the operations 
and function of the illegal networks like criminologists, activists and government officials. 
Meaning that, they dealt with the illegal networks but not at a primary level, for example 
being an actual member of an illegal organization. The interviews were directed at a more 
generic outlook of the illegal networks, overstepping the individual examination of the 
various subdivisions of organized crime like prostitution, smuggling etc. 
In a separate level, I examined Hezbollah, as in the literature as well as in the 
conventional wisdom, it is mostly represented as a terrorist organization. However many 
Lebanese people –and not necessarily only Shiites – view Hezbollah as a para-state 
organization with the authority recognized by the government. Despite the enormously wide-
spread acceptance in the Lebanese society it must be recognised that certain operations of 
Hezbollah do have a rather controversial gist. Illegal networks thrive within the Lebanese 
borders, under an all-encompassing spectrum of interdependent associations with the 
government, gangs and Hezbollah.  My attempt to separate and uncouple the association of 
criminal activities with Hezbollah was unworkable. As explained in the literature review 
Hezbollah is a state within a state and that alone renders the particular organization 
vulnerable to the association and involvement in manifold dubious enterprises, however 
Hezbollah if disconnected from the dubious actions that it is involved in has certain re-
distributional tendencies towards the base of support. 
 
Illegal networks; Respondents intermingled with organised crime and illegal networks in 
a secondary level 
Due to the sensitivity of the topic, this section is not divided according to the disciplines or 
the categories of the particular key driver but it is based on the capacity and status of the 
respondents. I have divided the academics and the activists – researchers due to their 
potentially different approaches regarding the issue. The activists may provide a rather more 
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radical and less scientific outlook on the informal networks due to their direct participation in 
organised efforts for the control and deterioration of the operations of those networks. 
Anti-organised crime activists and researchers in Lebanon 
According to Georges Mansour a Human Rights Watch part-time researcher, the organised 
crime networks in Lebanon, due to the corruption that characterises the country, have the 
ability to re-direct the political system and influence its decisions. With a covert reference to 
Hezbollah, he suggested that the way the media wields clout in the consciousness of the 
masses undermines democracy. This financial prowess of illegal networks was exceptionally 
influential in the past and still is, but at the moment, when they attempt to launder money, 
they are not anymore concentrated on the real estate market, but attempting to purchase 
banking institutions and companies. This is a display of the streamlining processes that the 
informal networks undergo, possibly faster than anything else in Lebanon. One of the 
respondents claimed that as soon as the construction of his over-luxurious house was 
completed, he received an offer from a local drug lord to purchase the newly built house in 
cash. Even though he was initially reluctant to refuse, he finally managed to avoid the 
dealing, without giving a straight answer and provoke any unfortunate situations as he felt 
rather intimidated by the whole affair. Those dealings are not unusual when local wealthy 
criminals wish to money launder some of their illegally obtained capital. However, when the 
amounts of the cash, which need to be laundered, increase they tend to resort to other 
techniques and habits, as shown in Chapter 5. Georges Mansour also added the illegal 
networks project an enormously successful financial performance probably representing the 
most dynamic and robust component of the economy. According to Mansour, the input of the 
illegal networks in the economy could be mathematically sizeable but the social benefit is 
minimum as nothing could possibly compensate for the kids who take drugs, the women who 
are hustled and the people who endure the humiliations imposed by the networks and their 
practices. 
 In opposition to Mansour is Aya Naji-Anderson, a member of an activist group, who 
suggests that without the participation and tolerance of the public, especially in the rural 
areas, the power of the illegal networks and the organised crime as a whole would have been 
significantly reduced. However, the involvement of the general public in the illegal networks 
affairs is usually triggered by the need for extra income, as farming or other agricultural 
activities provide a progressively deteriorating income. On the other hand, Aya Naji-
Anderson continues, the involvement of the public in urban areas, apart from being impelled 
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by poverty, it may provide the means for social and economic eminence. Many 
impressionable youngsters are easy recruits and they are absolutely needed as they usually 
conduct all the legwork. Illegal networks‘ recruiters usually lure them with the promise of 
obtaining expensive cars, girls or by the indoctrination to certain ideologies. Lower income 
adolescents have the most ductile characters and pushed by the general frustration of the 
public, effortlessly join the ranks of the illegal networks. Indeed, Beirut is a place of 
extremes; the ironic sight of an elegant luxurious racing Italian car parked next to a blasted 
building could potentially set off feelings of injustice and outrage. It seemed so to me. In fact, 
Aya Naji-Anderson suggested that this very example could be the motivation for recruitment. 
The certainty of parts of the society that via the official channels and formal employment 
their personal progress is a farfetched ambition is rather prevalent. 
Academics 
According to Jim Anastasopoulos the most problematical issue regarding the illegal networks 
in Lebanon is the general lack of apprehension for punishment, which characterises not only 
the criminals but large segments of the Lebanese society.  The fear for punishment no longer 
constitutes a deterrent for criminal activities, as Cesare Beccaria argued in 1762.
416
 The 
notion of equality and egalitarianism has been discarded and it is sought after by people 
through their involvement in the illegal networks and not by the use of legal means. Meaning 
that, it is easier for someone to enhance his (or her) income, for example, by the involvement 
in a criminal activity than actually working in formal job. The way of thinking of the 
Lebanese society views the segments of the society who have accumulated considerable 
wealth as the benchmark and they eagerly wish to emulate them. The main concern is that 
many seek this emulation via criminal activities or informal practices. This suggestion 
corresponds with William Brownsberger‘s view which suggests that high levels of 
clientelism constitute sources of corruption, a situation, which has found acceptance in the 
social psyche and behaviour.
417
 Jim Anastasopoulos mentioned that it would not be an 
exaggeration to suggest that informal activities in Lebanon are deeply entrenched in the mind 
set of the population and any effort of the government or other international bodies to battle 
with corruption or the illegal networks is destined to fail. 
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 According to Frago Kourandi the interconnection between sectarian concerns, 
corruption and the illegal networks is augmented by the governmental inadequacy or the 
indirect denial to substantially deal with those issues. Even if, certain measures for battling 
money laundering and the operation of those networks have been praised by international 
institutions, the size of the informal economy and the crime rate has actually increased, 
despite Lebanon‘s relative resilience to the global fiscal pressures emanated by the financial 
crisis. The association of the government and the army with the illegal networks also harms 
the macroeconomic and microeconomic environment of Lebanon. The re-distribution of 
income that potentially occurs, according to Frago Kourandi is, in all probability, 
overestimated. The socio-economic impact of the illegal networks on an economic level is 
that it marginally benefits consumption. The increased levels of –usually domestic goods- 
consumption, sooner or later, lead to higher prices and sweep along the prices of other 
products or services, which are not tradable or coordinated with import adjustment like rents. 
Since usually the average income improvement is overestimated and also frequently shows 
rapid saturation, the market as well as the population asphyxiates. Even if the aforementioned 
is deemed as hyperbolic, the beneficial attributes of increased consumption are enormously 
counter-balanced by the fact that the foretold association fends off potential investment in the 
country, and produces a climate of insecurity not only for the prospective foreign investors 
but for the society as whole. 
 Lastly, according to Ian Nicholson, Lebanon is a crime infested country, where 
ordinary economic activity is interrupted not only by the constant threat of war and the actual 
conflicts but from the deep penetration of the illegal networks in the society and the 
economic web. Surprisingly, Lebanon‘s economy still seems to grow. Maybe it is a result of 
those fermentations of the government and the illegal networks. However, Ian Nicholson 
points out the possibility that Lebanon could report unreliable budgetary statistics, like 
Greece did for example,
418
 in order to project blown out of proportion statistics and reinforce 
the confidence of investors, which maintains the relative credibility that credit rating agencies 
attach to the country. For example, in 2009 Standard & Poor's raised Lebanon‘s credit rate 
from ―B minus‖ to ―B‖ due to the strength of country's public finances and banking system, 
despite the general  political turmoil that characterised the country that year and the global 
financial downturn.
419
 It must be noted that in 2008 the credit rate was ―CCC‖ meaning 
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―vulnerable and dependent on favourable economic conditions to meet its commitments‖.420 
Luckily, Lebanon is not subjected to the levels of monitoring that the Greek economy was, as 
the danger for unpleasant surprises is eminent. 
Government officials 
Despite the fact that for a Lebanese government official it is a rather delicate and sensitive 
matter to speak for those issues, I managed to extract some information from them. However, 
the most important people I had arranged to talk to, cancelled literally minutes before the 
arranged interviews. Apparently when they realised the nature of my visit, meaning that it 
could potentially illustrate defamatory and derogatory aspects of Lebanon; they postponed 
our meeting with a rather inelegant manner, even if I out-rightly denied any ill intention for 
Lebanon‘s reputation and stressed the fact that I only observe. Consequently I had to re-direct 
my research to the former acquaintances from the Port and the Ministry of Transportation. 
Additionally, I have contacted a potentially more objective government official strongly 
associated with the illegal networks, who works not for the Lebanese government but for the 
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The Lebanese government officials stressed once more the high degree of corruption 
in the state apparatus which actually facilitates the operation of the illegal networks. 
Generally the state officials were rather reluctant to provide general information on the 
situation, or provide names and specific bureaus. They stated that it is preferable to enlighten 
me with the reference on specific –but harmless- examples which will characteristically 
depict the overall picture. 
 One of the examples is rather impressive. It seems that an insurance company, several 
ministry of transportation employees and few illegal car dealers, organized a network of 
grand theft auto. The insurance company would provide the information regarding the 
location of certain luxurious cars. The car dealers would steal the cars and transport them in 
secret locations. Once they actually concealed the cars into one of the ministry‘s properties. 
Then the insurance company would compensate the owners to the minimum possible amount 
. A few weeks later the cars would resurface, but according to several contracts of the 
insurance company, the cars if stolen, compensated and then found, return as property of the 
insurance company and not to the rightful owners. In most cases, the owners never find out 
that the car is actually found. Then with the assistance of the ministry‘s employees the cars 
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are legally prepared for sale into neighbouring countries in most cases. Needless to say, that 
most of those involved in the scheme make personal use of one of the cars they obtained via 
the above-mentioned method. 
 According to a Greek government official, a Greek-Cypriot construction company 
which invested in Lebanon on the development of the water supply infrastructure in rural 
areas initially faced significant problems regarding the entry into the project as well as during 
the relatively easy process of establishing legal status in the country. The setbacks started 
from the very beginning in the Trade Department as the paperwork never seemed to be 
correct. The problems continued while waiting for the blue copy of the receipt of the 
registration fees which was absolutely necessary for the second step of the company‘s 
registration in the country. This required translated paperwork and a one-off installment to 
the Magistrates Mutual Fund. Despite the deposit of the necessary bribes to certain officials 
the whole process was stalled, even at those introductory stages. Eventually, after the 
falsification of some documents and the political intervention of government officials 
associated with the company‘s entry in Lebanon, the obstacles were eventually lifted. 
Initially, it looked as unexplained extortion of additional bribes, however after several months 
the company realized that the initial plans of the projects where in opposition to certain 
powerful Shiite individuals heavily involved in rather unlawful practices. The influence of 
those individuals, apparently had overwhelming potency as the illegal network was aware of 
the forthcoming government plans, and delayed not only the Greek company but the entire 
joint venture to commence the project. The intensity of influence encroached on the lowest 
levels of the state apparatus affecting even the slightest bureaucratic transaction regarding the 
project. Eventually, when suddenly all of the obstacles ceased to exist, the administrators of 
the Greek delegation realized that the whole affair simply stopped being against the interests 
of the particular illegal network. Nothing was clearly stated regarding the details of the 
situation, and I had certain reservations concerning the validity of the story. However, 
according to a source associated with the Greek-Arab Chamber of Commerce a Greek 
company indeed faced exactly the above-mentioned difficulties but it was not the specific 
company I was informed of  in the beginning, as it was not a construction company. The 
source implied that sometimes sectarian disputes may affect the smooth functioning of the 
competition. 
 Lastly, the contact in Port of Beirut, mentioned that the Port is categorized amongst 
the most expensive ports in the Mediterranean and this is because of the incessant facilitating 
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bribes and the commissions extorted by various illegal networks which pump up the costs. 
Also he pointed out, that due to the illegal networks operation in the port and the clientelistic 
nature of the Lebanese government, the port employs thousands of unnecessary workers. 
Indeed throughout the public sector there are thousands of under-qualified and needless 
members of staff. On the one hand, some agencies and authorities are superfluous with 
employees without job description or objective like in the train company, which according to 
Bassam Abdel-Malek, chairman of the board of directors for the railway at the ministry of 
Transportation, still has two hundred former railway employees –according to others more 
than eight hundred- on its payroll,
421
 while the last regular rail operation was in 1997. 
Practically the rail company has been defunct for over 20 years. On the other hand, there are 
other public - less advantageous - positions which are drained and starved of vital workforce, 
because they are unpopular or useless to the objectives of the various illegal networks. 
Public opinion 
The interviews of the general public views on the illegal networks were overwhelming. When 
someone felt that he could express himself freely, his speech would have a torrential flow and 
he would be unstoppable. However, not all the cases fired libels against the government or 
the illegal networks as someone would have expected. Apparently the strong sectarian or 
ideological affiliations were obvious, but many were genuinely in favour of corrupt practices 
and the operations of various illegal networks. 
 The views of the respondents can be classified into three different schools of thought 
or perhaps three different perspectives. At the outset, many of the respondents posed a rather 
buoyant view regarding the operation of illegal networks in Lebanon, meaning that the 
operations of those networks indirectly have a say in the country but they do significantly 
contribute in socio-economic level. However, the younger generations –mainly- supported a 
rather pessimistic outlook as they felt that unless they become part of the networks or at least 
an active player in the unorthodox (for the Western point of view) practices in the country 
they would be excluded or deprived of certain opportunities. Lastly, a significant percentage 
of the respondents viewed that the function of the illegal networks in the country is essential, 
as they assist the governmental efforts for the rejuvenation of the country‘s economy and 
infrastructure and give a hand to the society to circumvent the obsolete –but legitimate- 
course of action for development, progression and even resistance, referring to Hezbollah. 
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 Generally, the entire sample of the public that I examined acknowledged the influence 
and impact of the illegal networks in the political, economic and social life. Many of the 
respondents perceive inevitability in the operation of the illegal networks in the country. 
Firstly, a significant amount of the respondents claimed that the income of the Lebanese 
residents that stems from their involvement in various illegal networks cannot be undermined 
or underestimated. The illegal networks may potentially absorb part of the underpaid 
workforce and that is remarkable.  The corrupt governments are unable to control the 
networks as they are both interconnected. Besides, as many were proud to suggest, Lebanon 
historically seems to accumulate wealth via unlawful practices. Some of the respondents 
assumed that it is probably originated from the astuteness of the Phoenicians. Lebanon being 
at the crossroads of an extraordinary region is destined to be the nexus of all the peculiar 
circumstances. Even the smuggling and drug production in the fertile valleys of Lebanon, it 
would be impossible to be utilized without the presence of those networks. Meaning that, 
they assume that the networks provide the means for the stabilization of the society in the 
rural areas mostly. 
However, the majority of the respondents stressed the destabilization attributes of the 
networks and the vast social disturbance they cause. It is frequent that the networks expose 
innocent people to skirmishes due to conflicting interests of the various drug lords and 
smugglers. During my interview sessions in the Cherry Pub in Beirut I have been asked by a 
group of young men, ―Where the interest or the gain is for those people?‖ People are afraid to 
stand up and openly admit their disapproval of the current state of affairs and condemn those 
sordid practices. The frequent demonstrations cannot possibly alter or affect the deeply 
entrenched interests of the illegal networks in Beirut, they suggested. The people of Beirut 
are suffocated by the all-embracing corruption and the omnipresent operation of those 
networks. Indeed some people make a living since there are no other alternatives; however 
the social benefit of those few people cannot counter balance the unrest and the perpetual 
supply to the internal strife that these networks cause. It is more than obvious; they proposed 
that if you take a stroll in the rich suburbs of Beirut, you will see those who are actually enjoy 
the primary gains of the networks in Lebanon. The gain is not collective; it is rather personal 
and private. Another group of youngsters suggested that the exploitation of the illegal 
networks is so ruthless, they even say people who are actively involved in those networks are 
vastly intimidated and constrained like several prostitutes they frequently visit. Even by 
excluding the parameter of coercion regarding their involvement, the low ranked people 
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fused with the networks are vulnerable to the shifting attitudes and alliances of the networks. 
They are all potential scapegoats, like a group of young would-be mobsters who got arrested 
in the Corniche during their daily habit of smoking cannabis there. 
On the other hand, several other respondents suggested that the existence and 
operation of the networks is rather indispensable due to the ability of the networks to avoid 
the erroneous decision making of the government, which is actually imposed by alien 
interests. The informal networks‘ operations have benevolent intentions, and in the case of 
Hezbollah all the allegedly ill gotten gains are ploughed back in for the protection of Lebanon 
and the enhancement of the sophistication of all the mechanisms that provide a solid (social) 
framework for the country. According to another man Hezbollah is a godsend institution. 
Without Hezbollah and other spin off operations the country would be in less advantageous 
position than it is now. However, even if I exclude Hezbollah from the equation, the approval 
of those networks by parts of the society is tremendous. Though, it is rather unclear if the 
levels of support stem from the imposed intimidation of the networks towards the society or 
because of the pressure that the government inflicts via legislation, policy making or the law 
enforcement agencies or from pure allegiance. 
 
The paradox of Hezbollah 
As mentioned in previous chapters the role of Hezbollah is apparently not restricted on illegal 
activities. Hezbollah play s a significant role in the political scene of Lebanon and also acts as 
a provider of social services. The literature review suggested that the systemic inadequacies 
within Lebanon promoted the emergence of radical social -or not- movements like Hezbollah 
and compelled them to step in and replace the partial and insufficient governmental capacity 
to provide. However, it is not uncommon for a social benefactor or a charitable entity to be 
involved in rather shadowy affairs.  Hezbollah indeed is characterized by many countries as a 
purely terrorist organization. Other states like the United Kingdom perceive as terrorist only 
the military wing of Hezbollah. Generally speaking, it is the commission of acts of violence 
that brand organizations like Hezbollah as terrorist groups in opposition to other legitimate 
political parties or resistance movements that do not engage in violence or armed struggle in 
an attempt to change governments.
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 According to Amy Zalman, Hezbollah is an integral 
and accepted Lebanese political element, although unlike other groups, they have not 
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abandoned the use of violence as a political tool. There is little doubt left in the minds of 
those that study or are involved in some way with the political process in Lebanon, that 
Hezbollah has an extremist militant faction, and will remain so until it can fully adopt 
responsible political practices which avoid undermining the strengthening of civil society. 
That said, a question remains that has caused genuine concern for policy makers in the region 
– without Hezbollah, could Lebanon bounce back from the many conflicts it has suffered and 
in the resilient way that it has demonstrated? According to Catherine Harrison a defence 
analyst, Hezbollah tries to compete with the Lebanese government in the efforts of the 
reconstruction of the shattered areas. 
As pointed out in this thesis' research, it is the nature of informal economy to bypass 
red-tape and bureaucracy, and mobilize quickly so that essential funds can reach their 
intended recipient. Hezbollah, according to Catherine Harrison, are masters at being able to 
utilize such a system. Predominantly this is for criminal means, forming the vital lifeline for 
continued operations. However, the group also provides funds and means for restructure, 
which many in Lebanon classify it as a form of charity. Indeed several members of the public 
mentioned –not to me, but to my assistant- that they had been frequently urged to participate 
in a zakat usually held in mosques in order to directly support the organization. 
Also Catherine Harrison mentioned that under challenging conditions, where people 
do not receive support from the ruling political body in a timely or efficient manner, it is the 
informal networks that provide much needed services. This creates a support network from 
the populous but also makes it difficult for the government to crackdown on the group's 
activities as they become vital to the country. As mentioned in Chapter 5 Hezbollah is also a 
provider of social welfare services in South Lebanon, including organizing hospitals and 
schools and a charity fund for the families of suicide bombers. 
However, this is not a phenomenon distinct to Lebanon and Hezbollah. Catherine 
Harrison projected certain similarities with another organization; Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) 
which operates in Pakistan as having a similar modus operandi. JuD call themselves a 
charity; they provide vital finances to Pakistan, running Madrassas (more often than not the 
only means of education) and hospitals. Filling a void where the government has failed to 
provide. But like Hezbollah, JuD are linked to criminal activities, the most serious of which is 
acting as the umbrella organization for terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayyibba, the militant group 
responsible for the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai. 
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Without a doubt, where the governments fail to provide, these groups are able to 
supply the means to deliver services to the poorest swathes of these countries. Catherine 
Harrison also mentioned that the unstable situation that these groups are able to operate in 
means that they can continue their respective illicit dealings (which grow exponentially 
without accountability) whilst garnering a growing support base from the electorates. 
According to Catherine Harrison and another unnamed source (for security reasons) 
there is strong evidence to suggest that these countries cannot at present survive without these 
groups, nor are these government's presently willing to dismantle them. While these countries 
fail to provide the basic needs of welfare, health and education to their respective 
populations, these groups will continue to have an important role. Catherine Harrison also 
mentioned that until the Lebanese government takes difficult and brave steps to restructure 
how they provide to their citizens, these groups will undoubtedly become further entrenched 
in the system – making it more difficult in the long term to eradicate them. She added that 
this may be in part because the Lebanese government (and the Pakistani government as well) 
fear the repercussions of banning these groups. It may turn their populations against them and 
create a formidable enemy within their own countries. It would also mean that the 
governments would have to implement fast acting, widespread and effective policy to fill the 
services void left by these groups – something which presently seems to be anathema to these 
respective states. Therefore, as Catherine Harrison views it, these groups it seems have 
become not only important to the population, but also to the government, making it more 
unlikely that the group will be separated from and eventually targeted by the political body. 
 Other respondents claimed that Hezbollah regarding the various criminal activities 
enjoys a certain degree of immunity. They also claimed that the police in the efforts to tackle 
larceny or drug trafficking seemingly linked with Hezbollah, when they stumble upon 
arsenals and other necessary tools for the continuation of the struggle, consciously pay no 
attention to it and they ignore it . Other members of the public, who had also been examined 
in the corruption section, mentioned that other illegal activities take place in the rural areas of 
Lebanon, under the permission of Hezbollah as the revenue of those activities is partly re-
directed to Hezbollah. Despite the protection that Hezbollah offers to the farmers, the need 
for bribes is constant in order to remain completely untraceable. However, apart from the 
intra-gang warfare, usually triggered by micro-interest conflicts or the clashes between the 
clans and cliques of organized crime, there also are atrocious conflicts with the army, like the 
brutal ambush of the Jafar family against an army patrol in the outskirts of Baalbak in April 
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2009.
423
 Usually those conflicts are instigated by the power struggle over the wealth 
generating fields or due to the call for retaliation against the army or other adversaries. 
 In any case, it is frequently reputed that militant groups cooperate with criminal actors 
purely for financial reasons. According to another unnamed source, the amounts of the cash 
that the police confiscate through arrests and raids on a monthly basis are colossal, and the 
value of the products that have been intercepted by the authorities could exceed the one 
million dollars. Thus the monthly amassed capital that circulates freely only within the 
borders is immeasurable and irrefutably gigantic.  
 Apparently certain branches of Hezbollah should be included in this section as they 
are undoubtedly involved in illegal or potentially illegal activities. However the 
complementary role of Hezbollah in the lacking governmental efforts of reconstruction and in 
the attempts for social equality is certain. Hezbollah for some of the respondents is a 
necessary evil that carefully needs eradication. For some it is an openly terrorist organization 
that feeds from informal and illegal activities and that in a way the state allowed its existence. 
However, they seem to neglect the vast social acceptance as well as the need for 
representation and probably resistance that Hezbollah despite its occasional shadowy modus 
vivendi provides. The political diversity within Lebanon on the one hand detests the existence 
of Hezbollah as a factor of destabilization and to a large extent the international stage seems 
to concur with that, but on the other hand a significant part of the Lebanese society as well as 
of the international academia view Hezbollah as a dynamic and tangible actor of resistance 
and a vigorous political presence with vast social welfare extensions. 
Summary of the interviews on the illegal networks 
The interviews due to the delicate nature of the subject were directed to individuals indirectly 
involved with the operations of the illegal networks. The first secondary level group of the 
respondents was anti organized crime activists. The activists suggested that the illegal 
networks display increased levels of sophistication in their modus operandi and that they are 
exceptionally thriving regarding their economic performance. Also the potential involvement 
of the public in such networks could be driven by poverty or the need for social advance. As 
Lebanon and specifically Beirut is a place of extremes. Wealth and poverty co-exist in a 
peculiar manner, for that reason impressionable youngsters are prone to be recruited in the 
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various illegal networks or desire to enter one for a variety of unripe reasons. However, this 
also could be the drive for more prominent political motivation and involvement. 
Additionally, Lebanon according to the activists offers a fertile ground for money laundering 
activities as shown in the example with the luxurious estate and the offer by an alleged drug 
lord. Apparently the illegal networks in Lebanon project the most dynamic component of the 
economy not only due to their remarkable performance but due to the interconnections and 
interdependence with the state.   On the other hand the academics suggested that the illegal 
networks‘ performance in the economic level is partly attributed to the lack of apprehension 
for punishment and partly on the subcutaneous tendency of the Lebanese people, in general, 
to operate in a disobedient framework. It seems for some academics that any effort to tackle 
the operation of those networks is destined to fail as the Lebanese are set to defy the law or 
the government. For some others, though this situation is fuelled by the governmental 
limitations to effectively deal with those issues. Generally, the impact of the networks could 
be overrated, but the discomfort of the public opinion is quite apparent in many occasions. 
However, the macroeconomic and microeconomic impact of the networks from the 
academic point of view seems to be overestimated as mentioned above. On the other hand, it 
is potentially undersized, as many government officials suggested that it may constitute a 
factor of international isolation and certainly project demagnetizing features regarding 
investments. The government officials stressed the magnitude of the penetration of the illegal 
networks inside the state apparatus and their ability to overpower more or less any 
governmental decision. Lastly the views of the public were more diverse since the majority of 
the respondents condemned in a rather fierce manner the operation of those networks while 
others put forward the necessity of their existence and the important role they play in the 
economic development of the people as well as the state‘s and their contribution in the 
regional armed struggle. Generally though it was rather difficult to extract information from 
Lebanese government officials in this topic due to its sensitivity and I consulted several 
foreign governmental officials in Lebanon. Those officials gave a more holistic and objective 
view on the role of the networks on constructions projects, like the water supply project 
blocked by local interests as described earlier on or in the insurance fraud with the stolen 
luxury cars which ended up in the hands of the same insurance company executives.  
Lastly the public opinion in Lebanon has a more varied attitude towards the networks. 
One part of the public opinion views them as a contributing element of the socio-economic 
web. Another part of the society reckons that unless you are part of the networks you shall be 
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excluded from certain opportunities, while another part of the respondents views the illegal 
networks as an essential element of the Lebanese reality.  
 At a separate level the input of Hezbollah was examined, due to the divergent 
responsibility and character it beholds in the international stage and within Lebanon. 
Hezbollah despite the active recognized parliamentary involvement in Lebanon still follows 
rather controversial methods for the achievement of its political plans and for the attainment 
of certain financial aspirations, in order to pursue certain political and social objectives.  
Hezbollah, despite the wide-spread similarities in the modus operandi with other illegal 
networks, is a provider of social welfare and energetic supporter of the interests of significant 
percentage of the Lebanese society. The systemic inadequacies within Lebanon promote the 
emergence of radical social -or not- movements like Hezbollah and compel them to step in 
and replace the partial and insufficient governmental capacity to provide. The complementary 
role of Hezbollah as a state agent is undeniable. Besides, as mentioned earlier, it is not 
uncommon for a social benefactor or a charitable entity to be involved in rather shadowy 
affairs. 
 Generally according to the respondents the illegal networks are directly responsible 
for evading profits on behalf of the government, monopolizing certain parts of the market, 
affecting competition and augmenting the social unrest and the economic inequalities; 
however they marginally contribute to the absorption of workforce surpluses, smooth (or 
obstruct) the progress of selected developmental plans and attempt to shield –sometimes very 
unsuccessfully- the agricultural  areas economic sustainability, even if it is for subjective 
purposes. 
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CHAPTER 9 Results 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section separately analyses the responses 
of the interviewed regarding the positive or negative participation of each key driver in the 
social and economic development. This is in order to project the required variables for the 
following analysis concerning the quality of the overall input of the informal economy in 
Lebanon. 
 The second section funnels all the responses of each key driver into a single spectrum 
in order to provide an overall image of the informal economy‘s beneficial or detrimental 
values, and to ascertain whether the informal economy is an inseparable and indispensable 
aspect of the Lebanese social and economic life, or a superfluous practice and a stumbling 
block towards development. Due to the dissimilar involvement of each group of the sample in 
every key driver, initially I will assess the outlook of each group individually, before the 
concluding inference regarding the idiosyncrasy of the informal economy in Lebanon. This 
synopsis on the perceptions of each respondent group was drafted by the coding process as 
projected and categorised into Tables 1-4. 
 Lastly the third section will assess the three foremost ingredients of the informal 
economy‘s emergence and development as derived by the analysis of the data included in the 
primary and secondary material of this paper. The third section will attempt to put into 
theoretical context the three factors, which enable the Lebanese populace to endorse the 
informal economy to such unprecedented heights. 
 
Evaluation of the contribution of each key driver of the informal economy 
in the wider socio-economic framework 
This section independently evaluates each key driver‘s responses in order to assess the 
beneficial or detrimental value of the ingredients of the informal economy in the wider socio-
economic framework. 
Key Driver One: Informal Employment and Commerce Sector 
The impact of the informal employment and commerce sector in Lebanon has a dual 
nature. As also shown in Chapter Two it may offer jobs and opportunities to individuals who 
were unable to work or find a satisfactory occupation in the formal sector, but at the same 
time it may lead to occupational diversion (mostly due to the refugees and the workforce 
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import from Syria) and generate imbalances among the workforce.
424
 Once again, the sample 
portrays certain peculiarities as the government officials could potentially be members of the 
informal sector as well. However, all of their responses, despite the peculiarity, are classified 
under their respective category without disregarding any of their input and opinions regarding 
the sector. The interconnection of the informal employment and commerce sector with 
corruption, renders the function in the informal zone evenly exposed to bribes and 
manipulation on behalf of state officials. On the one hand the state officials demand certain 
enticements to ignore particular practices in the informal (and formal) sector and on the other 
the implicated parties (users) offer bribes to encourage their smooth function in the informal 
sector unimpeded. 
The contribution of the informal employment and commerce sector is concentrated on 
the fact that it represents a tangible and viable option for thousands of underprivileged 
workers. Conventionally, as also mentioned in Chapter Two the informal sector may 
constitute the buffer for the workforce surpluses. However as shown in Chapter Eight the 
surpluses are more than likely artificial as there are a manifold of skilled and unskilled 
positions unoccupied but which are subjected to the system of favouritism and clientelism 
that prevails in Lebanon. Therefore, the informal sector is not the absorbent for the 
superfluous workers of Lebanon, but for those who cannot join the formal sector due to 
various circumstances, or those who have illegal status in the country and those who 
participate in the informal sector out of choice. 
In general, the informal sector is a pool for unskilled workers,
425
 as also shown in 
Chapter Two however, despite the abundance of unskilled workers in Lebanon there are 
many skilled workers in the country employed in the particular sector. Those skilled workers 
under different circumstances would be characterised as overqualified, as they currently work 
in jobs which do not correspond to their capacity of expertise. The informal sector may 
provide wages matching the formal sector, and due to tax evasion and the general avoidance 
of fees, the income may be significantly enhanced or preserved to a satisfactory level. Also 
larger firms which predominantly employ informal workers, due to the lower costs improve 
their productivity and provide sustainable employment. Moreover, the informal sector may 
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make available to the lower strata of Lebanon, commodities in significantly affordable prices 
and provide the means of survival for large segments of the society. 
The downside of the above mentioned however, is rather considerable. The strain that 
the informal sector places on the formal employment and commerce sector is immense. Due 
to the considerable presence of branded goods smuggled into the country and the significant 
operation of informal traders, the retail sector suffers substantial losses and the state loses 
vast amounts of VAT. Also due to the common practice of (formal and informal) businesses 
to occupy their workforce informally, the lower costs of production seriously affect the 
competition. Apart from the damages inflicted on the law abiding units, the loss of the 
contribution for social welfare eventually burdens the tax payer. This situation probably feeds 
the broad tax underpaying percentage in Lebanon. The widespread and almost habitual tax 
evasion contributes to the 'unbusinesslike' tendencies of many enterprises and pushes the 
situation towards its institutionalisation. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Lebanon unlike most 
of its Arab neighbours has an ageing population. Apart from the direct impact on the labour 
market structure, this may exacerbate the issue of pension provisions in the long term. 
426 
On the other side, the informal workers have no social insurance or any other legal 
recognition, whilst they are usually still obliged to endure dire working conditions and 
tolerate exploitative behaviours. Additionally, they face the uncertainty regarding the 
permanence of their occupation as they are vulnerable to any socio-economic alteration, 
despite the general notion as mentioned in Chapter Two, that the informal sector functions as 
a safety net in times of crisis.
427
 Generally, the informal sector is a factor that represents a 
relative convenience for the underprivileged social groupings of Lebanon, and a mechanism 
of additional enrichment of the nouveau riche industrial elites of the country, whilst the state 
is at a constant loss, despite the economic activity that the informal sector may supplement. 
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Table 1: Cross tabulation of the responses on informal employment and commerce sector 
Informal 
Employment 
& Commerce 
Users – Public opinion Academics Government 
Officials 
Self-Employed Waged 
On income 
apportionment 
-Labour intensive jobs 
usually underpaid 
-capital intensive depend 
on success 
-in services frequently due 
to lack of social insurance 
above the average 
-poorly paid in 
constructions 
 
Underpaid, especially the 
refugees 
Underpaid but 
may  vary 
according to 
type of 
involvement 
On I.E. 
predilection 
-illegal status 
-lack of alternatives 
-early age 
-turnover limited to be 
formal 
-profitable 
-makes no difference being 
formal 
 
-illegal status 
-lack of alternatives 
-good pay 
-lack of opportunities 
-coerced or misled 
-legislative vacuums for 
refugees 
-lack of alternatives 
-incompatibility 
with formal 
occupation 
-profitable (for 
them) 
On resilience of 
the sector 
Trade diversion during 
conflict but generally 
unaffected 
-completely circumstantial N/A N/A 
On productivity 
of the sector 
-may increase but minimal 
output 
-replicas, contraband, 
pirated goods 
-productivity may increase 
due to low costs 
-deteriorates productivity 
of formal firms 
-main channel 
of contraband 
distribution 
On competition -ill-competition especially 
with formal shops 
N/A -distorts competition 
-affects prices 
Ill competition, 
especially on 
trade 
On working 
conditions 
-mediocre in general 
-depends on job 
-long working hours 
-dreadful conditions but 
may vary 
-intimidation by employers 
-mostly insecure and 
negative 
-equally 
mediocre with 
the formal 
sector 
 
Links with 
other key 
drivers 
-corruption 
-illegal networks 
-corruption -corruption 
-illegal networks 
-corruption 
-illegal 
networks 
Main pitfalls of 
involvement 
-immigrants lower the 
income 
-insecurity for the future 
-lack of social insurance 
-working conditions 
-bribes 
-irregular payments 
-lack of social insurance 
-working conditions 
-seasonal 
-lack of legitimacy 
-underemployment 
-working conditions 
-exploitation 
-lower wages 
-illegal status 
-legal perils 
 
Main 
advantages of 
involvement 
-enhances or preserves 
necessary income due to 
tax and fees evasion 
-lack of bureaucracy 
-employment 
-probability of better wages 
 
-social recognition (if 
combined with illegal 
networks) 
-defiance to the state 
-significant 
financial or 
material gains 
Impact on 
economy 
-affect formal trade 
-offer cheaper products 
-tax evasion 
-scourge for formal 
businesses and firms 
-tax evasion 
-affects formal workforce 
-entire sections of economy 
base operations on I.E & C. 
 
 
-adverse consequences on 
the economic structure 
-tax evasion 
-creation of cartels 
-supporting unlawful agents 
(loan sharks) 
-black market 
-banking sector 
affected 
-tax evasion 
-loss of revenue 
Overall 
estimation 
-buffer for unprivileged 
workers 
-allows access of poorer to 
commodities 
-contributes to the lives of 
the poor 
-buffer for unprivileged 
workers 
-supports productivity of 
business operations etc 
-deduct significant input for 
social welfare 
-distorts indicators of 
economic measurements, 
may support poverty 
stricken areas 
-perplexes the fault-finding 
market conditions 
-tolerance of 
the state 
supports every 
aspect of I.E 
and C. sector 
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Key Driver Two: Informal Remittances 
Despite the popular suggestion, as shown in Chapter 3, that the informal remittances actually 
are a temporary stream of income,
428
 with a high degree of saturation over time,
429
 Lebanon 
has projected a remarkable stability in the informal inflows of remittances, since no particular 
decline has occurred during the recent periods of conflict and unrest, nor during the financial 
crisis which commenced in 2008. The broad-spectrum predilection on the informal transfers 
systems is principally manifested through lower income senders and to a lesser degree by 
more affluent senders. The principal reasons on the preference of the informal transfers 
systems, as shown in Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, are positioned on the comparative advantages 
of those systems against the formal channels which are speed, efficiency, lack of 
bureaucracy, lack of fees and taxes, resilience and cultural familiarity.
430
 The formal channels 
also reveal an equal level of the ambiguity of the transaction. Also, more often than not, the 
informal systems are preferred as the variable circumstances of the senders force them to 
resort to those systems as a result of denied access to formal banking institutions, lack of 
linguistic capacity in the host country, or due to the lack of legal status of the recipient (i.e. 
Palestinian refugees, illegal networks).  However, the informal systems are not totally 
immune against hazards of fraud, monetary loss, personal rivalries and other exogenous 
factors like financial crisis and war. 
 The contribution of the informal remittances to the economic activity of Lebanon is 
phenomenal. Apart from the remarkable size, these vast amounts of untaxed income 
circulating in the country boost the balance of payments since they potentially represent up to 
one fifth of the economy. The economic activity throughout Lebanon is significantly 
augmented as the remittances are funnelled towards a wide spectrum of commodities and 
services. Also the increased financial capacity assists the reconstruction efforts in the country 
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and compensates for the lacking infrastructure and lack of social welfare. Most importantly, 
the remittances in general also provide the necessary income for the defrayment of bribes and 
facilitating payments which constitute an integral part of every bureaucratic transaction and 
of any other public and possibly private engagement. Additionally, the informal remittances 
may provide the means for the needier segments of the society for better access to health 
care, education and other sectors prone to facilitating payments and bribing, as well as 
housing and lifestyle improvements. Also, the less deprived segments may complement their 
income and enhance the investments, the consumption of luxurious goods but also resort to 
frivolous spending as well. 
 The disadvantages of the remittances however are focused on the potential over-
reliance of the recipients, which may impact on a reduction of capable and potentially skilled 
workforce from the employment sector. This may impact on sustainability of the remittances 
flows and threaten their beneficial aspects. Also, the income misdistribution the remittances 
cause could be a source of the vast continuous inequalities within the economy, the market 
and the society. Lastly, the association of the informal transfer systems with the illegal 
networks funding, constitutes probably the thorniest aspect of their weaknesses. The informal 
transfer systems are indeed linked with the funding of several illegal networks in Lebanon, 
however they are concentrated on very specific receivers and therefore disruption of these 
networks could presumably be an unproblematic task. However, the illegal networks in 
Lebanon is a rather complicated issue since there are strong sectarian ties amongst the 
receivers and the government, as well as the public due to mutual interests focused on 
economic sustainability, employment and social services. 
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Table 2: Cross tabulation of the responses on Informal Remittances 
Informal 
Remittances 
Users – Public Opinion Academics Government 
Officials Senders (18) Recipients (18) Hawaladars 
On informal 
remittances 
predilection 
Preference on the 
grounds of the 
comparative 
advantages and lack 
of alternatives 
Preference on the 
grounds of the 
comparative 
advantages 
N/A Senders 
dismissed by 
official 
channels 
N/A 
Preference on ITS 
due to lack of 
alternatives or 
other problems 
-  Major reason  for 
poorer 
-Restricted for the 
wealthier 
N/A The exclusive 
reason for 
their clientele 
Senders 
dismissed by 
official 
channels 
N/A 
Resilience of ITS; 
conflict 
Minor decline due to 
uncertainty 
Minor decline due to 
senders 
Uninterrupted Relatively 
stable 
N/A 
Resilience of ITS;  
financial crisis 
Minor decline, but 
living standards may 
affected in host 
country 
Minor decline Uninterrupted 
but vulnerable 
N/A Limited decline 
Effectiveness of ITS -Relatively effective 
but always anxious 
-Equally unsafe with 
formal channels 
Highly regarded but 
occasional problems 
especially with 
hawaladars 
Safe but 
problems may 
occur 
N/A N/A 
Direction of ITS Lebanon and regional 
countries 
Regional mostly Muslim 
countries 
predominantly 
N/A N/A 
Use of remittances Consumption of basic 
goods,  education, 
Reconstruction, 
Savings 
Consumption of 
basic and luxurious 
goods, bribes, 
lifestyle, savings, 
N/A N/A N/A 
Need for 
remittances 
Unfailing  and mostly 
for survival purposes 
Varies from survival 
needs to completely 
superfluous 
N/A N/A N/A 
Remittances 
possible links with 
other key drivers   
-Illegal networks 
-corruption 
-Illegal networks 
-corruption 
Unspecified 
but vulnerable 
to abuse 
  
Contribution of 
remittances in 
macroeconomic 
level 
Enhancing the market 
and the 
reconstruction efforts 
Enhancing the 
market and the 
reconstruction 
efforts 
N/A N/A Vast GDP 
contribution, 
responsible for 
the 
maintenance of 
whole sectors 
Contribution of 
remittances on the 
living standards 
Vast improvements, 
on lifestyle, 
education, housing 
Vast improvements, 
on lifestyle, 
education, 
commodities 
N/A N/A N/A 
Overall estimation 
of the remittances 
Beneficial for the 
institution of the 
family, the economy 
and reconstruction 
but may assist to 
overreliance and 
abuse 
Beneficial for both 
the state and the 
recipient 
N/A N/A Beneficial but 
may affect 
income 
distribution but 
may lead to 
abuse 
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Key Driver Three: Corruption 
A very important implication regarding the sample on corruption is the fact that the 
government officials are not detached from certain characteristics, which could also classify 
them as users of the informal economy. However, since they are practically state 
representatives, or at least heavily involved with the mechanisms of the state, they are shown 
in a different category. From another perspective someone may suggest that the government 
officials are also the most outspoken users regarding grand corruption while the public 
opinion represents more adequately the petty corruption practices in Lebanon. 
 As shown in Chapter 4 the bulk of the literature is concurrent with the notion that 
corruption acts as a negative factor in sustainable development and obstructs real economic 
growth. However, Lebanon shows a considerable growth rate given its unstable 
circumstances. Even though the overall responses provide a rather negative outlook regarding 
the particular key driver‘s input in the economy, isolated responses suggest that corruption 
may have the attributes to augment growth even if it is on an ostensible level. Probably the 
real cost for society and the state is detrimental, however it must be recognised that 
corruption sets the state apparatus in motion. Corruption is the mechanism that, as also shown 
in Chapter 4, boosts up the redundant state apparatus, which perhaps would not be in its 
current state if corruption did not exist in the first place.
431
 The dichotomy of opinions and 
circumstances regarding corruption does not end here. The same people, who condemn 
corruption and the current state of affairs in Lebanon, are usually the same people who 
support the status quo. Those who are marginally benefited or not benefited at all condemn 
and resent the lack of governance and the behaviour of other people who abuse their 
authority, independently of how minimal it might be. Even the most outspoken complaints 
stem from the same people that later on will willingly or forcibly proceed to those corrupt 
practices, which they condemned earlier. This is a clear representation of the omnipresent 
nature of corruption in Lebanon and of its inescapability. 
 The contribution of corruption in the wider socio-economic context presents itself 
through facilitation. This is the raison d‘être of corruption. For many, corruption is an aspect 
of the daily life in Lebanon, which given the situation in the country, it needs to be preserved. 
The lack of serious political decisions, which will tackle corruption, renders the preservation 
of this practice a necessity. The public sector due to its design, routine and tradition is 
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steamed by corruption. On the one hand bribes may be extorted but on the other they speed 
up the unacceptably slow processes and the rigid regulations. 
 However, the limitless submission of Lebanon to corruption has been converted to a 
tool for abuse and personal gain. Corruption is a normative process, which provides 
indispensable services to the highest bidder, from the smallest daily transaction up to political 
decisions. Every aspect of the state apparatus is subjected to scrutiny which inspects how the 
people involved will extract the most out of it, for personal or sectarian gain. The most 
vulnerable social grouping is the financially underprivileged,
432
 meaning the poor and those 
who cannot rely on any other exogenous factors of income such as remittances or indirect 
benefits from corrupt practices. The poor deal with the harshest adversities of corruption as 
they simply cannot even afford to pursue their legal rights within their own country. 
 Even the positive attributes of corruption, for example the undertaking of public 
works projects, are counterbalanced by the overall corruption within the state which drains 
the resources and delays development. For example, the same development projects which 
are actually in progress due to a behind-the-scenes corrupt dealing are perpetually in progress 
because of corruption as well. In other words, corruption may indeed generate developmental 
operations within the country, which at the same time it practically undermines, as 
exemplified earlier. The spiral nature of corruption within Lebanon starts from the very 
bottom of the social pyramid and goes all the way to the political and economic elites of the 
country, reinforces the destabilisation effects of corruption and assists the moral, social and 
economic disintegration of the country. 
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Table 3: Cross tabulation of the responses on corruption 
Corruption Users / Public Opinion Academics Government Officials 
Frequency/Occurrence every day phenomenon Integral part of the daily life common 
Penetration depth Spiral, omnipresent, 
government more exposed 
-every possible aspect 
-Elite corruption is more 
widespread but people to 
blamed as well 
All-inclusive but public sector 
more prone 
On corruption’s predilection -Effective but unavoidable 
habitual and frequently 
imposed 
-lack of alternative path 
-unavoidable 
-part of the psyche 
-socially inherent 
-generally advantageous for all 
the parties involved, 
 
Effectiveness of corruption -Highly effective, renders 
almost everything achievable 
-service provider even if 
someone is entitled to it 
Only assists the transaction 
which belongs in the vested 
rights of the citizens and state 
-catalyst for all the affairs 
-highly effective 
Corruption effects on quality in 
general 
-reception of at least the 
standard 
-usually better, depending on 
the bribe 
-severe deterioration 
-lack of funds due to 
embezzlements 
-severe deterioration, especially 
in public works 
Need for corruption unconditional and total N/A -necessary as supplement  since 
income does not correspond to 
workload 
Effects of corruption on 
distribution of income 
Severe and unfair severe Severe and conditional 
Contribution of corruption in 
living standards 
unless corrupt transaction has 
major beneficial impact on 
income they could deteriorate 
deterioration in long term Significantly enhanced 
Corruption as favouritism and 
clientelism 
-Extremely wide-spread 
-favours occasionally  
demanded as entitled 
-regional characteristic 
-inextricable practice 
throughout the social web   
N/A 
Despite self evident links 
Measures against corruption -futile 
-circumstantial and interest 
driven i.e. before elections 
The objections will emerge 
from the policy makers first 
N/A 
Accountability -No particular remorse 
-mostly ascribed to state 
deficiency and elites 
Public opinion belittles 
seriousness of their actions, 
while other simply assess it as  
legitimate practice 
- no accountability 
- the faults are bureaucratic 
 
Actual cost of corruption In contrast with the average 
Lebanese income is 
considerably high 
N/A According to the flexibility of 
the project and the propensity 
of the involved 
Links with other key drivers All three All three Illegal networks and informal 
employment and commerce 
sector 
Corruption as investment 
incentive 
N/A -generally repels serious 
investment but may constitutes 
encouragement as a tool for 
future problem solver (see 
avoidance of contractual 
obligations) 
-catalyst as selection process 
for public works is disintegrated 
Corruption and rule of law -Intimidation 
-abuse of authority 
-law can be bypassed in favour 
of the enforcers or the public 
N/A N/A 
Position of corruption on 
macroeconomic level 
-loss of revenue and taxes 
 
-enhances inflation 
-destabilizes prices 
-challenges the sustainability of 
market and economy 
-loss of revenue 
-indirect effects as political 
decision may affected o altered 
-social welfare may affected 
 
Overall estimation of 
corruption 
-constitutes social problem but 
its facilitating attributes are 
indispensable 
-the building block of informal 
economy, taken as a whole has 
negative input 
-supplements income 
-maintains the smooth 
operation of the entire state 
apparatus 
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Key Driver Four: Illegal Networks 
Undoubtedly the illegal networks were the most controversial key driver as they were 
intertwined between condemnation and approval by both the primary and secondary 
resources. The conflicting responses of the diverse sample are amalgamated in Table 4. The 
extremity on the divergence of opinions regarding the illegal networks is vast. Perhaps this 
situation stems from the complex association of the illegal networks with all the other key 
drivers and the consequent negative as well as positive impact on segments of the society and 
the wider economic framework. 
 Whilst theorists struggle to identify the degree of legality of the other key drivers, the 
self explanatory nature of the illegal networks reveals to the reader a rather surprising fact, as 
the extensive social tolerance or acceptance of those networks is remarkable, given their 
unlawful character. 
 The contribution of the illegal networks in the wider socio-economic environment is 
multi-faceted and most of the benefits have a bidirectional line. Meaning that, the beneficial 
attributes of the illegal networks in most cases have a counterbalancing feature. The 
economic benefits that stem from the illegal networks are to a certain extent, responsible for 
the wide social acceptance they enjoy. In rural areas large segments of the local population 
base their livelihoods on the operations of those networks, as shown in previous chapters. The 
gap of the income distribution in Lebanon attracts many underprivileged people towards the 
networks, who view those networks as a means for social advancement or for career 
opportunity. The rigid and harsh socio-economic reality in Lebanon is a major factor of social 
frustration. Given the unsatisfactory and limited political adjustments due to the limited state 
capacity, large parts of the society project a disconcerting predilection in favour of the illegal 
networks. The statement of a young man who told me ―if you can’t beat them, join them‖ is 
not an isolated and individual standpoint among the Lebanese society. Therefore, the illegal 
networks constitute a tangible choice for employment and indeed provide the means of 
survival for many. Of course, the untaxed income the networks offer, potentially enhances the 
overall economic activity in Lebanon, however the losses for the state and consequently for 
the tax payer and the consumer are immeasurable and impossible to accurately estimate.  
Generally, the social web recognises -independently of the degree of approval- significant 
favourable characteristics in the illegal networks as they may provide what the state fails to 
offer such as employment, additional income and social recognition, and in the case of 
Hezbollah, social provisions and active participation in conflicts and protests. It must be 
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noted, that Hezbollah portrays a rather paradoxical role in Lebanon as many may render it as 
a controversial and biased entity when others, and most importantly large parts of the 
Lebanese society view it as complementary tool of social and political balance. 
 However, all the advantageous characteristics have an element of bias since the 
beneficial attributes are not horizontal and collective, and first and foremost serve the 
interests of the primary beneficiaries (drug lords, ring leaders etc). Additionally, the 
penetration of the state apparatus leaves the state resources prey to the raptorial tendencies of 
the illegal networks. What is more, the association of the illegal networks with the other three 
key drivers and their remarkable potency in socio-political life renders them extremely 
powerful and almost immune to the efforts of controlling or restraining them. Furthermore, 
these impervious features of the illegal networks establish and augment the innate tendencies 
of the public to defy the laws and the regulations of the state, independently of how rigid or 
flexible the laws may be. 
Also their operation contaminates the uneventful function of the social and economic 
procedures and mechanisms. On the one hand, the illegal networks impinge on the economic 
framework as they seriously affect potential investments and they may well influence the 
prices in the market. On the other hand the illegal networks also impinge on social stability, 
as organised crime thrives and creates an environment of insecurity and intimidation, 
enhancing the feelings of resentment since the lack of rule of law accommodates the illegal 
networks. This situation generates an atmosphere of social volatility which if combined with 
the sensitive and fickle economic clauses of the Lebanese market may provide us with an 
insight into the slow-matched socio-economic breakdown. It is rather remarkable how 
Lebanon manages to maintain its economic status and resilience. Perhaps it is indeed the 
subcutaneous input of the illegal networks or simply the overall image of Lebanon's 
economic performance which is a façade. 
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Table 4: Cross tabulation of the responses on illegal networks 
Illegal Networks Public Opinion Academics Activists Government Officials 
Degree of penetration -socio-economic and political 
influence 
-omnipresent 
-governmental and social 
influence 
-army 
-deeply entrenched 
-affect/redirect political 
decisions 
-deep socio-political 
involvement 
 
-intensive involvement in 
public affairs 
-capacity to influence 
political decisions 
Resilience of illegal 
networks 
-historical references 
-untouchable 
-lack of justice 
-governmental inadequacy 
or denial to deal with them 
 
-thriving economic 
performance 
-continuous streamline 
-the state consents to 
operation 
-potency of illegal networks 
-lack of punishment 
Tolerance and social 
acceptance 
-economic stabilization 
parameter for rural areas 
-social approval vast due to 
indoctrination or interests 
-may viewed as example of 
emulation 
-innate social tendency to 
defy authority 
-public tolerance 
reduced but 
-acceptance induced for 
income or intimidation 
-interconnected with state 
apparatus via corruption 
-society may have specific 
interests in the prolongation 
of their existence 
 
Major advantages of 
illegal networks 
-social services and resistance 
(for Hezbollah) 
-provide employment/income 
-may rejuvenate infrastructure 
-circumvent outmoded 
legislation 
-amend wrong political 
decisions 
-marginal income 
improvement to social 
segments 
-may indirectly add to 
growth 
-dynamic economic 
component 
-alleged social eminence 
of participants 
-many people seek and find 
employment in the networks 
- clientelism 
-may assist for personal 
accomplishments 
Major disadvantages 
of illegal networks 
-income inequalities 
-crime 
-sentiment of injustice 
-social disturbance 
-provoke conflicts 
-exploitation 
-factor of inter/nal isolation 
-repel investment 
-social scourge 
-deceitful, especially to 
younger members   
-clientelism 
-support squander of state 
resources 
-affect the smooth function 
of profitable state 
mechanisms (i.e. Port) 
Links with other key 
drivers 
All three All three -corruption 
-informal empl. and 
com. Sector 
-corruption 
-informal empl. and com. 
sector 
Sectarian 
involvement 
-monopolies 
-strong sectarian association 
-strong sectarian 
associations 
-indoctrination part of 
the recruiting process 
-Sectarian interests could be 
the drive for complexities 
but may boost competition 
On Hezbollah -beneficial attributes 
-resistance 
-may be immune of wrong-
doing 
 
-violent with criminal 
elements but may substitute 
state efforts 
-influential political 
element but prone to 
corruption 
-complementary nature 
-indispensable overall 
contribution 
-vast accountability for 
unlawful exercises 
Accountability -erratic, according to the 
ideological background of the 
respondent 
-all-encompassing in general 
- ascribed to public due to its 
wide approval 
-governmental weakness 
-the social acceptance 
provides alibi  also 
ascribed to state due to 
the facilitation it 
provides 
- no accountability, claimed, 
always passed to other 
bureaus and individuals 
Macroeconomic 
impact 
-participate in economic 
development 
-assist agricultural production 
-beneficial attributes 
overestimated 
-harmful to investments 
-ostensible consumption 
increase 
-prices affected 
-must be  disassociated 
with growth as offer 
ostensibly sizeable 
contribution but 
probably 
counterbalanced 
-direct involvement in the 
wider macroeconomic 
environment for personal 
gains 
-harmful to  investments 
Overall Estimation -climate of insecurity 
-important benefits but not 
horizontal 
-may lead to social 
frustration 
-interrupt normal economic 
activity 
-unreliability 
-crime increase 
- loss of revenue 
-undermine democracy 
-contaminate social 
consciousness 
-purely negative 
-loss of revenue 
-immense power and 
influence may destabilize but 
may offer substantial output 
- loss of revenue 
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Overall estimation of the informal economy key driver’s contribution on 
the broader societal level and state level 
This section funnels all the responses of each key driver, as shown in the previous section, in 
a single spectrum in order to provide an overall image of the informal economy‘s beneficial 
or detrimental values, and to ascertain whether the informal economy is an inseparable and 
indispensable aspect of the Lebanese social and economic life or a superfluous practice and a 
stumbling block towards development. 
Perceptions on the informal economy - Users / Public opinion 
The informal practices are so deeply entrenched into the mindset of the Lebanese society that 
sometimes it is inconceivable to operate otherwise. The majority of the Lebanese society, 
even if it demonstrates considerable disapproval towards the undesirable products of 
informality, acknowledges that the patterns in the social organisation are rather unlikely to 
change if current political and economic trends continue. As a result, people are increasingly 
obliged to resort to informal economy. As mentioned earlier, the informality is actually 
sustained from the very same people that despise it and condemn it. The general frustration, 
in the lower income social strata, and the lack of positive views for the future is widespread. 
The pressure tends to be so immense, that given the right circumstances the people might 
even rise up against the state or those who represent the core of this problematic situation. 
This level of abuse and exaggeration may lead to economic and social collapse. 
 However, since the status quo remains the same, the informal economy will maintain 
its current modus operandi and the public will never eschew the relative conveniences of 
informality. Indeed, the facilitating attributes of the informal economy cannot be 
underestimated. The informal economy has the capacity to provide employment under 
acceptable circumstances and satisfactory returns but in many cases the working conditions 
would be appalling and the workers would be significantly underpaid. But still, given the 
high degree of the population below the poverty line, even those unfortunate circumstances 
are welcome. Of course the improvement of income is not only conjoined with the poorer 
social strata and survival. The informal economy is a tool for the augmentation of an existing 
income, whether that income stems from bribing, tax evasion or illegal practices has no 
importance for the beneficiary. Besides, the public thinks that its accountability is non-
existent. The majority of the public is convinced of the notion that it was coerced to 
participate in the informal economy. Some may attribute their involvement to the uneven tax 
system, or to the rigid public sector, or to the limited income but this is voluntary. However, 
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others are indeed forced to participate in the informal economy due to their deprived 
conditions. And this is the main problem of informal economy. The benefits are not 
horizontal as they affect only a selected network of people each time and the socio-economic 
inequalities are so vivid that they enhance the social and sectarian imbalances within the 
country. The other problematic for the majority of the public is the abuse of authority that 
characterises every private and public position even with the slightest degree of power. This 
is another derivative of the informal economy and the consequent lack of the rule of law that 
it generates. The general intimidation and exploitation coupled with the forestalling of 
chastisement on behalf of the malefactors, assists the public resentment, however the social 
concessions that the informal economy makes available to the public are enough to offset any 
non-constructive aspects.     
 Independently of the above mentioned public acknowledgements, the public also 
recognises that the informal economy may be a scourge for the smooth functioning of the 
state and the market, and that the severe tax evasion and the lack of social insurance 
contributions represent a significant burden to the finances of the state. However, no 
conscious accountability is still taken, as the public counts on the reserves of the state and on 
the input of the prosperous political and economic elites of the country, as this is their 
responsibility. The public has no perception of the unsustainable contribution of the informal 
economy in Lebanon, since part of the reconstruction and the social services must be 
attributed to the informal practices. Perhaps the benefit for the state is marginal and indirect 
but the public in any case overrides the well-being of the state. 
 
Perceptions on the informal economy – Academics 
The informal economy for academia usually portrays a negative aspect for the welfare of the 
society and the state, with only few bright exceptions like Hernando De Soto, as shown in the 
literature review, who seeks for development through the cemented and traditionally 
established informal economies of the developing countries. The academics probably 
constitute the most objective part of the sample as they were the only group without specific 
and active interest in the practices of the informal economy in Lebanon. The academics 
recognise positive aspects in the informal economy, like the substitution of various 
governmental efforts for reconstruction and social services as the income could be informally 
enhanced, especially to the poverty stricken areas via the illegal networks, informal 
employment and informal remittances. The overall social contribution of the informal 
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economy is marginal but important; however the injurious aspects of the informal economy 
are by far more eminent and in retrospect affect the social web as well. Generally the 
informal economy contributes to the creation of a smokescreen. The high degree of informal 
economy in Lebanon renders almost every indicator or estimation inaccurate. The ostensibly 
functional economic environment potentially conceals the perplexed market conditions. The 
beneficial characteristics are by large overestimated, as even the few social gains are 
counterbalanced by the tax evasion, lack of legal compliance and the hindrance of the 
sustainable function of the market, which influences prices, inflation and consequently 
employment. The penetration of the informal economy in every aspect of the political and 
economic life taints the decision making process, thus it directly affects the already 
challenged democratic institutions in Lebanon. The potentially undermined democratic 
processes coupled with the inadequate enforcement of social obligations, drag down 
Lebanon‘s overall output and living standards for the poorer strata, whilst augmenting the 
wealth accumulation of the populous nouveau riche social segments and establishing the 
horizontal diffusion of informal economy deeper into state apparatus. 
 In a wider economic context the state, apart from the immeasurable loss of taxes and 
revenue, loses significant investments as the overall informal background coupled with the 
volatile political environment, constitutes Lebanon unattractive to serious investments and 
deals and negatively influences the healthy competition and formal productivity. The 
aforementioned are major ingredients for social aggravation and governmental unreliability. 
The academics transpose the accountability firstly on governmental weakness and potential 
willingness to ineffectively deal with the informal economy, and secondly on the public as it 
eternalises the informal practices.  In a nutshell, the overall contribution of informal economy 
in Lebanon constitutes an underestimated mega-problem which is in absolute need of a 
macro-solution. 
Perceptions on the informal economy – Government officials 
The main problem regarding the government officials was that the Lebanese officials were 
more than likely actively involved in the informal economy practices as well as the public. 
Therefore, a significant portion of their responses was subjected to bias or personal interests. 
Additionally, the government officials in Lebanon had more at stake given the fragility of 
their position if they pose a negative view on the state or its policies. Besides, every 
government official as a citizen of Lebanon is automatically a prospective participant in the 
informal economy. This was the main reason, for also choosing non-Lebanese officials 
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actively involved with the state apparatus of Lebanon, as they would be excluded from the 
problem of expressing themselves in a biased manner. However, even this approach was not 
absolutely objective as the penetration of informal economy is far reaching. However, since 
none of the government officials denied the existence and importance of the informal 
economy their opinion still holds certain weight. Potentially, there might be an element of 
exaggeration regarding the alleged input of the informal economy as expectedly the officials 
would attempt to belittle the transgressions of the government or of themselves if such a hint 
was suggested. Despite those dangers, the government officials provided data which was far 
from being characterised as understated. 
 The officials recognised the association of the informal economy for the 
accomplishment of personal goals and the massive role it plays in the misuse of state funds 
and grants, and in the establishment of a clientelistic structure throughout the society. Also 
they acknowledge the unlawful features of most of the informal practices and the backing 
they offer in the weakening of the law enforcement or law obedience throughout the society. 
However, the latter for the government officials does not always constitute a purely negative 
parameter. On the one hand the informal economy theoretically affects the smooth and 
competitive operation of the state and the market but on the other hand it fuels the 
functioning operation of the entire state apparatus. This is probably a diluted version of the 
principle of efficiency.
433
 Of course, there are too many assumptions that must be made to 
determine the actual social costs, however as shown earlier, the public is in concurrence with 
this notion too. To be more specific, the complementary nature of the informal economy, 
despite the overall setbacks that it may implement in the socio-economic framework, has an 
indispensable contribution to the social web, given the current adverse circumstances in 
Lebanon. If the contemporary situation was different, the climate for informal economy 
would be rather bleak, however at the moment it represents a catalyst – a polluting one- but 
still a catalyst. In other a words, it is an extensive disassociation of the socio-economic 
correctness of the Lebanese people with their socio-economic competence and effectiveness. 
More specifically, people for example, seek and find employment in the framework of the 
informal economy and preserve their incomes and without a doubt it represents a significant 
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product. Also the black market and the informal 
remittances in the recurrent periods of upheaval, respond to the flux needs of the population 
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when the government is unable to provide. However, the informal economy undeniably 
harms the potential investments, despite the marginal facilitation that it may provide and its 
penetration properties may be a factor for political and financial destabilisation as the state 
throws away millions of tax and revenue, still through this disintegration and disproportion, 
the informal economy may still sustain whole sectors of the economy and the society. 
 
Summary of the overall evaluation of the informal economy’s contribution in the broader 
societal and state level 
The overall contribution of the informal economy is undeniably multifarious. The main 
assumption which is safe to derive from the aforementioned responses, is that the informal 
economy in Lebanon is a catalytic and complementary mechanism for most of the adversities 
that stem from the complex socio-political situation. The informal economy is the heaven and 
hell of the Lebanese subsistence. The theoretically injurious nature of the informal economy 
represents an indispensable tool for the effective juxtaposition of the social and economic 
insolvency of Lebanon. Indisputably it is the double edged weapon which on the one hand 
contributes in the endurance of the Lebanese society in the face of adversity and on the other 
hand undercuts every beneficial input, as the synchronized burden that imposes on the society 
and the economy is unbearable. It is hard to estimate which negative features of the informal 
economy counterbalance the positive ones and vice versa, however the vicious circle of the 
informal economy is undoubtedly on shaky grounds and the lack of horizontal contribution is 
probably the main negative aspect. In this respect, the beneficial attributes of the informal 
economy have an imbalanced and discriminating essence at the state level as well as at the 
societal level. The beneficial characteristics are vastly important and imperative as they 
support the survival of significantly large parts of the society; however the detrimental 
characteristics may undermine the entire state structure and render the whole nation 
unsheltered and desolate. 
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The structure of informal economy in Lebanon; Theorising Informal 
economy 
The evaluation of the two previous sections provided the adequate groundwork for the 
theoretical assessment regarding the factors which fuel and perpetuate the informal economy 
in Lebanon. This section will project the three main enablers of the informal economy. 
The dynamics of the informal economy which are shaped by the input of the four key 
rivers were analysed in the previous chapters and by the unique socio-political peculiarities of 
Lebanon were highlighted by the sectarian issue and the historical context of the country, as 
also shown in chapter six.  The long fermentations of Lebanon‘s past formulated and 
cemented the sustainability of the abetting ingredients of the potentially embedded 
informality in the country. The first factor pertains to the organised establishments of the 
state, foundations and institutions as well as the conditions of the bureaucratic environment as 
shaped by the governmental course of action, and to the deficit of civil attention attributed to 
the public institutions that serve the population. Those systemic factors affect the civic 
system itself, the market, the economy and the society as whole. The second factor or 
cognitive refers to the mental processes of perception, judgement and reasoning of the 
society, as contrasted with their emotional and their volitional behaviours. The third factor or 
the criminal/illicit factor pertains to the sphere of the actions that are disapproved or not 
permitted for moral or ethical reasons, which as a rule involve crime and illicit transactions. 
 
Systemic factors 
The systemic factors are divided into two categories. The first category includes the 
problematic normative structure of the state apparatus and the second includes the 
exploitation of those normative deficits, mostly on behalf of the street level government 
officials as well as of the political elites. The high levels of the informality in the public 
sector necessitate or coerce the society to resort to the informal economy. 
 In the first category the rigidity of the public sector regulations, the unacceptable 
levels of bureaucracy, the tax burden and the cost of operating formally - which antagonises 
the cost of operating informally - prompt the society to function through the casual and 
informal channels of the economy even if in reality they are not necessarily cost-effective but 
just effective in opposition to the formal path. The structure of the public sector compels the 
society, due to its formal inflexibility and the unnecessary time consuming processes and 
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procedures, to seek alternatives in informal practices as sometimes people assume that it is 
impossible to complete a simple bureaucratic task via the formal options at their disposal. 
 The first category of the systemic factors which fuels the informal economy in 
Lebanon is tremendously supported by the second category which involves the human factor. 
The informal economy is by large intensified due to the involvement of the manifold parasitic 
elements which are part and parcel in the public as well as in the private sector. The 
interconnection of the street level officials with the various facilitators/fixers in the private 
sector enhances and sustains the normative vacuums in the state apparatus, while they assist 
in the overall degeneration of the public sector. Of course, their existence may entail some 
elements of relief for the general population which struggles with the bureaucracy in 
Lebanon, but other officials may be less compliant. Specifically, as shown in previous 
chapters, the civilians may be coerced and manipulated in order to bypass or avoid strict 
regulations, valid or false fines or penalties and generally take part in manifold informal 
dealings without their consent or approval. Extortion and embezzlement in light of the 
institutional insufficiencies portrays the individualised strain that the human factor attaches to 
the systemic factors regarding the expansion of the informal economy in Lebanon, given that 
these people represent a section of the state apparatus. 
 
Cognitive factors 
In chapter six, I explored the historical roots of informal economy prevalence in Lebanon. 
Ayubi attributed the informal economic practices to the undeveloped class structure coupled 
with the remnant of the hybrid feudal system of Lebanon.
434
 Gates on the other hand 
suggested that the informal economy was never harnessed in the country,
435
 while 
Brownsberger suggested that the informal economy is actually well entrenched in the psyche 
and behaviour of the population.
436
 In the interviews it was also suggested that the Lebanese 
people after the long historical processes in the country, have an innate social tendency to 
defy authority, the laws and the regulations of the state and that this was subliminally carved. 
 The existing social norms also contribute to the problem. There is little social 
pressure to comply with the laws and regulations and as Ayubi suggested the informal 
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economy is perceived as a mainstream device.
437
 Both sides of the same coin –the public and 
the state- have exalted the informal economy to a system. Indeed, a significant part of the 
public perceives the informal economy as legitimate means to counteract the economic 
adversities, the market competition and the state apparatus, as the state administration would 
use it as an instrument of economic and political objectives. The lack of accountability and 
the belittlement of the civil contribution to the informal economy clearly project the distorted 
perception of the Lebanese people on the issue. Therefore their interpretation and reasoning 
encourages their involvement, as the repercussions on the economy and the society would be, 
according to them, negligible. Even those who acknowledge the responsibility of the general 
population would still -voluntarily or involuntarily- participate in the informal economy if it 
was lucrative. 
The social consent in the informal economy even transcends the systemic factors as 
the deliberate participation is the cornerstone of the establishment and expansion of the 
informal practices in Lebanon. However, this realisation also challenges the notion of the 
inescapability of the informal economy in Lebanon but since the social costs are not 
determined, such a suggestion is ineffectual. The cognitive factor cannot be altered overnight. 
The profound infiltration into the social web will require social and political sacrifices in 
order for it to be amended and seriously affect the possible peculiarities of the Lebanese 
society. 
 
Criminal factors 
The most obvious factor is the criminal factor as the informal economy is the most tangible 
operating ground for all the illicit transactions. The third factor basically functions on top of 
the other two factors. The lack of effective appliance of the legislation coupled with 
disorganised governmental and judicial agencies results in the expansion of the criminal 
factor. 
 Seeing that frequently the illicit activities represent an alternative way of 
accumulating wealth, as shown in chapter five and eight, the perception that the criminal 
involvement is potentially the most lucrative method of living is rather worryingly 
widespread among the Lebanese society. As the lack of compliance has certain rewards for 
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large fractions of the social web, the informal and illicit economic practices will be 
dramatically augmenting. 
 Many theorists, as also shown in previous chapters, suggested that the informal 
economy will be eventually absorbed by the formal, as the latter will be growing.
438
 
However, given the perplexed structure of Lebanon due to its sectarian issue, the constant 
conflicts and the oversized informal economy the possibility of the formal sector 
overpowering the informal requires an extremely lengthy and high risk political cost 
adjustment, which –for the time being- seems rather distant. The criminal activities represent 
not only a large percentage of the annual economic activity in Lebanon, but a social 
necessity. The interconnection of the criminal factor with social needs as well as with various 
ideological entities and other conflict-ridden entities like Hezbollah - which base their 
operation and function on illicit activities for the continuation of their objectives - endorses 
the criminal factor with impervious features. Besides, as shown in chapter eight the size of 
the informal economy and the crime rate has actually increased, despite Lebanon‘s relative 
resilience to the global fiscal pressures emanated by the financial crisis.
439
 Since organised 
crime and illegal networks in Lebanon are practically impossible to be diminished, every 
illicit attachment will be stimulating for the criminal factor.  Also it must be noted, as shown 
in Chapter 4 and 5, it is more than frequent to observe governmental involvement into the 
illegal networks. This involvement could be direct or indirect. Meaning, that the political 
elites could support and maintain the illegal networks as they could be immediately involved 
or simply act as a facilitator of their activities. 
 The criminal factor will remain a major ingredient of the informal economy‘s 
development as it is tangled, as shown in chapter eight, in a complex configuration of 
interdependence and profit. 
 
Conclusion 
The findings of this research were presented in three areas, namely the contribution of each 
individual key driver of the informal economy in the socio-economic level, the contribution 
of the informal economy in total, as assessed by the overall input of the four key drivers and 
the theoretical conceptualisation of the three factors which fuel the informal economy in 
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Lebanon.  Each key driver provides a diverse input into the social, economic and political 
level, as shown in the Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4.  The overall input of the key drivers was then 
evaluated as presented by each group of the respondents, namely the actual users of the 
informal economy or the public opinion, the government officials and the academics. As  was 
expected, there was a tendency for each group of the respondents to offer views and opinions 
that would directly promote them or relieve them from any unwanted associations, however 
the diversity of the data provide a holistic view on the beneficial or detrimental values of the 
informal economy. In a nutshell, as mentioned earlier the beneficial characteristics are vastly 
important and imperative as they support the survival of significantly large parts of the 
society; however the detrimental characteristics may undermine the entire state structure and 
render the whole nation unprotected and desolate. 
Lastly, the presentation of the theoretical components of the informal economy 
provided the necessary framework for future recommendations, determined the origins of the 
informal economy with the exclusion of the practical reasons of involvement as shown 
throughout the paper, and provided a sound understanding regarding the omnipresence and 
perpetuation of the informal economy in Lebanon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
215 
 
 
CHAPTER 10 Conclusion 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the synopsis of the findings of the thesis and the major conclusions of 
the research. The chapter also includes several recommendations regarding the future of the 
informal economy in Lebanon and its importance. It also explores areas for further research 
on the topic and addresses the extent to which the objectives of the thesis have been achieved. 
Lastly the present chapter looks at the potential contribution of the thesis to the wider 
academic community and the prospective contribution to knowledge regarding the informal 
economy and its components as they are enacted in Lebanon. 
 
Summary of major conclusions 
The findings of this research were presented in three areas; namely the contribution of each 
individual key driver of the informal economy in the socio-economic level, the contribution 
of the informal economy in total - as assessed by the overall input of the four key drivers - 
and the theoretical conceptualisation of the three factors which fuel the informal economy in 
Lebanon. The findings will be presented in epigrammatic manner. The synopsis of the 
findings regarding each individual key driver is as follows: 
1. Informal remittances 
The responses regarding the first key driver of the informal economy in Lebanon projected a 
remarkable stability in the informal inflows of remittances since no particular decline 
occurred during the recent periods of conflict and unrest. The broad-spectrum preference on 
the informal transfers systems is primarily manifested through lower income senders and to a 
lesser degree by more affluent senders. The principal reasons for the preference of the 
informal transfers systems are positioned on the comparative advantages of those systems.
440
 
The informal systems are preferred as the variable circumstances of the senders force them to 
resort to those systems as a result of denied access to formal banking institutions, lack of 
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linguistic capacity in the host country, or due to the lack of legal status of the recipient. 
Additionally, the informal remittances and the I.T.S. are not totally immune against hazards 
of fraud, monetary loss, personal rivalries and other exogenous factors such as financial crisis 
and war. 
The economic activity throughout Lebanon is significantly augmented, as the 
informal remittances are funnelled towards a wide spectrum of commodities and services. 
Also the remittances boost the balance of payments since they potentially represent up to one 
fifth of the economy. As a result, the remittances assist the reconstruction efforts in the 
country and compensates for the lack of infrastructure and lack of social welfare. The 
informal remittances in general also provide the necessary income for the defrayal of bribes 
and facilitating payments, and may provide the means to the needier segments of the society 
for better access to health care, education and the other sectors prone to facilitating payments 
and bribing as mentioned earlier. 
 However the less deprived segments may complement their income and enhance the 
investments, the consumption of luxurious goods but also resort to frivolous expenditures. 
Another drawback is the fact that the remittances may cause an over-reliance of the recipients 
and assist the inequalities within the economy, the market and the society. Lastly, the 
association of the informal transfer systems with the illegal networks funding constitutes a 
considerable problem for the economy and the societal segments which rely on them. 
2. Corruption 
The collective responses regarding the second key driver of the informal economy showed 
that the contribution of corruption in the wider socio-economic context presents itself through 
facilitation. The public sector due to its design, routine and tradition is driven by corruption 
and corruption is an aspect of the daily life in Lebanon, which given the perplexed situation 
in the country, needs to be preserved. Corruption has been converted to a tool for abuse and 
personal gain, becoming a normative process, which enjoys high levels of tolerance and 
acceptance. 
The most vulnerable social grouping is the financially underprivileged. The poor deal 
with the harshest adversities of corruption as they simply cannot afford to pursue their legal 
rights within their own country. The positive attributes of corruption are counterbalanced by 
the overall corrupt practices within the state which drain the resources and may delay 
development. However, corruption may indeed generate developmental operations within the 
country, whilst at the same time undermining it. The spiral nature of corruption within 
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Lebanon starts from the bottom of the social pyramid and goes all the way to the political and 
economic elites of the country. Also it reinforces the destabilisation of state and economy and 
assists the moral, social and economic disintegration of the country. 
3. Informal Employment and Commerce Sector 
The responses on the third key driver of the informal economy in Lebanon showed that the 
interconnection of the informal employment and commerce sector with corruption renders the 
function in the informal zone evenly exposed to bribes and manipulation on behalf of state 
officials. Also the informal employment and commerce sector is concentrated on a tangible 
and viable option for thousands of underprivileged workers. The workforce surpluses are 
more than likely artificial as there are many skilled and unskilled positions unoccupied but 
they are subjected to the system of favouritism and clientelism that prevails in Lebanon. In 
this respect the informal sector is not the absorbent for the superfluous workers of Lebanon 
but for those who cannot join the formal sector due to various circumstances. 
Additionally, the informal sector may provide wages matching the formal sector and 
due to the tax evasion and the general avoidance of fees, the income may be significantly 
enhanced or preserved on satisfactory levels. Also the informal sector, due to the lower costs, 
may improve productivity and provide employment and commodities at significantly 
affordable prices and provide the means of survival for large segments of the society. 
However, it definitely induces immense strain on the formal employment and commerce 
sector. The retail sector suffers substantial losses and the state loses vast amounts of VAT. 
The lower costs of production seriously affect the competition and the loss of the 
contributions for social welfare eventually burdens the tax payer. The habitual tax evasion 
contributes to the un-businesslike tendencies of many enterprises. 
Also the informal workers have no social insurance or any other legal recognition, while 
they are usually obliged to endure dire working conditions and tolerate exploitative 
behaviours. The informal workforce faces uncertainty regarding the permanence of their 
occupation. The informal sector is a factor that represents a relative convenience for the 
underprivileged social groupings of Lebanon. Also it represents a mechanism for additional 
enrichment of the nouveau riche industrial elites of the country, while the state is at a 
constant loss, despite the economic activity that the informal sector may supplement. 
4. Illegal Networks 
The responses on the fourth key driver of the informal economy in Lebanon presented that 
the beneficial attributes of the illegal networks in most cases have a counterbalancing feature. 
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The economic benefits that stem from the illegal networks are to a certain extent responsible 
for the wide social acceptance they enjoy. In rural areas large segments of the local 
population base their livelihoods on the operations of those networks. 
The gap of the income distribution in Lebanon attracts many underprivileged people 
towards the networks, who view those networks as a means for social advancement or for 
career opportunity. The creation of defeatist views of the public operates as a recruiting 
mechanism for the illegal networks. In other words, the illegal networks constitute a tangible 
choice for employment and indeed provide the means of survival for many. 
The untaxed income the networks offer, potentially enhances the overall economic 
activity in Lebanon, however the losses for the state and consequently for the tax payer and 
the consumer are immeasurable and impossible to be accurately estimated. The social web 
recognises -independently of the degree of approval- significant favourable characteristics in 
the illegal networks as they may provide what the state fails to offer. The advantageous 
characteristics have an element of bias since the beneficial attributes are not horizontal and 
collective. The deep penetration of the state apparatus leaves the state resources vulnerable to 
the raptorial tendencies of the illegal networks. 
The association of the illegal networks with the other three key drivers and their 
remarkable potency in socio-political life renders them extremely powerful and almost 
immune to the efforts of controlling or restraining them. Certain features of the illegal 
networks establish and augment the innate tendencies of the public to defy the laws and the 
regulations of the state. The illegal networks impinge on the economic framework as they 
seriously affect potential investments and may well influence the prices in the market. 
Additionally, the illegal networks also impinge on the social stability as organised crime 
thrives and creates an environment of insecurity and intimidation, enhancing the feelings of 
resentment. Also they may generate an atmosphere of social volatility which if combined 
with the sensitive and fickle economic clauses of the Lebanese market, may provide us with 
an insight on the slow-matched socio-economic breakdown. 
 
The synopsis of the findings regarding the perceptions of the respondents on the informal 
economy as a whole, based on the input of each key driver is presented on the following 
epigrammatic section: 
1. Users/Public Opinion 
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The informal practices are so deeply entrenched into the mindset of the Lebanese society that 
sometimes it is inconceivable to operate otherwise. The majority of the Lebanese society - 
even if it demonstrates considerable disapproval towards the undesirable products of 
informality - acknowledges that the patterns in the social organisation are rather unlikely to 
change if current political and economic trends continue. The general frustration, in the lower 
income social strata, and the lack of positive views for the future is widespread. Also the 
public assumes the levels of abuse and exaggeration of the informal economy may lead to 
economic and social collapse. The informal economy seems to maintain its current modus 
operandi and it seems unlikely that the public will ever avoid the relative conveniences of 
informality. 
The informal economy has the capacity to provide employment under acceptable 
circumstances and satisfactory returns but in many cases the working conditions would be 
appalling working conditions and the workers would be significantly underpaid. Also it is a 
tool for the augmentation of an existing income, whether that income stems from bribing, tax 
evasion or other illegal practices for the beneficiary. However, the public opinion sees no 
accountability in its actions. The majority of the public disagrees with the notion that it was 
coerced to participate in the informal economy. 
The benefits are not horizontal as they only affect a selected network of people each 
time and the socio-economic inequalities are so vivid that they enhance the social and 
sectarian imbalances within the country. Also the informal economy reinforces the lack of the 
rule of law. The public recognises that the informal economy may be a scourge for the 
smooth functioning of the state and the market, but the social concessions that the informal 
economy makes available to the public are enough to offset any non-constructive aspects 
2. Academics 
The academics recognise certain positive aspects in the informal economy, like the 
substitution of various governmental efforts for reconstruction and social services. The 
overall social contribution of the informal economy is marginal but important. They also 
suggest that it contributes to the creation of a smokescreen regarding the economic indicators 
in Lebanon. The beneficial characteristics are by large overestimated as even the few social 
gains are counterbalanced by the tax evasion, lack of legal compliance and the hindrance of 
the sustainable function of the market. 
The penetration of the informal economy into every aspect of the political and 
economic life affects the already challenged democratic institutions in Lebanon. The state 
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suffers from immeasurable loss of taxes and revenue, loses investments, and competition and 
formal productivity are negatively affected. The academics transpose the accountability on 
the governmental weaknesses and on the public as it eternalises the informal practices 
3. Governmental Officials 
The government officials frequently attempt to belittle the transgressions of the government 
or of themselves if they are actually involved in the informal economy. The officials also 
recognised the association of the informal economy for the accomplishment of personal 
goals, the misuse of state funds and grants and the establishment of a clientelistic structure 
throughout the society. They acknowledge the unlawful features of most of the informal 
practices and the backing they offer in the weakening of the law enforcement or law 
obedience throughout the society. The informal economy may affect the smooth and 
competitive operation of the state and the market but on the other hand it fuels the 
functioning operation of the entire state apparatus. 
 However, the complementary nature of the informal economy has an indispensable 
contribution to the social web. As a result of the current conditions in Lebanon the informal 
economy represents a catalyst. The informal economy is an extensive disassociation of the 
socio-economic correctness of the Lebanese people with their socio-economic competence 
and effectiveness. The black market and the informal remittances in the recurrent periods of 
upheaval, respond to the flux needs of the population when the government is unable to 
provide, however it may harm the potential investments, despite the marginal facilitation that 
it may provide. 
4. Summary of the responses on the informal economy in Lebanon 
The informal economy in Lebanon is a catalytic and complimentary mechanism for most of 
the adversities that stem from the complex socio-political situation. The theoretically 
injurious nature of the informal economy represents an indispensable tool for the effective 
juxtaposition of the social and economic insolvency of Lebanon. The informal economy 
contributes to the endurance of the Lebanese society in the face of adversity, however it 
undercuts every beneficial input, as the synchronised burden that imposes on the society and 
economy is unbearable. 
The beneficial characteristics are vastly important and imperative as they support the 
survival of significantly large parts of the society. However the detrimental characteristics 
may undermine the entire state structure and render the whole nation unsheltered and 
desolate. 
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The synopsis of the theoretical framework formulated by the primary and secondary data 
regarding the factors which enable the informal economy in Lebanon is the following: 
1. The systemic factors which pertain to the organised establishments of the state, 
foundations and institutions as well as the conditions of the bureaucratic environment 
as shaped by the governmental course of action, and to the deficit of civil attention 
attributed to the public institutions that serve the population. Those systemic factors 
affect the civic system itself, the market, the economy and the society as whole. The 
systemic factors are divided into two categories. The first category includes the 
problematic normative and rigid structure of the state apparatus and the second 
includes the exploitation of those normative deficits mostly on behalf of the street 
level government officials as well as of the political elites. 
2. The cognitive factors which refer to the mental processes of perception, judgement 
and reasoning of the society, as contrasted with their emotional and their volitional 
behaviours. Those factors deal with the innate social tendency to defy the authority, 
the laws and the regulations of the state. 
3. The criminal factors pertain to the sphere of the disapproved or not permitted -for 
moral or ethical reasons- actions, which as a rule involve crime and illicit 
transactions. The lack of effective appliance of the legislation coupled with 
disorganised governmental and judicial agencies, results in the expansion of the 
criminal factors within the informal economy. 
 
Areas for further research 
Several areas for additional and further research have been identified during the primary and 
secondary data collection process. The following areas for further research are essential for a 
substantial approach to the various problematical issues regarding the role and input of the 
informal economy in the Lebanese state and society. Also there are additional concerns that 
need to be addressed in Lebanon, irrelevant to the overall operation and contribution of the 
informal economy in the country, but vital for a structured improvement of the social and 
economic predicaments associated with the components (key drivers) examined. The 
following areas are decisive for Lebanon: 
1. There is need for a more accurate estimation regarding the population of Lebanon, 
since the possibility for the conduction of a formal census is bleak. Lebanon has a 
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robust middle-class, an expanding nouveau riche upper class and wide low working 
class. The social strata in addition to the sectarian divergences require a proper 
distinction of the social stratification in Lebanon and a more precise estimation for the 
income per capita as the inequalities are more potent than projected in the literature. 
2. The potential that significant amounts of the financial indicators regarding Lebanon‘s 
economic performance and stability are inaccurate is broad. There is a need for a 
proper investigation regarding Lebanon‘s true economic potential, such as the 
possibility that Lebanon may benefit from participation in robust and fair Free Trade 
Agreements (possibly within the region rather than relying on western agreements). 
3. There is need to investigate Lebanon‘s capacity to operate under a strict set of 
regulations and whether that is possible to be applied, as the political inadequacies are 
strongly linked with the informal economy. Also there is need to estimate if such an 
outcome would be workable for Lebanon‘s peculiarities. 
4.  There is need for quantitative research regarding the operation and size of Lebanon‘s 
informal economy. Also a numerical and statistical projection regarding the role of 
the street vendors and the informal production units in the economy and competition 
would be extremely useful. Apparently it is an arduous task, but given the lack of data 
regarding this affair, even an approximate estimation would be constructive and 
valuable. 
5. Also there is need to investigate in depth the micro-economic impact of the informal 
economy in association with prices, inflation and the proper application of the rule of 
law and the underemployment. 
6. Also it is essential that additional research is conducted regarding the cognitive 
characteristics, as described in Chapter 9, of the Lebanese society in association with 
their financial behaviour and their attitude towards authority. 
7. It is also necessary to scrutinise the perceptions of the Lebanese society towards the 
illegal networks and examine the input of those networks with a more direct method. 
Apparently this is rather difficult, it so for me, but given the controversial 
rationalisation of the Lebanese society towards the operation of those networks, 
including Hezbollah, some additional research is necessary. 
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Recommendations 
There are several recommendations that can be made based on the findings and conclusions 
above. I will avoid referring to basic recommendations that are rather intangible and 
farfetched. Of course, it is a complicated process to apply adjustments to countries like 
Lebanon. As mentioned in a previous chapter Lebanon faces mega-problems which require 
macro-solutions. The willingness of the society and of the political elites to substantially deal 
with those problems is debatable.  Nevertheless, there are people who desperately call for a 
considerable amendment of the current situation in Lebanon in association with the informal 
economic activities. The following recommendations are influenced by the principle of 
effectiveness and based on the assumption that the state will not resort to significant and 
potent alterations, as the interests of the political elites are embedded within the informal 
economy. 
1. Stricter application of regulations and laws is ineffective in Lebanon. The government 
should offer luring and attractive incentives to the employment and commerce sector 
to tackle tax evasion and the massive loss of revenue. The incentives should apply to 
the consumers and to the entrepreneurs. The character of the incentives should be 
rewarding. 
2. Lebanon should realise the magnitude of the informal economy in the country and 
utilise its beneficial attributes, and seek to promote legalising the function in a way 
that is agreeable to those that use it. Besides, the Lebanese government never felt 
constrained to apply anti-constitutional regulations in the country that serve particular 
interests. The incorporation of the informal tendencies in the formal framework could 
have positive effects. The legalisation of certain informal or illegal practices may 
facilitate growth and deflate exploitation. 
3. There is need for the state apparatus to operate independently of the political leaders, 
as aspects of the state apparatus is subjected to partiality of the political elites. The 
society should recognise that sectarian and political differences are not constructive 
for their well being, even within the context of the informal economy. 
4. The government should abolish all restrictions for foreign investments, in order to 
eradicate incidents of corruption and rigid bureaucracy. If there is no one to bribe, 
corruption will weaken at least at the lower levels of the state apparatus. The 
lessening of restrictions will result in less complicated procedures and easier and more 
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transparent transactions. However, that alone is not enough to tackle the problems of 
corruption and bureaucracy.  
5. The confiscated contraband should be active tradable merchandise for the state. An 
agency dealing with the promotion of smuggled legalised goods should be created. It 
will protect competition and offer incentives to the appliance of the rule of law. The 
law enforcers also should be entitled to rewards. Besides, it is common to embezzle 
confiscated assets. 
6. Positive economic output does not necessarily require robust regimes but collective 
yearning for improvement. The realisation of the cooperative and collective potential, 
even for a small country like Lebanon may be farfetched, but it could be assisted by 
the sectarian or communal interests, even if it entails deeper societal or sectarian 
divisions. Besides focalisation and centralisation of sectarian concerns is an already 
widespread aspect of the Lebanese society. Although, this suggestion represents a 
viable option, the adjunct implications are unknown and maybe controversial. 
7. Lebanon needs to deal with factors that enable the informal economy. The required 
macro-solutions need serious investments on behalf of the state on education, and the 
methodical creation of a proper functional economic consciousness of the public. The 
public should also acknowledge its vested rights. 
The following section identifies and explores the extent to which the objectives have been 
achieved and further down projects the significance and contribution of the present thesis in 
the wider academic community. 
 
Critical assessment; extent of objectives achievement 
It is undeniable that all studies of this nature have their limitations. Some studies are limited 
due to their design; some others may be constrained by the tools available or by their 
methodology and others simply by the inherent nature of the problem. Certainly this thesis 
due to its controversial nature faced a plethora of problems, especially in the approach and 
the sample and the collection of the primary data. The size of the sample, although relatively 
small in comparison to other studies, given the circumstances and the nature of the research, 
it may be considered adequate. The main constraint for a smaller sample was the validity of 
the data.  I had to verify most of the responses and filter the background of some respondents 
in order to maintain a balance sample as described in Chapter 7.  In the eventuality of 
sacrificing some of the validity and substantiation of the responses, the size of the sample 
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would be undoubtedly larger, as the data collection process would have been much simpler. 
Besides, the analysis of the four key drivers of the informal economy comprised a very 
demanding literature review and an arduous primary data collection, as the sheer size of 
information needed was immense. However, it was impossible to narrow down the key 
drivers or the broadness of the data for a secure determination and accomplishment of the 
aims and objectives of the thesis. 
The primary objective of this thesis was to establish the balance and participation of 
the informal economy into the Lebanese state and society through situational and empirical 
research. The aim was to primarily display the beneficial and detrimental aspects of the 
informal economy for the Lebanese state and population and establish the conceptual 
difficulties of the informal parameters. The literature review coupled with the interviews 
section clarified and projected the conceptual interpretations or misinterpretations of the key 
drivers. The thesis' purpose is to determine if the informal economy in Lebanon functions as 
an accelerator or a decelerator for growth, development, social stability and economic 
sustainability. The use of the situational and empirical data gathered over a period of two 
years through a diverse sample in terms of location, education, employment and income, 
directed the present thesis into the formulation of certain results. Potentially the result did not 
provide a one-sided outcome or an answer with a single perspective. Besides, the implicated 
parties cannot be represented via a monocular outcome. The informal economy is not a black 
or white notion, nor a simply good or bad element. The primary objective of this thesis has 
been fulfilled as it revolves around a comprehensive conception of the informal economy, 
responding to each parameter of the Lebanese state and society. 
The secondary objectives have also been achieved to a satisfactory extent. One of the 
secondary objectives of the research attempted to explore the overall perceptions of the three 
groups of the respondents (users/public opinion, government officials and academics) 
regarding each key drive and the informal economy as a whole. Indeed, all the respondent 
groups provided a diverse and sometimes conflicting view regarding the key drivers and the 
entire informal economy, as shown in the cross tabulation of the responses in Chapter 9. 
Additionally, the theoretical and historical background of the informal economy in Lebanon 
has been adequately examined in the four-fold literature review as well as in Chapter 6 which 
offered the back-casting of the informal economy in the country. The historical context of 
Lebanon‘s informal economy acted as an analytical parameter for the drafting of the 
theoretical conclusions in Chapter 9. 
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Additionally, the thorough and detailed examination of the four key drivers of the 
informal economy provided a sound understanding of the operation of the informal economy 
and its components in a wide spectrum outlook. The division of the literature into theoretical 
and pragmatic approaches facilitated this objective. 
 Also the need to project the interconnection of the key drivers with the state and the 
society has been sufficiently achieved as shown throughout the literature review and the 
primary data. Besides, all the secondary objectives are a prerequisite for the accomplishment 
of the primary objective. Without the substantial input of the secondary objectives, the 
primary ones would not be able to emerge. Possibly, the assessment of the contribution of the 
informal economy in Lebanon on a macroeconomic level suffered the most significant 
omissions, as the majority of the sample lacked the adequate background knowledge on the 
issue. However, circuitously with the assistance of the overall evaluation of the government 
officials‘ responses and of the academics, the impact of the informal economy with emphasis 
on the macroeconomic level has been projected as is evident in the interviews of Chapter 8 
and shown in Chapter 9. Lastly the determination of the theoretical framework on which the 
informal economy expands and fuels its operation was adequately analysed via the loose 
implementation of the grounded theory, and the association of analytical methods of the 
thesis, in Chapter 9. The theorisation of the pro-creators of the informal economy in Lebanon, 
offered an additional theoretical as well as tangible framework, which could enable further 
future recommendations and analysis on the issue. 
 
Contribution of the study 
The notion of the informal economy in the vast majority of the bibliography has been dealt 
with as if it was just one of the four key drivers. Many view corruption or the informal 
employment and commerce sector as the sole agent of the informal economy in a given 
country. However, the informal economy throughout the world is a complex multifaceted 
structure. Informal trade or corruption cannot fully portray the size and the input of the 
informal economy simply because they are just one of the components of the wider system. 
The informal economy required an intrinsic analysis based on theoretical, historical 
and situational grounds. Every chapter displays a logical sequence for the purpose of the 
study. The literature survey projects the secondary material on the four key drivers which 
constitute the informal economy in the international stage. The following chapter, which was 
also based on secondary material, focuses on Lebanon‘s chronological and historical 
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circumstances related to the informal economy in order to project and assist the 
understanding of the country‘s present informal status. It attempts to back-cast the informal 
economy of Lebanon‘s past. 
The methodology chapter explains how the Force Field analysis functions to the 
purpose of the study and how the key drivers were chosen, while the following chapter of the 
interviews projects the views of the primary material in each individual key driver. The 
results chapter evaluates and analyses the components of the informal economy in Lebanon 
and the informal economy as a whole, based on the primary material and secondary material 
of the research as assembled by the analytical method. It is the first time to use an analytical 
method developed in sociology and then developed further by the British government, into a 
thesis related to political and social sciences. This advancement of the study allows the reader 
to obtain simultaneously a holistic and segmental outlook on the informal economy in 
Lebanon and understand the positive and negative aspects of it. 
The role of the informal economy is not adequately understood in the context of 
Lebanon. Its scope, operation and beneficial or detrimental values are yet to be determined. 
The perceptions of the society, the government and of the academia are in a constant flux 
regarding the nature and input of the informal economy in Lebanon. 
This thesis attempts to scrutinise the core and the cortex of the socio-economic 
structure and input of the informal economy in Lebanon. In that perspective the present thesis 
is unparalleled with any other similar research on the field. This research is not inimitable 
only in terms of the analytical tools but also in the classification of the components of the 
informal economy. The wide-scope analysis may also constitute the ground for 
recommendations regarding a broad range of interests in Lebanon, as it depicts all the 
favourable and unfavourable aspects of the informal economy. The research does not attempt 
to denounce or eulogise any informal practice in the country but to provide a balanced and 
impartial outlook on an area which is subjected to manifold preconceived notions, prejudice, 
biases and intimidation. The overall contribution of the thesis is to be found in uniformity and 
independence of the analysis regarding the informal economy in Lebanon. 
 
Conclusion 
The informal economy in Lebanon represents a significant element of economic activity. It is 
a major source of income, employment and social appeasement, although it may be the basis 
for economic destabilisation. Unquestionably it is an amalgam of positive and negative 
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characteristics. The beneficial features, as shown earlier, are vastly important and imperative 
as they support the survival of significantly large parts of the society; however the 
detrimental characteristics may undermine the entire state structure and render the whole 
nation exposed and desolate. The amplitude and omnipresence of the informal economy 
enshroud the state and the society. Therefore the contribution of the informal economy on the 
public or state interest cannot be seen in one dimension only. Some of the negative aspects 
cannot be simply eradicated overnight. It will be complex and arduous process. If the state 
and the society realise Lebanon‘s true potential and supersede the present vicious circle of 
exploitation and abuse, the informal economy will be converted into a purely beneficial trait 
of the country. However, for the time being Lebanon will endure the current problematic 
symbiosis of the antithetical attributes of the informal economy. 
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List of Respondents 
Name of Respondent Occupation Location 
Aisha Faraz Unemployed Beirut 
Aisha Haidar Mini Market Assistant Beirut 
Alekos Karahalios Trucker Athens 
Ali Hadi Lawyer Athens/Beirut 
Ali? Stevedore/Docker Beirut 
Aliona Pehackova Waitress/Entertainer Beirut 
Amber Snyder - - (facebook contact) 
Ammar Jayyousi Mini Market Assistant London 
Amy Zalman Political Scientist London 
Aya Naji-Anderson Activist/Researcher ? 
Bahij Baroudi Kiosk Assistant Athens 
Barry Commons Trucker Plymouth 
Catherine Harrison Strategic Analyst (MoD) London 
Charbel El Khouri Musician Beirut 
Charbel Fadel Mini Market Assistant Athens 
Dany Faraz ALS  Shipping Co. 
Superintended  
Athens 
Dimitris Alexakis Mariner (Captain Retired) Athens 
Dimitris Magoulas Trucker Athens 
Eliad Vanounou Internet Cafe Assistant London 
Emile Gazal Stevedore Beirut 
Fara Al Masri Student Beirut 
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Farrah Shallalah Waitress London 
Frago Kourandi Economist (Economic 
University of Athens) 
Athens 
George Mansour Human Rights Watch 
Researcher 
? 
George Pavlopoulos Economist (Economic 
University of Athens) 
Athens 
Haidar Ismail Unemployed Athens 
Haifa Wahby Clothes Shop Assistant Beirut 
Hannah Charkour Greek Arab Chamber of 
Commerce Employee 
Athens 
Ian Nicholson Strategic Analyst (Mod) London 
Ibrahim Khlel Economist  Athens/Beirut 
Jad Daoud Retired Senior Manager Athens 
Jim Anastasopoulos Criminologist Athens/London 
Katerina Anevlavi-Osman Teacher Athens 
Lenora Faraz Unemployed Beirut 
Mahmoud ? Builder Athens 
Mahmoud Ramadan Greengrocer (street vendor) Beirut 
Mariana Ibrahim Student Beirut 
Maroun Mssallem Souvenir Shop Owner Beirut 
Mohamad ? Kebab Shop Assistant London 
Mohamad Alaiti Trucker Beirut 
Mohamad Hamzeh Docker Beirut 
Mohamad Khanji Mini Market Assistant Athens 
Mohamad Sidawi Docker Beirut 
Mohd Zulqarnain Waiter Beirut 
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Myrna - Student Beirut 
Nasif Samhat Telephone Center Employee Athens 
Nikos Sakkos Greek Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Cultural Attaché in 
Lebanon) 
Athens/Beirut 
Rami Rouhana Shop Owner Beirut 
Rawad Srour Shop Owner/Public Servant Beirut 
Rayan Keirouz Waiter  Beirut 
Ribael Otaki Clothes Shop Assistant Beirut 
Rita Kouri Nanny Athens 
Sabine El Harouni Anthopologist/Sociologist London/Beirut 
Samira -  Clothes/Shoes Shop Assistant Beirut 
Simon Melkonian Restaurant Owner Beirut 
Stephanie Aoun Public Servant Beirut 
Stephanos Dokos Trucker Athens 
Tamra Pelleman Teacher Athens 
Teresa Chakem Nurse Beirut 
Toufik Chami Student Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent A Street Vendor Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent B Street Vendor Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent C Street Vendor Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent D Bystander in Cherry Club Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent E Bystander in Cherry Club Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent F Student Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent F Doctor Athens 
Unnamed Respondent G Nurse Beirut 
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Unnamed Respondent H Doctor Athens 
Unnamed Respondent I Facilitator/Ministry of 
Transportation 
Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent K Waiter London 
Unnamed Respondent L Public Servant Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent M Public Servant Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent N Bar Owner Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent O Programmer Athens 
Unnamed Respondent P Beirut Port Official Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent Q - Nablus/Athens 
Unnamed Respondent R Delivery Driver Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent S Taxi Driver Damascus 
Unnamed Respondent T Sales Representative Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent U Public Servant Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent W Businessman Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent X Doctor Beirut 
Unnamed Respondent Y Public Servant Beirut 
Wassim El-Maoed Telephone Center Employee Athens 
Yasmine Sabba Seamstress Beirut 
Yoni Zabari Constructions Worker Athens 
Youssef Maard Stevedore Beirut 
Youssef Osman Chartered Accountant Beirut 
Zaki Avedikian Waiter Beirut 
Ziad Mustafa  Builder Athens 
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Also there are 12 unidentified respondents who were unable to provide any information 
regarding their status due to the casual approach of the various interviews mostly 
in the streets of Beirut 
